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Abstract
The 2007-2008 global financial turmoil is the most severe crisis since the Great Depres-
sion. Starting with the sub-prime defaults in the United States, it quickly spills over into
other markets leading to the collapses of many financial institutions, worldwide banks bailouts,
downturns in asset prices and also to sovereign debt crises. The aim of this thesis is to empiri-
cally investigate the repercussions of this financial crisis on interbank market and sovereign risk.
In Chapter one, we empirically explore the effect of bank lending relationships in the in-
terbank market. We use data from the e-MID market that represents the only transparent
electronic platform in Europe and the United States, unaffected by search costs and other
fictions. We show that stable relationships exist and that they play a significant role during
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Trading with preferred counterparts is associated with more
favorable rates for both lenders and borrowers, and carries larger trading volumes. The results
point to a peer monitoring role of relationship lending, which contributes, at a time of financial
distress, to a smooth liquidity redistribution among banks. Relationship lending thus plays an
important positive role for financial stability.
Chapter two investigates the role of banks’ network centrality in the interbank market on
their funding rates. Specifically we analyze transaction data from the e-MID market, over
the 2006-2009 period, which encompasses the global financial crisis. We show that interbank
spreads are significantly affected by both local and global measures of connectedness. The
effects of network centrality increased as the financial crisis evolved. Local measures show that
having more links increases borrowing costs for borrowers and reduces premia for lenders. For
global network centrality, borrowers receive a significant discount if they increase their interme-
diation activity and become more central, while lenders pay in general a premium (i.e. receive
lower rates) for centrality. This provides evidence of the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ hypothesis.
ix
Chapter three draws attention to the effect of monetary policies and international linkages
on European countries sovereign risks. Using a Global VAR method that allows for interdepen-
dencies across individual variables within and across units, we model government bond credit
default swaps (CDS) relative to Germany by domestic, global, monetary and weighted foreign
variables, where weights are calculated based on the countries’ fiscal positions. We find evidence
of positive correlation between sovereign bond CDS and risk aversion for almost all countries
in the eurozone. When the European Central Bank (ECB) increases the refinancing rate, we
observe an increase in risk of sovereign bonds of all countries due to negative environment in
Euro area. A decline in money aggregate (M3) leads to all countries becoming more fragile,
hence increasing sovereign risk. The shocks that stem from monetary policy changes (i.e. an
increase in ECB refinancing rate) causes a rise in sovereign risk due to sensitivity to crisis and
uncertainty in Euro area. In contrast, monetary policies have an opposite impact on Greece
due to its relative worse performance.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
2007-2008 was a turning point in the history of capital markets with one of the
most impactful turmoils affecting governments, regulators, financial institutions,
investors and others. Originating in the United States (US) with the downward
spiral in the real estate linked instruments, it quickly spread into all segments of
financial markets. Consequent events gradually impacted on all economic activities
and opened the gateway to global recession as well as European debt crisis, especially
in Portugal, Ireland and Greece. This uncertainty caused significant disruptions and
continued to threat foundational and stable pillars of the financial ecosystem.
Macro factors, financial factors and banking misapplications are the main fac-
tors that led to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Firstly, macro factors consist of three
primary drivers including monetary expansion and the housing boom in the US
market, banks offering loans to high risk borrowers and high indebtedness of the US
households. Secondly, financial factors included the introduction of new structured
finance instruments, insufficient capabilities and regulations in credit risk assessment
and increase in the number of hedge funds. Finally, banking misapplications con-
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tributed to the crisis with two main drivers. One of them was that banks followed an
“Originate and Distribute” model which allowed them to repackage collateral and
associated risk to other investors, not assuming any liability on the bank’s balance
sheets. The other driver was that financing loans with short-term maturities lead-
ing to maturity misalignment and eventually funding liquidity risk (Brunnermeier,
2009).
These common factors initially lead to defaults in subprime mortgages in early
2007, followed by a steep decrease in the mortgage credit default swap index. By
the middle of 2007, two highly exposed hedge funds of Bear Sterns took a hit from
subprime mortgage backed securities and confronted large margin calls. In the
following months, high leverage of financial institutions along with a decline in
house prices led the markets to asset price booms and a credit bubble.
Unsuprisingly, vulnerabilities quickly spread and spilt over into other asset types.
Commercial banks also realized their share of impact along with mortgage lenders
and investment banks. Through this period, the impact on the financial industry
was observed on three critical points in August 2007, December 2007 and then in
March 2008. Soon after, the elevated credit risk transformed into counterparty
and liquidity risk. Especially following the white flag from Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, counterparty risk continued to climb and all market participants
were under pressure with significant liquidity concerns.
Until the start of events leading to global crisis in the US, Eurozone money
markets demonstrated strong performance with stable interest rates. The markets
in Eurozone were highly liquid and characterized with low volatility and associated
risk premiums. However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis had significant implications
for the European interbank market. By the end of September 2008, spreads surged
to unforeseen levels with high volume of funds sitting idle at the European Central
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Bank (ECB). With Lehman Brothers collapse leading to further lack of trust in the
markets, financial institutions deposited and aimed to secure large sums at ECB,
despite the lending opportunities and business growth potential in the interbank
market. In the last quarter of 2008, asymmetric data on counterparty risk along
with the rise in liquidity risk adversely affected the functioning of interbank market.
Even the unprecedented increase in the liquidity provision from central banks did not
help the situation. Consequently, the relationship between the banks and the banks’
position in the interbank network emerged as a key determinants of borrowing cost,
attracting wide interest in the topic.
The domino effect continued within Europe and the 2007-2008 financial crisis
eventually lead to global recession and causing the Greece debt crisis. In 2012,
sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) markets experienced high levels of disruptions
causing a major concern to the stability of government risks. The debt crisis in
Greece drew attention to the sovereign bond spreads and interdependence of each
country’s risk in Eurozone.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the repercussions of the 2007-2008 crisis
on the interbank market and 2012 Greece debt crisis on European sovereign risk,
and to provide empirical evidence on the changes in the pricing of interbank deposits
and government CDS before, during and after respective crisis.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research has the following objectives
• To examine the effect and evolution of lending relationship on the interbank
interest rate before, during and after 2007-2008 financial crisis.
• To analyze the stability of relationship during this period.
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• To explore how interbank market rates are affected by the position of both
bank and counterparty in the network.
• To offer an analysis on whether local and global network centralities have
different impact on funding rates.
• To extend the literature by exploring effect of position of bank in the trade
(aggressor/quoter) on borrowing cost.
• To analyze the effect of ECB monetary shocks on the CDS markets controlling
by local factors (fiscal fundamentals and growth), global world factors (mar-
ket’s appetite for risk) in order to model contagion of country risk on the Euro
area.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This introductory chapter gives background information about the relevant topics
of the thesis and marks the importance of this thesis. Chapter 2 investigates the
effect of bank lending relationship in the interbank market before, during and after
the 2007-2008 financial crisis with the aim of detecting early warning indicators
of distress in the financial sector. Chapter 3 examines the importance of bank’s
position in the network in the interbank market and their funding rates. Chapter
4 focuses on European Sovereign risk in order to detect international linkage and
interdependence of country risk during Greece debt crisis. The last chapter presents
the main conclusions of this study as well as some suggestions for future research.
4
Chapter 2
The role of bank relationships in the interbank market
2.1 Introduction
Financial markets have been under extreme pressure since the start of the financial
crisis late in 2007. Many components of the global economy and financial structure,
from bond and share prices to money markets and foreign exchanges were affected
by the market conditions following the turmoil. Among the areas affected, the
money market stands out as a crucial element as it supports the implementation
of monetary policy and stable borrowing conditions for the financial sector, other
corporations and individuals. Within the interbank market, which covers maturities
from one day to one year, the overnight (O/N) segment is of particular interest
because the O/N interest rates are directly affected by rules and practices governing
the refinancing operations run by the European Central Bank (ECB). This is the
segment of the money market where credit institutions look to mitigate any risk that
may emerge from short-term liquidity shocks and to ensure the trading day is closed
with healthy liquidity positions. The interbank market is a significant element due to
the fact that the O/N rates are determined in this market. Furthermore, interbank
markets are central hubs for complex institutional networks, connecting all financial
5
organizations in the banking industry (Iori et al., 2008; Fricke and Lux, 2015a,
2015b).
During the crisis, increased uncertainty about counterparty credit risk led banks
to hoard liquidity rather than making it available in the interbank market. Money
markets in most developed countries almost came to a freeze and banks were forced
to borrow from Central Banks. Nonetheless there is growing empirical evidence
that banks that had established long term interbank relationships had better access
to liquidity, both before and during the crisis (Furfine, 2001; Cocco et al., 2009;
Affinito, 2012; Liedorp et al. 2010, and Brauning and Fecht, 2012). Overall, these
studies have shown that banks build stable relationships over time and benefit from
more favorable rates when trading with their preferred counterparties. This evidence
suggests that, particularly at a time of deteriorating trust towards credit rating agen-
cies, private information acquired through repeated transactions plays an important
role in mitigating asymmetric information about a borrower’s creditworthiness and
can ease liquidity redistribution among banks. The markets analyzed in the above
studies have a distinct over-the-counter (OTC) structure (Furfine, 1999, looked at
the U.S. interbank market, Cocco et al., 2009, at the Portuguese, Affinito, 2012, at
the Italian, Liedorp et al., 2010, at the Dutch, and Brauning and Fecht, 2012, at the
German ones). Traders in OTC markets actively search for counterparties. When
counterparties meet, they negotiate terms privately, often ignoring prices available
from other potential counterparties and with limited knowledge about trades re-
cently negotiated elsewhere in the market. As suggested by Duffie et al. (2005)
banks may form relationships in OTC markets to avoid costly counterparty search
under asymmetric information about the liquidity shocks of other banks. Brauning
and Fecht (2012) for example reports that in the run-up to the 2007-2008 finan-
cial crisis relationship lenders charged higher interest rates to their borrowers. The
6
liquidity insurance premium paid for the relationship supports, at this time, the
argument of Duffie et al. (2005).
The main goal of our paper is to explore the existence of stable trading rela-
tionships, before, during and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, in an electronic
and transparent venue such as the e-MID. The e-MID stands out as the only fully
transparent trading system in Europe and the USA, with ’buy’ and ’sell’ proposals
available on screens of the trading platform, along with the identity of the banks
quoting them. Information on the terms (prices and amounts) of executed trades
are available to banks in real time. Search frictions, thus, should not affect the
matching process in the e-MID market. Furthermore lack of information on rates
offered by alternative lenders cannot be responsible for the observed cross sectional
dispersion of O/N rates in this market. In a perfectly transparent market there is
little scope for relationship lending, unless private information, acquired through
repeated transactions, is valuable in mitigating asymmetric information about a
counterpart creditworthiness. Our objective is thus to disentangle search frictions
from information effects as the determinant of relationship lending in the interbank
market.
For our analysis we represent the market as a network consisting of nodes (banks)
and a time-varying number of, weighted and directed, links between them (repre-
senting interbank loans). The direction of the links follow the flow of money (from
lenders to borrowers) and the weights are given by the number of loans exchanged by
each pair, over a given period of time. Two banks can be connected by two links, one
in each direction, if they both act as lenders and borrowers. As a proxy of strength
for a pair relationship we use, as detailed in section 4.4, a measure of concentration
of lending and borrowing activity. Our main two relationship variables, defined as
LPI and BPI for lending and borrowing preference indexes, respectively, are con-
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structed within this network framework. We evaluate if changes in these relationship
measures within a given bank-pair, across time, affects spreads and volumes.
Banks can engage in liquidity trades in other OTC market, but these transac-
tions are not observed in the e-MID data set. In this sense, our LPI and BPI are
local measures, they capture lending and borrowing relationships within the e-MID
market only, and not a global measure, as they do not take into account lending
and borrowing transactions happening simultaneously in the OTC market. How-
ever, we do not claim that relationships are only built within the e-MID market or
that these “cause” spreads or volumes. Feedback effects between relationships and
prices are possible, with relationships leading to better prices and more favorable
prices reinforcing relationships. This feedback loop makes it difficult to establish
the causality of the effect. We find nonetheless weak evidence showing that such
feedback effects are small and they may not be the main drivers of our relationship
effects. Spreads do not determine survival of a bank pair into the following months
once relationship indexes are controlled for, while relationship lending has an effect
on spreads (and volumes) that is robust to potential survivorship bias. Previous
studies (see Hatzopoulos et al., 2015) have show that, when controlling for banks
heterogeneity in trading activity, the matching process in the e-MID market is fairly
random. This suggests that links are not preferentially formed with banks that offer
lower rates or that are more trustworthy. Rather banks appear to be more likely to
selected as trading partners because they trade more often. This points to a causal
effect of relationship on prices rather than the other way around. In this paper we
do not model the entry and exit decisions of banks and their matching patterns.
What we show is that relationships, once formed, possibly at random, persists and
are important for explaining spreads and volumes and can play an important role
also within a transparent market such as the e-MID.
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The identity of the banks trading in the e-MID is unknown to us and replaced by
a unique identifier in our dataset. This makes it impossible to match e-MID trading
data with balance sheet or other banks’ specific data. Other studies (see Angelini
et al., 2011) have shown that banks characteristics such as credit ratings, capital
ratios, or profitability remained roughly unchanged during the pre-crisis and crisis
period. Neither borrower and lender liquidity nor their shortage of capital correlate
with e-MID market spreads in Angelini et al. (2011) study. Of course, since credit
ratings lost credibility as the crisis unfolded we do not know if banks used rating
agencies’ scores to inform their choices of counterparty. Neither we know what other
private or public information was available to banks. For this reason in our analysis
we use a panel data model with fixed-effects at the pair-level. Therefore, unobserved
characteristics of pairs, as long as they remain “fixed” for all periods are controlled
for by pair-level dummy variables.
While the e-MID market is not affected by search frictions and lack of trans-
parency, trading in the electronic segment of the interbank market is affected by its
own specific micro-structure features. Gabbi et al. (2012) have shown that due to
a bid-ask spread effect, better rates are obtained, both by lenders and borrowers,
when they act as quoters rather than as aggressors. A credit institution that first
comes to the market with a proposal to lend or borrow is called quoter, while the
bank that picks a quote and exercises a proposal is called aggressor. Aggressors,
by choosing their counterparts, may have more power than quoters in a pair rela-
tionship. Thus we control for variations in rates that are explained by the bid-ask
spread effect by separately studying quoters and aggressors.
Our analysis show that trust, reflected both by strong preferential relationships
and existence of long maturity exposures, facilitated the trade of large O/N volumes
after the crisis and the redistribution of liquidity. Stable relationships were formed in
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the e-MID market and survived throughout the financial crisis. Relationship lending
is associated with better interest rates for both lenders and borrowers, and carries
larger volumes. The effect is stronger when the lender is the aggressor, as one would
expect given that the lenders are exposed to credit risk. Thus information acquired
through repeated interaction is valuable in the e-MID platform and, given the ab-
sence of search costs in this venue, points to a peer monitoring role of relationship
lending. We also show that the existence of long term maturity trading between
banks increases willingness of building relationship and is positively correlated with
the amount of a transaction, during and after the crisis, but also positively cor-
related with spreads after Lehman’s default. Overall this picture suggests that a
borrower who has long term exposure to a lender benefits from being able to access
larger volumes in the O/N market, but pays a premium for O/N transactions after
the Lehman’s bankruptcy, as the lender can exploit its position of power over the
borrower at this time.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 covers key notes
in literature. Section 2.3 explains how the interbank market operates with specific
focus on the e-MID platform. Section 4.4 describes the data and methodology.
Section 3.5 presents and discusses regression analysis. Section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
One of the first papers studying the relationship driven behavior amongst mar-
ket participants is Petersen and Rajan (1994) who show that borrowers benefit by
maintaining a relationship with a single or small number of banks. Early papers on
interbank markets focus on the existence of lending relationships in the US Federal
Funds markets (Furfine, 1999, 2001). Furfine (1999) shows that larger institutions
tend to have a high number of counterparties and Furfine (2001) finds that bank-
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ing relationships have important effects on borrowing costs and longer relationship
decreases the interest rate in the funds market. Cocco et al. (2009) analyze bank
pairs loans using quarterly data from the Portuguese interbank market over the pe-
riod 1997-2001. This article shows that small banks acting as borrowers are more
likely to rely on lending relationship than larger banks. The authors interpret this
finding as an indication that small banks try to avoid in this way the cost of peer-
monitoring. They also show that both lenders and borrowers achieve more favorable
rates when they establish strong relationship with their counterparts. Affinito (2012)
uses monthly data from Italy, over 11 years, to analyze interbank customer relation-
ships. His findings are that stable relationships exist and remained strong during
the financial crisis. Liedorp et al. (2010) examine bank to bank relationships in
the Dutch interbank market to test whether market participants affect each other
riskiness through such connections. They show that larger dependence on interbank
market increases risk, but banks can reduce their risk by borrowing from stable
neighbors. Brauning and Fecht (2012) use Furfine algorithm to identify and extract
O/N loans from the German TARGET payment system. They show that lenders
anticipated the financial crisis by charging higher interest rates in the run-up to the
crisis. By contrast, when the sub-prime crisis kicked in, lenders gave a discount to
their close borrowers, thus pointing to a peer monitoring role of relationship lending
in the German market.
There is a wide range of studies in the interbank market literature that inves-
tigate how the cross sectional dispersion in borrowing rates may relate, in addition
to relationship lending, to bank specific characteristics such as their size. Allen and
Saunders (1986) and Furfine (2001) show that interest rates and tiering in the US
Federal Funds market favor big banks as opposed to smaller ones. Angelini et al.
(2011) and Gabrieli (2011, 2012) work with e-MID transactions data to analyze the
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effect of the latest financial crisis on key determinants of interest rate spreads. The
study of Angelini et al. (2011) focuses on maturities from one week to one year
and finds that the biggest banks have access to more favorable funding conditions
than smaller participants of the interbank market. A different conclusion, for the
O/N segment, is found in Gabrieli (2011, 2012) whose findings, for the period fol-
lowing Lehman’s bankruptcy, indicate that foreign banks borrowed at higher rates
than Italian banks, and that small/medium banks (mostly Italian) benefited from a
discount after the Lehman’s collapse. While these two papers are similar to ours, in
scope and dataset employed, neither of the two has looked at the role of relationship
lending as a determinant of cross-sectional spreads.
Another key determinant of O/N rates is the time of a transaction. While
Angelini (2000) using hourly e-MID data shows no intraday pattern of interest rates,
Baglioni and Monticini (2008) and Gabbi et al. (2012) find a decreasing trend in
the O/N rate as the trading day progresses. The intraday slope becomes more
pronounced with the financial crisis and, in particular, after the Lehman Brother
collapse. The intraday term structure of interest rate is due to the maturity of O/N
deposits which are expected to be reimbursed at 9 am of the day following the trade.
The increase in the slope of the yield curve after the default of Lehman apparently
creates a risk-free profit opportunity. Baglioni and Monticini (2008) suggest that
this opportunity is not arbitraged away for two main reasons: uncertainty about
availability of liquidity late in the afternoon and an increase in the implicit cost of
collaterals.
Hatzopoulos et al. (2015) have investigated the matching mechanism between
lenders and borrowers in the e-MID market and its evolution over time. They
show that, when controlling for bank heterogeneity, the matching mechanism is
fairly random. Specifically, when taking a lender who makes l transactions over a
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given period of time and a borrower who makes b transaction over the same period,
and such that they have m trades in common over that period, Hatzopoulos et al.
(2015) show that m is consistent with a random matching hypothesis for almost
all lender/borrower pairs. Even though matches that occur more often than those
consistent with a random null model (which they call over expressed links) exist and
increase in number during the crisis, neither lenders nor borrowers systematically
present several over expressed links at the same time. The picture that emerges from
their study is that banks are more likely to be chosen as trading partners because
they trade more often and not because they are more attractive in some dimension
(such as their financial healthiness).
A potential issue when working with e-MID data is that of a selection bias follow-
ing the drop in the number of trading banks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Since the e-MID is a transparent platform, banks may decide not to post any bid on
the e-MID market to avoid a reputation effect (i.e. a borrower posting the urgent
need for funds). More specifically, it might be the case that after the occurrence of
the financial crisis only banks with sound financial conditions would remain trading
in the e-MID market, whereas troubled banks would search for alternative ways of
obtaining financing in more opaque OTC markets. Other authors, such as Heider,
Hoerova, and Holthausen (2015), have suggested that the bias may affect interbank
lending in the opposite direction, that is, with the more creditworthy participants
leaving the market and the remaining banks facing higher interbank rates due to ad-
verse selection. Empirical evidence does not support the existence of this potential
bias in either direction. Angelini et al. (2011) show that banks characteristic such
as credit ratings, capital ratios, or profitability remained roughly unchanged during
the pre-crisis and crisis periods or improved slightly. Neither borrower and lender
liquidity nor their shortage of capital correlated with spreads in their study. They
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address the potential self-selection problem on longer maturity loans in the e-MID
market but conclude that these type of distortions did not influence their empiri-
cal findings. More recently, Iori, Kapar and Olmo (2015b) reject an overwhelming
presence of survivorship bias in their analysis of the overnight segment of the e-MID
market. While they find some effect during the early periods of the financial crisis
(where banks that dropped had obtained, in the preceding periods, higher borrowing
rates than those banks that remained in the market) they do not find statistically
significant differences in funding rates between dropping and surviving banks after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
2.3 Interbank market and e-MID
Credit institutions have two main alternatives to deal with liquidity shocks and
meet their liquidity needs in the short term. The first option is recurring to the
Central Bank refinancing operations against posting of collaterals. This channel
usually provides banks with the majority of the liquidity they require. In addition
credit institutions can access unsecured money market to meet their short-term
liquidity needs and to ensure that the trading day is closed with a balanced position.
According to a 2007 ECB survey, the overnight segment accounts for about 70% the
unsecured money market.
The O/N market is directly affected by the Eurosystem’s operational framework,
which is enforced by the ECB for the implementation of its monetary policy. The
operational framework of the Eurosystem consists of the following set of instruments:
open market operations, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements for
credit institutions. With the help of its open market operations, the Eurosystem
controls interest rates and manages liquidity in the money market. These include
the main refinancing operations, longer-term refinancing operations as well as fine-
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tuning and structural operations. Standing facilities aim to provide and absorb O/N
liquidity. Two standing facilities, administered in a decentralised way by national
Central Banks, are available to eligible counterparties: marginal lending facility and
deposit facility. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility normally provides
a ceiling for the O/N market interest rate while the interest rate on the deposit
facility normally provides a floor. Credit institutions are required to hold minimum
reserves over a specific period of time which allows the operational framework to
stabilize money market interest rates and create a structural liquidity storage. This
period of time in which credit institutions have to comply with the minimum reserve
requirements is called the reserve maintenance period, and is usually equivalent to
one calendar month.
The largest proportion of unsecured credit transactions takes place OTC and
data of the trades can only be inferred from the payment system such as in Furfine
(1999). Nonetheless two benchmarks for the money and capital markets in the Euro
zone have been introduced. One is the Euro O/N Index Average (Eonia) computed,
by the ECB, as the weighted average of all uncollateralized O/N lending transactions
in the interbank market in Euros undertaken by a panel of banks, and published,
through Thomson Reuters, every day before 7pm CET. The panel of contributing
banks currently consists of 35 contributors. The other is Euribor, the rate at which
Euro interbank term deposits are offered by one prime bank to another prime bank
within the EMU zone. As of 1 June 2013, the Eonia and Euribor respective panels
of contributing banks have been differentiated.
The e-MID market represents the only exception to OTC trading in Europe
and USA, by providing an electronic platform for interbank deposits. Founded in
1990 for Italian Lira transactions it became denominated in Euros in 1999. The
e-MID currently facilitates transactions in multiple currencies including Euro, US
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Dollar and GBP. Participation of foreign banks fast increased since the opening
of the market and just before the crisis the foreign banks shared, almost equally,
the market with the Italian banks. In 2007 there were 246 participants from 16
EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France,
United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
and Portugal. According to the ECB the e-MID accounted, before the crisis, for
17% of total turnover in unsecured money market in the Euro area.
The e-MID provides a transparent platform where all parties can monitor in
real time the evolution of traded rates. Trades are public in terms of maturity,
rate, volume, and time. A credit institution that comes to the market first with a
proposal to lend or borrow is called the quoter. Quotes are visible to all market
participants on their terminal screens. Banks can choose which quote to accept. A
bank that picks a quote and exercise a proposal is called the aggressor. While the
identity of the quoting bank is also usually public (the quoter can choose to post a
trade anonymously but this option is rarely used) the identity of the aggressor can
only be disclosed by a quoter during the negotiation phase. Within a trade, both
aggressor and quoter have the right to negotiate volume and rate and the right to
reject a trade after knowing the identity of the counterpart.
An important advantage of the e-MID is that interest rates reflect actual trans-
actions, and therefore they are isolated from distortions impacting offered rates,
such as Libor and Euribor. Also, the limited number of data points captured by the
Eonia makes it unsuitable for studies on relationship lending. On the other side,
entry or exit of banks from the e-MID platform is driven by endogenous decisions
and may lead to a self selection bias (see Gabbi et al., 2012, for a recent analysis of
this point). For this reason we limit the analysis to the banks that traded actively
on the electronic platform in the period under study.
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2.4 Data and econometric modelling
2.4.1 Data
The dataset used for this paper includes tick-by-tick data of the e-MID from 5
June 2006 to 7 December 2009. Our time structure consists of maintenance periods,
usually four weeks. These periods correspond to a specific component of a regulatory
framework where ECB mandates a bank to maintain a certain amount of its short
term liabilities on its central bank account. We have 42 maintenance periods.1 We
also consider three sub-samples according to the evolution of the financial crisis:
Period Description Key date Maintenance periods
5-Jun-06 - 7-Aug-07 Before Crisis Two Bear Stearns’ hedge fund bankruptcy 14
(31-Jul-07)
8-Aug-07 - 7-Oct-08 During Crisis Lehman Brother’s collapse 14
(15-Sep-08)
8-Oct-08 - 7-Dec-09 After Crisis - 14
We have detailed information about each transaction; time, trading volume,
maturity, interest rate, the side of the transaction (buy/sell) and the code (but not
the identity) of the banks acting as quoter and aggressor, country of origin and size
of both parties (for the Italian banks only). The interest rate is expressed as annual
rate and the volume of the transaction is provided in millions of Euros. The e-MID
market includes contracts with maturities varying from one day to one year. We
restrict our analysis to O/N and O/N long2, which consists of more than 90% of
all e-MID transactions as the interbank market is mainly a market for short-term
1Besides the mandate to meet reserve requirements, banks are also required to avoid negative
balance on any day. Therefore the market activity increases towards the last days of the reserve
maintenance period with noticeable rise in the number of transactions, bank pairs and volatility
of the interest rates. As a consequence, the interbank market is mostly dominated by reserve
management activities of banks (Gaspar et al., 2008; Cassola et al., 2010).
2This refers to contracts when there is more than one day between two consecutive business
days.
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trades. If loans with longer maturities were included in the dataset, it would be
difficult to derive a representative interest rate for the market as longer term loans
tend to be infrequent.
In our study, we restrict our analysis to banks that actively participate in the
interbank O/N market for all periods before, during and after the financial crisis of
2008. This is done for avoiding potential selection bias in our analysis, although at
the price that our results are only valid conditional on active participation. With
this approach we aim to exclude banks that leave the market for any reason, as
well as banks that enter the market within the same period. Then we only consider
banks that have at least one transaction in each sub-period (i.e. before, during and
after crisis). As a result of this data trimming for entering and exiting banks, the
number of banks during the period analyzed decreases from 200 to 140.
Our unit of analysis is not the individual bank but a pair of banks, that is,
lender and borrower. We consider pairs when lender and borrower have more than
one transaction in a given period. Finally, we construct two subsamples of bank
pairs depending on the nature of the e-MID transaction. These are when lender
is aggressor (LiA) and when borrower is aggressor (BiA). As shown in figure 2.1,
the number of bank pairs in a month range from 1000 to 2000 when lender is
aggressor, but the number decreases to a range between 400 and 1000 when borrower
is aggressor. The same pattern (approx. 1:2.5) is also observed for the number
of transactions. This is expected because borrowers are those in need of funds,
hence their quotes dominate the market activity on most days. Although there is a
remarkable decrease in the number of pairs after Lehman’s bankruptcy, the average
number of transaction for pairs increased for active pairs where lenders participate
as aggressors. Average volume for each transaction of pair decreases from June 2006
through to December 2009 with a sharp fall in the last quarter of 2008.
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Figure 2.1: Descriptive analysis for bank pairs
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2.4.2 Variable definitions
2.4.2.1 Interbank rate spread and trading volume
In this study we calculate the monthly volume weighted average rate for each bank
pair considering the reserve maintenance period announced by ECB. Consider banks
i and j. The spread for each ij pair of banks for period t is calculated as
Sij,t =
1
∑Nij,t
n=1 Vij,n
Nij,t∑
n=1
(rij,n − r¯
d
m)× Vij,n, (2.1)
where rij,n and Vij,n are the transaction level interest rate and volume, respectively,
of transaction n for pair ij, i 6= j, Nij,t is the number of transactions for the bank
pair ij at maintenance period t, and r¯dm is the daily volume weighted average rate
over all transactions carried out by the bank pairs in a given day the transaction n
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Figure 2.2: Daily O/N spread aggregated within maintenance periods
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corresponds to, which is calculated as
r¯dm =
∑
j=1
∑
i=1
∑Nij,d
n=1 rij,n × Vij,n
∑
j=1
∑
i=1
∑Nij,d
n=1 Vij,n
, (2.2)
where Nij,d is the number of transactions for the bank pair ij at day d.
As shown in figure 2.2, the variation in the spread increases during crisis and
has its peak when Lehman Brothers collapsed. Being a quoter is more beneficial
for both lender and borrowers. We also run t-tests to compare the mean spread
for both datasets, for each sub-period and for all pooled periods, and the results
show significant differences for aggressors and quoters. We believe that the reason
is that the quoter bank is the one which defines the volume/amount and interest
rate of transactions in the first place, and therefore, they have more power than the
aggressor in determining the interbank rate, although both parties have a right to
negotiate.
We also investigate the determinants of trading volume, which is a key determi-
nant of liquidity in the interbank market. In order to make total trading volume of
transactions for a given pair comparable across periods, we divide aggregated pair
volume within a period by total transaction volume in that period. This variable is
defined as VN (for volume-normalized) and allows us to capture the importance of
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Figure 2.3: Aggregated trading volume-normalized within maintenance periods
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bank pair for flow of funds in the interbank market. This is calculated as
VNij,t =
∑Nij,t
n=1 Vij,n∑
h=1
∑
k=1
∑Nhk,t
n=1 Vhk,n
. (2.3)
Figure 2.3 presents average and percentiles of monthly transaction normalized
volume for both datasets. There are three interesting facts to highlight. First, there
is an increasing trend in both datasets. Second, the variation in volume-normalized
increases after the 2008 financial turmoil. Third, the average market share of pair
is higher when lender is quoter. The reason behind this might be that borrowers
are reluctant to quote a loan in the market in high volumes as there is a potential
reputation and credit risk effects.
2.4.2.2 Lending relationship variables
With the 2007 crisis, banks struggled to re-built a trust environment within the
interbank market. Our hypothesis is that, while banks were able to screen their
potential counterparts on the e-MID system, they were reluctant to have an extra
cost for intelligence on each peer’s credit profile. In such environment of uncertainty,
with increased level of concern on the validity of opinions from credit rating agencies,
we explore if participants of the e-MID interbank market moved into a relationship
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driven funding approach. This behavior would allow each participant to better
understand each other’s credit risk profile with closer relationships.
Our proxies for interbank relationships are given in terms of concentration of
lending and borrowing activity. Unlike Furfine (2001) who defines pair relationship
in terms of number of days that the bank pair has transactions, but similar to Cocco
et al. (2009), Affinito (2012) and Brauning and Fecht (2012), we use lender and
borrower preference indexes as relationship measures. We introduce a new versions
of preference indexes and use the number of transactions, rather then the volume, as
a measure of the strength of a relationship. Our choice is motivated by the fact that
banks are heteregeneous. We do not want to bias the results toward the large banks
that trade more volumes with each other simply because they are bigger. Moreover,
our main interest is in estimating if building a relationship with a counterpart is
important in the interbank market because of its information content. Our working
hypothesis is that information flows with a transaction, regardless of the amount or
volume of each transaction3.
We compute the lender preference index (LPIij,t) as the ratio between the number
of loans that i lends to j for a given period t and average number of lending trans-
actions of lender i. We define the average number of lending transactions as the
ratio between the number of loans that bank i lends to any bank in the interbank
market and the outdegree of lender i, defined as the number of counterparties (i.e.
banks) to which a bank lends in the interbank market. Therefore lender preference
index is computed as:
3The literature has used both types of weights to measure the strength of a relationship. Volume,
or “money flow”, is generally used when the focus is on measuring market liquidity, or the potential
for interbank contagion. Number of transactions, or “information flow” is used when the focus is
on understanding the network formation mechanism such as in Hatzopoulos et al. (2015) and Iori
et al. (2015a).
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LPIij,t =
∑Nt
n=1 y
i→j
n∑Nt
n=1 y
i→any
n /outdegreei,t
, (2.4)
where n = 1, 2, ..., Nt refers to all loans in the market at time t, y
i→j
n is an indicator
for each loan n that bank i lends to bank j, yi→anyn is an indicator for each loan n
that bank i lends to any bank, and outdegreei,t is the outdegree of lender i at time
t.
Similarly we define the borrower preference index (BPIij,t) as the ratio of the
number of transactions that bank j borrows from bank i to the average number of
borrowing transactions of borrower j:
BPIij,t =
∑Nt
n=1 y
i→j
n∑Nt
n=1 y
any→j
n /indegreej,t
, (2.5)
where yany→jn is an indicator for each loan n that any bank lends to bank j, and
indegreej,t is the indegree of borrower j at time t, defined as the number of banks
from which a borrower take loans.
Since the denominator of LPI (BPI) is the average number of lending (borrow-
ing) transactions, when LPI (BPI) is 1, it means that the number of transactions
with the borrower j (lender i) equals to the average number of lending (borrowing)
transactions, and therefore the preference of lender (borrower) for that borrower
(lender) is neutral. If LPI > 1 (BPI > 1), then the lender i (borrower j) prefers
trading with bank j (i) more compared with the rest of the market. The opposite
occurs when LPI < 1 (BPI < 1).
We estimate LPI and BPI for each month (i.e. maintenance period), t =
1, 2, ..., T . We also calculate the average of the last four months of the relation-
ship measures in order to distinguish short and long term relationship measures.
Both lending preference index and borrowing preference index are calculated using
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Figure 2.4: Bank pairs preference indexes
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only the aggressor dataset in order to find out the effect of counter-party selection
as an aggressor. To have enhanced precision for the effect of the preference index,
only the pairs where both lender and borrower have more than one transaction are
included in the empirical study.
Figure 2.4 plots percentiles of monthly time series of preference index of market
for our two subsamples, that is, LiA and BiA. Based on our calculation of preference
indexes, the value of 1 reflects that the bank is neutral to the counterparty, therefore
the trend in higher percentiles shows us the importance of change in establishing
relationship over time. There is a slight increase in trend for upper percentiles of
preference indexes. Banks rely more on lending relationship after Lehman’s collapse
in September 2008. This can be attributed to deteriorated level of trust in mar-
ket perception of credit profiles (mostly through credit rating agencies) and bank’s
tendency to work with preferred peers becoming a pattern.
2.4.2.3 Other control variables
We also control for a set of pair- and bank-specific variables that affect interest rate
spread and volume. Transaction concentration (Transaction Ratio in %) measures
the ratio of the number of transactions between each pair to all transactions taken
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place in the same period within the market. Similar to Baglioni and Monticini
(2008), we also examine the effect of the time interval of the transaction performed.
Instead of dividing the day into hourly segments, we use only two slots: morning
(8 am - 1 pm) and afternoon (1 pm - 6 pm). Morning-Afternoon (AM/PM Ratio)
is the fraction of the difference between number of transactions that occur during
morning and afternoon to all transaction of each pair at a given period. In the
interbank market, participants must repay the loans at 9 am on the next trading
day of transaction. Hence, morning interest rates have a premium to account for
the longer maturity period than those transactions in the afternoon.
Since we work with bank pairs, it is important to explore inverse relationships
between them. In order to capture the effect of bilateral relations on the interbank
rate, we introduce a variable (Reciprocity Ratio) which is defined as the number of
counter-way transactions divided by the number of transaction of a pair at a given
period. We expect a negative effect on spreads for this variable since a lending bank
would charge less interest rate to its counter-party from which it also borrows.
Besides activity, timing and pair related variables, we also examine two indicators
that represent the sizes of lender and borrower as defined by e-MID based on total
assets of each institution. Size is a widely referred item in the literature and it has
been identified as an important variable in the financial crisis. However empirical
analysis regarding the effect of bank size also contradict with each other in terms
of the way it affects the rates (Furfine, 2001; Angelini et al., 2011; Gabrieli, 2011,
2012). Therefore we believe it is important to include size of both borrowing and
lending banks in order to identify the effect on the e-MID rate of bank pairs.
The identity of the lender and borrower is not known, and therefore we cannot
observe the bank’s size. We are only able to observe a categorical variable with
categories: Foreign, Major, Big, Medium, Small and Minor. Since we use fixed-
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effects panel model at the level of bank pairs for our estimations, we need a proxy
for the size information that we have in tick-by-tick data. Our initial analysis on
the e-MID data confirms that larger banks make transactions with larger volumes.
Therefore, total amount is used as a proxy for size in section 2.5.2 where we present
estimation results for determinants of preference indexes. We also construct an
index taking value of 5 for Foreign or Major (all foreign banks in the Italian market
are large compared to national ones), and in descending order to 1 for Minor. A
high number of the index thus reflects a large size.
In order to measure the effect of long-term maturity relationship on the spread
for overnight rates, we use a variable (LT Maturity) which reflects the number
of transactions with longer term maturity for a given pair at a given time. The
percentages of the observations with deals for longer terms maturities is similar for
both datasets. The existence of loans with LT maturity are 7% and 10% of the
observations when lender is aggressor and when lender is quoter, respectively.
We also introduce two new variables to examine the volume ratio of inverse
transactions. The variable for Lender (Lender’s B/L Ratio) of a pair is measured as
the borrowing amount of the bank from any other bank divided by its lending amount
to any other bank at a given period. Same ratio is also included for borrowing bank
(Borrower’s L/B Ratio).4
Since our dataset is separated for lenders only as aggressors and borrowers only
as aggressors, all variables used in the analysis are calculated within each group.
Table 2.1 and 2.2 provide summary statics of all variables and number of banks in
each subsample used in the empirical analysis. A detailed description of the variables
appear in the Appendix.
4For lender: Assuming bank A is the lender of a pair, this variable is the bank A’s borrowing
amount from any other bank divided by its lending amount to any other bank at a given period.
For borrower: Assuming bank B is the borrower of a pair, this variable is the bank B’s lending
amount to any other bank divided by its borrowing amount from any other bank at a given period
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2.4.3 Econometric modeling
We estimate a set of regression models to shed light on the impact of the preference
relationship index variables defined in the previous section on the existence of a bank
pair in the following months (i.e. survival), the interbank rate spread and volume.
All analyses are done conditional on bank pair ij fixed-effects, and therefore, the
effect of the variables should be interpreted as conditional on the existence of that
particular link i→ j (bank i lends to j). Let t index time for which we also construct
time-specific fixed-effects. In all models we compute robust standard errors with
clusters at the bank pair level. Since we want to explore for differences across the
phases of the latest financial crisis, we run the models for four time spans: all pooled
periods and before, during, and after crisis.
We evaluate first the suitability of the proposed preference indexes to measure
the stability of bank relationships. Our unit of analysis is the bank pair relationship,
which is only observed if there was any trade between the banks in the pair. We
thus explore the hypothesis that having stronger relationship with a counterparty,
as measured by LPI and BPI, increase the probability of having transactions with
the same counterparty in the next month. The dependent variable survival is a bi-
nary variable, Survivalij,t, which takes the value of 1 if trade happens between pair
ij in t and 0 if the pair is not active in t. We thus run a logit model of Survivalij,t+1
on a set of covariates of interest evaluated at t, [Sij,t, LPIij,t, BPIij,t], and dummy
variables for bank-pairs and time periods. Bank-pair dummies (i.e. fixed-effects by
pair) are intendend to capture unobserved characteristics of the pair that determine
their probability of being active in any particular month. Time dummies capture
changes in market conditions over time. We also use Survivalij,t+1 × Survivalij,t+2
and Survivalij,t+1×Survivalij,t+2×Survivalij,t+3 as alternative dependent variables
in the logit model in order to explore the effect of having relationships on the prob-
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ability of occurring trade for the same pair the following two consecutive months
and following three consecutive months, respectively.
We then consider a fixed-effects model in order to investigate what causes lending
relationship and how the effect of these changes over the three subperiods of analysis:
LPIij,t(orBPIij,t) = β0 + β1Aij,t + β2Bi,t + β3Cj,t + u
(1)
ij,t, u
(1)
ij,t = µ
(1)
ij +δ
(1)
t +e
(1)
ij,t,
(2.6)
where A, B and C represent pair, lender and borrower specific variables, respectively,
and u
(1)
ij,t is the residual term with bank-pair (µ
(1)
ij ) and time-specific effects (δ
(1)
t ),
and e
(1)
ij,t corresponds to uncorrelated shocks. The bank-pair effects captures banks
unobserved characteristics such as ownership and long-term pair relationships. The
time fixed-effects captures the evolution of the market across time and common
shocks that affect all banks.
The most important analysis in this paper correspond to the questions:
1. What is the effect of relationship on pricing?
2. What is the effect of relationship on volume? We therefore construct the
following models.
Regarding the first question we consider the following panel data fixed-effects
model of the interbank spread:
Sij,t = γ0 + γ1LPIij,t + γ2BPIij,t + γ3Aij,t + γ4Bi,t + γ5Cj,t + u
(2)
ij,t, u
(2)
ij,t = µ
(2)
ij +δ
(2)
t +e
(2)
ij,t.
(2.7)
Regarding the second question we use the following panel data fixed-effects model
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of volume normalized:
V Nij,t = η0 + η1LPIij,t + η2BPIij,t + η3Aij,t + η4Bi,t + η5Cj,t + u
(3)
ij,t, u
(3)
ij,t = µ
(3)
ij +δ
(3)
t +e
(3)
ij,t.
(2.8)
Here A, B and C also represent pair, lender and borrower specific variables, respec-
tively, u corresponds to unobserved determinants of spreads and volumes, with the
corresponding bank-pair- (µ), time-specific (δ) and shocks (e).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Stability of relationship
We first study the suitability of the preference indexes described above to predict a
bank pair survival. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the survival analysis for the subsam-
ples of lender is agressor (LiA) and borrower is agressor (BiA), respectively, using
logit models. Each table reports the marginal effect of selected variables on the
probability of a pair being active the next month, next two months and next three
months, and for the all/before/during/after crisis time intervals separately.
The results show that the interbank spread is in general not statistically signif-
icant or have a small effect on the probability of survival for the three time spans
considered and for both subsamples. On the other hand, the preference indexes,
LPI and BPI, are statistically significant to explain the likelihood of the pair being
active in the following months. The effects of both LPI and BPI are positive mean-
ing that the preference index captures features that are correlated with the stability
of the relationship. Moreover, the effects decrease in magnitude with respect to the
number of consecutive months that we evaluate the survival of the pair. Both tables
show that the preference indexes have a larger effect on the subsample of pairs that
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are active in all time intervals, again showing that LPI and BPI capture inherent
characteristics of a pair that correspond to stability. The effect of LPI is the largest
after the financial crisis for LiA subsample, while BPI has the largest effect during
the crisis (for one and two months survival only). Similar results, although weaker
in terms of statistical significance and magnitude, are observed in Table 2.4 for the
BiA subsample.
2.5.2 Lending relationship
After studying the stability of relationships, we next study banks’ characteristics
that are correlated with the preference indexes. Table 2.5 and 2.6 estimate the
determinants of lending relationships LPI and BPI for LiA and BiA subsamples,
respectively, using least-squares pairwise FE estimates. For the former subsample, a
higher number of transactions between two banks lead to higher preference indexes,
although this effect decreases over time and has the smallest effect after Lehman’s
collapse. This might be an indicator for the banks’ tendency to concentrate lending
(borrowing) activities on less risky borrowers (lenders) as a result of market shocks.
For the latter subsample, however, there is a significant effect of Transaction Ra-
tio only for the during crisis time interval. Thus LPI and BPI capture the pair’s
specificity when lender is aggressor, but there is no clear association when borrower
is.
Controlling all other variables, bank size becomes more important over time to
establish relationship in the LiA subsample. In line with Cocco et al. (2009), our
results show that smaller banks tend to establish and build relationships with large
counterparties. Since the bank’s strategies are different for the two subsamples,
we observe significant differences. When lender is aggressor, smaller banks try to
strengthen existing funding channels and create new ones with other banks in or-
30
der to benefit from more favorable rates, especially during and after crisis. When
the borrower is aggressor we do not observe the effect of size as strong as when
lender is aggressor. Lender’s size has significant effect on LPI only after crisis, how-
ever there is no effect of borrower’s size on BPI. Although bank’s own bilateral
transaction and counterparty’s bilateral transaction ratio has positive and negative
effect respectively for both datasets, the magnitude is almost zero for all scenarios,
therefore borrowing/lending ratio does not have any effect on preference indexes.
When the borrower is aggressor (BiA subsample), loans with long term maturity
in the same month increases its willingness of building closer relationship after the
crisis. However, when the lender is aggressor, loans with long term maturity have
no clear effect on LPI and BPI. This suggest that lenders have no incentive to be
be exposed to the same borrowers both at short and long maturity, while borrowers
interpret the willingness of a lender to provide long term funding as an indication
they are trusted counterparties and thus are encouraged to establish stable relation-
ships on the O/N market. To the best of our knowledge, no paper has yet exploited
the multilayer structure of the interbank network and investigated whether the co-
existence of the different maturity layers strengthen the role of relationship lending
or if the two layers are independent from one another (see Boccaletti et al. (2014)
for a recent review on multilayer networks).
2.5.3 Interest rate spread
We now study the main subject of our paper, that is, the effect of preference in-
dexes on interest rates. This analysis answers the question: ‘Do banks’ preferences
for trade partners have an effect on interest rates?’ If lending relationship builds
trust among banks, then lenders and borrowers in a pair with high values of the
relationship measure indexes should get a better rate compared with pairs with low
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index values. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show least-squares pairwise FE estimates for the
determinants of interest rate spreads and how lending relationship affects the market
before/during/after crisis, for the LiA and BiA subsamples, respectively.
When lender is aggressor (LiA subsample), we come up with several impor-
tant results regarding the effect of preference indexes on interest rate spread. Our
estimates suggest that both borrowing and lending banks benefit from having rela-
tionship with other participants in the market. LPI has a positive effect on spread
while BPI has a negative effect. Therefore, while borrowers have a discount on in-
terest rates, lenders have more favorable rates when there is a high preference for a
counterparty.
This result suggests that when a borrower is exposed predominantly to one
lender, the lender can observe the behaviour of the borrower on most of its borrow-
ing transactions and better assess its credit worthiness. Nonetheless, the borrower,
by concentrating all its trading with a single lender, exposes itself to funding risk, in
case its preferential lender decides to hoard liquidity and stop rolling over credit in
the future. The lender thus is willing to offer a discount to compensate the borrower
for taking funding risk, as a price to improve its monitoring opportunity. On the
other side, when a lender concentrates its lending activity with a single borrower, it
exposes itself to counterparty risk by not diversifying its loan portfolio. The lender
can monitor the reliability of the borrower only on their pairwise transactions but
cannot observe the behaviour of the borrower when trading with other counterpar-
ties. The lender in this case does not fully benefit from an informational advantage
on the quality of the borrower. The borrower on its side benefits from the prefer-
ential relationship as it represents a stable source of funding. The borrower thus is
willing to pay a premium, to compensate the lender for non diversification risk, as
a price for preferential access to liquidity.
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Our results are consistent with Cocco et al. (2009) who examined the impact of
preference indexes as a determinant of interest rate spread in the Portuguese inter-
bank market. Moreover, the effect of the former is the largest during the financial
crisis and the effect of the latter is the largest after the crisis (in line with Affinito
(2012) and Brauning and Fecht (2012)). A similar pattern is observed if we replace
monthly-based LPI and BPI with four months averages, thus reflecting that the
monthly based preference indexes capture a longer term relationship. In contrast to
results in the German interbank market by Brauning and Fecht (2012), we observe
that borrowers do not pay any premium for relationship during crisis (in fact the
opposite). This can be attributed to the OTC structure of the German interbank
market, in contrast with the transparent e-MID platform.
When borrower is aggressor (BiA subsample), only LPI is statistically signifi-
cant, and it is not significant before the crisis. In this case, if borrowers choose
lenders for which they are a preferential relationship they pay a premium while they
do not seem to have any advantage (or disadvantage) from trading with their own
preferential counter parties. These results may arise because, when lenders quote,
borrowers decision to accept a trade may be driven by prices rather than by existing
relationships. Also, as shown by Gabbi et al. (2012), when borrowers act as ag-
gressor they pay higher rates because of the bid-ask spread. Possibly any advantage
from trading with preferential counter parties is diluted by this.
We also run the same specification, separately, for each individual month in
order to illustrate the evolution of the effects of lending relationship measures and
size of lender and borrower. As discussed above, the identity of the borrower is
not known, and therefore we cannot observe the bank’s size. We are only able to
observe a categorical variable with categories: Foreign, Major, Big, Medium, Small
and Minor. We then construct an index taking value of 5 for Foreign or Major (all
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Figure 2.5: LiA - Effect of preference indexes and banks size on O/N spread
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Note: Bold data points coefficients significant at 10%.
foreign banks in the e-MID market are large compared to the average Italian bank),
and in descending order to 1 for Minor. A high number of the index thus reflects a
large size. We also run the fixed effects specification when both LPI and BPI are
interacted with both size of lender and size of borrower.
Figure 2.5 shows changes in the effect of preference indexes and size on interbank
rate spread over time, controlling for all other variables, and for the LiA subsample.
While the effect of LPI is positive, BPI is mostly negatively correlated with spread.
There is an increased movement in the effect of lending relationships that starts
early in 2007 and accelerates with the Lehman’s bankruptcy. The trend changes in
the Spring 2009 suggesting the ECB injection of liquidity starts easing the liquidity
crisis. The effect of these variable is further reduced in June 2009 after the ECB
injected almost 450 billion euro with a 1-year longer term refinancing operation and
goes back to pre-Lehman level at the end of 2009. Thus, the effects of LPI and BPI
described above are significant only in times of financial distress, when liquidity and
credit risk becomes an issue for concern even at the shortest exposures. In this
sense the evolution of the regression coefficients of these variables can provide an
early warning signal of an impending financial crisis and can be used to monitor the
impact of regulatory measures.
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Figure 2.6: BiA - Effect of preference indexes and banks size on O/N spread
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Similarly, the sizes of lender and borrower show a significant differentiation dur-
ing and after the crisis. In particular, the size of lender becomes markedly positive
during and after the crisis, while the size of the borrower becomes negative for the
same time intervals. The fact that size has a marked effect during and after the crisis
has a different interpretation for lenders and borrowers. For lenders, the positive
effect tells a story of market power that favors lenders. For the borrower, it suggests
that lenders choose big borrowers because they have lower risk. This could be a real
reduction of risk associated with big banks or the results of the “too big too fail”
assumption.
When borrower is aggressor (see figure 2.6), the effect of LPI and BPI on spreads
goes in the same direction as in the LiA subsample, but the curves are more noisy
(no clear pattern can be extracted from the figure), while size follows the same
results of the previous figure, that is, big lenders obtain higher and big borrowers
lower interest rates. In this case, the effect of size is larger for the borrower than
in the LiA subsample, pointing out that big borrowers may have more flexibility to
choose a better deal.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 report coefficients of the preference indexes effect on spread,
when interacted with size of the lender and borrower (using the categories Foreign,
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Major, Big, Medium, Small and Minor as above), for LiA and BiA subsamples,
respectively. For LiA, the interactions suggest, with different degrees of statistical
significance, that preference indexes have an effect for Medium and Small borrower
banks that trade with Big to Small lender banks. For BiA, there is no clear statistical
pattern that emerges.
Turning to the other control variables in the model, the transaction concentra-
tion for a given pair is significant in explaining interest rate spreads when lender is
aggressor but it has no significant effect when borrower is aggressor. The AM/PM
ratio for the time of transactions is a key determinant of a pair spread at all times
before, during and after crisis, both when lenders or borrowers are aggressors. More-
over, this effect has the highest effect during the crisis for LiA, and after the crisis for
BiA. The reason behind this result is that banks in need of urgent liquidity, make the
deal in the morning to avoid the risk of not finding an offer in the afternoon, and for
that borrowers are willing to pay a premium. Reciprocity ratio is only significant for
the LiA during the crisis. We can conjecture that banks who have built a reciprocal
relationship of lending and borrowing reduce the interest rate at which they trade
in times of financial distress. Finally, number of loans with long term maturity has
an effect only for lenders being the aggressors, with marked increasing trend over
the time of analysis, suggesting that lenders require a premium for accepting both
long term and short term exposure from the same borrower.
2.5.4 Trading volume
The volume of trade is an important variable because liquidity plays a central role
in financial crisis. This analysis answers the question ‘Do banks’ preferences for
trade partners have an effect on volume traded?’ Tables 2.11 and 2.12 present least
squares pairwise FE results for the determinants of VN (volume ratio traded by the
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pair to volume traded in the market) for the LiA and BiA subsamples, respectively.
LPI has a positive and significant effect on the volume ratio traded by the pair for
both subsamples. BPI has a significant effect for the LiA subsample, however for the
BiA subsample it is significant only in the after crisis interval. The sign is positive
in all cases. Because all the analysis is conditional on the pairs’ characteristics
(i.e. fixed effects), this reflects that for a given pair, volume increases the more
preferential relationship has been built between lender and borrower. In particular,
it is the lender to whom relationship matters the most as it faces the risk of loan
default.
In a similar fashion to the spread analysis, we run the same specification for
each month, separately, in order to illustrate the evolution of the effects of lending
relationship measures and size of lender and borrower on volume (figures 2.7 and
2.8). The effect of LPI and BPI on volume, while positive and significant, is very
small in the LiA subsample. In the BiA subsample the positive role of LPI is more
evident from the summer of 2007, while BPI become positive and significant only in
the few months preceding the Lehman bankruptcy. The effect of relationship lending
on volume decreases (but it is still positive and significant for both variables) after
October 2008, when the ECB decided to carry out their weekly main refinancing
operations through a fixed rate-full allotment procedures, to reduce the corridor of
its standing facilities from 200 basis points to 100 basis points, to expand the list of
assets eligible for collateral and to enhance the provision of liquidity through longer
term refinancing operations.
When lender is aggressor, as expected, AM/PM ratio can explain the variation
in volume ratio for all time spans. The reason behind this result might be that the
banks, which need liquidity urgently, make the deal in the morning since there is a
chance of not finding an offer in the afternoon. However, the variable is significant
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Figure 2.7: LiA - Effect of preference indexes and banks size on trading volume
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Figure 2.8: BiA - Effect of preference indexes and banks size on trading volume
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only after crisis for the second dataset. When lender is aggressor, lender’s higher
borrowing/lending ratio leads lower value of volume ratio after crisis, however there
is no effect before and during crisis. We also find that having a deal in longer term
maturities have negative, positive, and positive relations with the volume of ON
transaction before, during and after crisis, respectively. The change in sign of this
variable suggest that, during and after the crisis, trust, as reflected in this case by
the existence of long term maturity trading, facilitated access to ON liquidity, even
though at a premium, as seen in the previous sub-section.
2.5.5 Robustness analysis
2.5.5.1 Attrition bias
As noted by an anonymous referee, one potential concern is that of attrition bias.
Figure 2.1 shows that the number of pairs fluctuates over time and thus, the effect
of LPI and BPI might be biased if these are correlated with bank-pairs unobservable
factors, which in turn determine the pair appearance in a given month. Moreover,
the survival analysis above shows that both LPI and BPI affects the probability
of survival into the following periods. In order to address this concern we run a
Heckman selection-type model to the regression models for interbank spread and
trading volume.
The model is implemented as follows. First, note that if a pair is not observed
at a given period t, we cannot observe the pair’s spread (or trading volume) and
any other covariates at t, and there is no guarantee this particular pair has been
observed at t−1. For this reason we use Survivalij,t+1, that is, survival into the next
period, as a proxy of the probability of appearance of a given pair ij at t. The key
assumption is that the probability of appearance of a particular pair in t is related
to the probability of appearance at t+1. Second, we then run a probit model where
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Survivalij,t+1 is used as dependent variable and we use all covariates considered for
equations (2.7) and (2.8), respectively. That is, we model selection bias using bank-
pair survival into the next month using the same covariates used in both the spread
and trading volume specifications, including bank-pairs and time dummies. This
corresponds to the first-step (i.e. selection equation) in a Heckman selection model.
From the probit model we get ̂Pr(Survivalij,t+1) ≡ Φ(zij,t), where Φ(.) is the nor-
mal cumulative distribution function and zij,t is the implied realization of a normal
random variable. Then define φ(zij,t) as the normal density function evaluated at
zij,t. Third, we then construct the inverse Mills ratio to control for attrition bias as
invMillsij,t ≡
φ(zij,t)
1−Φ(zij,t)
. Finally, we include invMills as an additional covariate in
regression models (2.7) and (2.8). This last model corresponds to the second-step
(i.e. outcome equation) in a Heckman selection model.
Regression results in tables 2.13 and 2.14, for the LiA and BiA subsamples, re-
spectively, evaluate the effects of lending relationships on O/N spread and trading
volume controlling for potential attrition bias. Overall the results show that control-
ling for attrition bias does not change the coefficient estimates of the relationship
variables, LPI and BPI, spread and volume. That is, the coefficients in these tables
are similar to the corresponding coefficients in tables 2.7 and 2.8 for O/N spreads5,
and 2.11 and 2.12 for trading volume. If any, there is a slight reduction in the coeffi-
cient estimates of both LPI and BPI, pointing out that the presence of survivorship
bias may have produced upward biased results in the original estimates. The ad-
ditional variable invMills is in general non-statistically significant or significant at
the 10% level.
5Although not reported, but available from the Authors upon request, similar results are found
for the the 4-month average values of LPI and BPI.
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2.5.5.2 Trading volume weighting
Our two key relationship variables, LPI and BPI, were constructed using number
of transactions rather than trading volume (i.e. money flow) of transactions. As
explained above this is done because we consider that information flows according
to the number of interactions, and it is not necessarily proportional to the volume
or magnitude of each interaction. As noted by an anonymous referee, this deviates
from the literature (eg. Cocco et al. (2009)) where volume weighted relationship
measures are used instead. In order to evaluate this we construct LPI and BPI
using trading volume weights, and then run regression models (2.7) and (2.8) with
the newly defined variables.
We compute the volume-weighted lender preference index (LPI volij,t) as the ra-
tio of total volume of loans from bank bank i to j for a given period t (
∑Nt
n=1 Vij,ny
i→j
n )
to the average lending volume of lender i. Therefore volume based lender preference
index is calculated as:
LPI volij,t =
∑Nt
n=1 Vij,ny
i→j
n∑Nt
n=1 Vi any,ny
i→any
n /outdegreei,t
.
Similarly we define the volume-weighted borrower preference index (BPI volij,t) as
the ratio of the volume of transactions of bank pairij to the average borrowing
transaction volume of borrower j:
BPI volij,t =
∑Nt
n=1 Vij,ny
i→j
n∑Nt
n=1 Vany j,ny
any→j
n /indegreej, t
.
These variables have the same interpretation as the number-of-transactions-weighted
defined above. That is, a value of 1 correspond to lender or borrower neutrality, > 1
to a high preference towards a particular lender or borrower, and < 1 low preference
towards a particular lender or borrower.
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Regression results appear in Tables 2.15 and 2.16 for interbank spreads and vol-
umes, and for the LiA and BiA subsamples, respectively. The regression results
confirm that lending relationship has an effect on O/N spreads. LPI vol is statis-
tically significant for all pooled periods and for each subperiod separately, and for
both LiA and BiA subsamples. The largest effect corresponds to the During Crisis
period. BPI vol has a negative effect for spreads in the LiA subsample, and no
statistically significant effect on BiA. Regarding trading volume, both LPI vol and
BPI vol are positive and statistically significant for the LiA subsample, and positive
and with less statistical significance for the BiA subsample. The largest effect cor-
responds to the After Crisis period. Note that these are similar results to those in
table 2.11.
2.6 Conclusion and implications for systemic risk
The aim of our study is to analyze the structure of the links between financial in-
stitutions participating in the e-MID interbank market in an attempt to establish a
connection between interest rate spread and volume and the stability of bank rela-
tionships. Our data allow us to monitor the evolution of the lending patterns during
the first and second phase of the financial crisis. We show that, particularly after
the Lehman Brothers collapse, when liquidity became scarce, established relation-
ships with the same bank became an important determinant of interbank spreads.
Both borrowers and lenders benefited from establishing relationship throughout the
crisis. Preference indexes also impacted the O/N transaction volumes with LPI and
BPI indices showing both a positive and significant effects on the volume traded by
pairs. The effect of BPI in particular increased as the crisis progressed.
Given the transparent nature of the e-MID platform, our results point to a
peer monitoring role of relationship lending. Private information acquired through
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frequent transactions, supported liquidity reallocation in the e-MID market during
the crisis by improving the ability of banks to assess the creditworthiness of their
counterparties. Relationship lending thus plays a positive role for financial stability.
If a bank, who is the preferential lender to several borrowers defaults, or stop lending,
this may pose a serious funding risk for its borrowers who may find it difficult to
satisfy their liquidity needs from other lenders and may be forced to accept deals
at higher rates. This may eventually put them under distress and increase systemic
risk in the system. Similarly if preferential borrowers exit the interbank market,
such lenders may find it difficult to reallocate their liquidity surplus if they fail to
find trusted counterparties. The resulting inefficient reallocation of liquidity, may in
turn increase funding costs of other borrowers and again contribute to the spread of
systemic risk. In this sense relationship lending provides a measure of the financial
substitutability of a bank in the interbank market 6. Thus when establishing if a
bank is too connected to fail, regulators should not only look at how connected a
bank is, but also at how preferentially connected it is to other players.
Furthermore, reliance on relationship lending is an indicator of trust evaporation
in the banking system and monitoring the effect of stable relations on spreads and
traded volume may help as an early warning indicator of a financial turmoil.
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Appendix: Definition of variables
Formula Description
Sij,t =
∑Nij,t
n=1
(rij,n−r¯
d
m)∗Vij,n
∑Nij,t
n=1
Vij,n
Monthly volume weighted spread of bank pair ij.
VNij,t =
∑Nij,t
n=1
Vij,n
∑
h=1
∑
k=1
∑Nhk,t
n=1
Vhk,n
The ratio of monthly total volume of pair ij
to monthly total transaction volume in the market.
LPIij,t =
∑Nt
n=1
yi→jn
∑Nt
n=1
y
i→any
n /outdegreei,t
Lender Preference Index: The ratio of number of loans from bank i
to bank j to average number of lending transactions of i.
BPIij,t =
∑Nt
n=1
yi→jn
∑Nt
n=1
y
any→j
n /indegreej,t
Borrower Preference Index: The ratio of number of loans from bank i
to bank j to average number of borrowing transactions of j.
Transaction Ratioij,t =
∑Nt
n=1
yi→jn
∑Nt
n=1
y
any→any
n
The ratio for number of transactions between each pair to
all transactions taken place at a given period.
AM/PM Ratioij,t =
∑Nij,t
n=1
yamij,n−
∑Nij,t
n=1
y
pm
ij,n
∑Nij,t
n=1
yij,n
The ratio for the difference of number of transaction that occur during
morning and afternoon to all transaction of each pair at a given period.
Reciprocity Ratioij,t =
∑Nt
n=1
yj→in
∑Nt
n=1
y
i→j
n
The number of counter-way transactions divided
by the number of transaction of pair at a given period.
Lender’s B/L Ratioij,t =
∑Nt
n=1
V any→in
∑Nt
n=1
V
i→any
n
Assuming bank i is the lender of a pair, this variable is
the bank i’s borrowing amount from any other bank divided by
its lending amount to any other bank at a given period.
Borrower’s L/B Ratioij,t =
∑Nt
n=1
V j→anyn
∑Nt
n=1
V
any→j
n
This variable is the bank j’s lending amount to any other bank
divided by its borrowing amount from any other bank.
Tot Amount of Lenderij,t =
∑
i=1
∑Nij,t
n=1 Vij,n Monthly total transaction volume of lender.
Tot Amount of Borrowerij,t =
∑
j=1
∑Nij,t
n=1 Vij,n Monthly total transaction volume of borrower.
LT Maturityij,t =
∑Nt
n=1 L
i→j
n
Number of transactions with longer term maturity
for a pair at a given period.
where yi→jn , L
i→j
n are indicators of loans n borrowed by bank i from bank j with over-night and longer term ma-
turities respectively. Vij,n is volume of transaction for each bank pair ij, and Nij,t is the number of transactions
for the bank pair ij at time t. Nt is the total number of the transactions in the market for given time period t. r¯dm
is the daily volume weighted average rate over all transactions carried out by the bank pairs.
44
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Name Dataset Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LiA -0.4428 8.8623 -118.0136 97.0987
Spread (in bps)
BiA -0.0910 8.1543 -118.5429 70.1501
LiA 1 0.8185 0.03509 17.7931
LPI
BiA 1 0.8847 0.0089 15.4636
LiA 1 0.8867 0.0385 16.7842
BPI
BiA 1 0.7462 0.0667 15.0578
LiA 0.0688 0.0895 0.01311 2.2314
Transaction Ratio (as %)
BiA 0.1738 0.3764 0.03389 28.4740
LiA 0.0529 0.8599 -1 1
AM/PM Ratio
BiA 0.2926 0.8712 -1 1
LiA 0.1216 1.2242 0 129
Reciprocity Ratio
BiA 0.0422 0.5073 0 42
LiA 5.0504 7.3391 0.0010 108.9172
Total Amount of Lender (in Billions)
BiA 6.2366 8.6716 0.0025 108.9172
LiA 8.2561 9.7499 0.0015 108.9172
Total Amount of Borrower (in Billions)
BiA 6.2605 8.3608 0.0020 108.9172
LiA 3.0391 40.0668 0 4085.2000
Lender’s B/L Ratio
BiA 3.1439 29.6242 0 2026.3480
LiA 2.0141 20.9463 0 1947.4670
Borrower’s L/B Ratio
BiA 5.2931 88.7491 0 10011
LiA 0.0697 0.2547 0 1
LT Active (in bps)
BiA 0.1034 0.3045 0 1
LiA 0.5731 0.4946 0 1
Survival-Next Period
BiA 0.44267 0.4972 0 1
LiA 0.3956 0.4890 0 1
Survival-Next Two Periods
BiA 0.2712 0.4446 0 1
LiA 0.2957 0.4564 0 1
Survival-Next Three Periods
BiA 0.1873 0.3901 0 1
LiA 173.5799 592.4856 0.0500 65393.0000
Volume-Pair
BiA 123.9555 1222.1650 0.0500 158897.8000
LiA 3.8275 5.7255 1 280
No. of Transaction-Pair
BiA 3.2502 13.5544 1 1628
Note: Number of observations in LiA and BiA datasets are 61085 and 24161, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Participation of banks by bank size
Lender - LiA
Foreign Minor Small Medium Large Major
Before Crisis 70 18 62 14 10 6
During Crisis 73 20 58 12 8 6
After Crisis 52 20 57 12 5 4
Borrower - LiA
Foreign Major Large Medium Small Minor
Before Crisis 56 12 50 14 10 6
During Crisis 56 15 53 12 9 6
After Crisis 38 13 47 13 5 4
Lender - BiA
Foreign Major Large Medium Small Minor
Before Crisis 54 13 51 14 9 6
During Crisis 57 17 55 11 8 6
After Crisis 28 17 52 9 5 4
Borrower - BiA
Foreign Major Large Medium Small Minor
Before Crisis 61 14 56 15 10 6
During Crisis 55 18 55 13 9 6
After Crisis 35 17 52 13 5 4
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Table 2.3: LiA - Marginal effect of survival analysis
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
Survival for the next period
Spread 0.001*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
LPI 0.087*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.071***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
BPI 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.097*** 0.045***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 47,690 14,577 16,280 10,175
Number of pairs 3,866 2,330 2,459 1,563
Survival for the next two periods
Spread 0.001*** -0.002* -0.000 -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LPI 0.080*** 0.027** 0.032*** 0.064***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
BPI 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.068*** 0.022*
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 42,292 11,792 13,777 8,490
Number of pairs 2,780 1,553 1,709 1,058
Survival for the next three periods
Spread 0.002*** -0.001 0.001 -0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LPI 0.069*** 0.011 0.024** 0.043***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
BPI 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.013
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 36,921 9,512 11,419 6,711
Number of pairs 2,100 1,113 1,257 721
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: BiA - Marginal effect of survival analysis
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
Survival for the next period
Spread -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
LPI 0.108*** 0.052*** 0.106*** 0.067***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024)
BPI 0.038*** 0.059*** 0.019 0.032
(0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024)
Observations 16,293 5,436 5,909 2,674
Number of pairs 1,810 1,057 1,045 496
Survival for the next two periods
Spread 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
LPI 0.093*** 0.076*** 0.056*** 0.030
(0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.023)
BPI 0.033*** 0.013 0.039** 0.031
(0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024)
Observations 13,004 4,036 4,471 1,868
Number of pairs 1,067 620 603 251
Survival for the next three periods
Spread -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
LPI 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.034** -0.016
(0.008) (0.019) (0.015) (0.024)
BPI 0.031*** -0.009 0.045*** 0.048*
(0.009) (0.022) (0.017) (0.026)
Observations 10,577 2,985 3,566 1,545
Number of pairs 733 397 426 180
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: LiA - Determinants of LPI and BPI
Dep.var.: LPI Dep.var.: BPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
Transaction Ratio 6.279*** 10.375*** 7.088*** 5.032*** 7.016*** 13.592*** 8.672*** 5.364***
(0.279) (0.438) (0.524) (0.264) (0.289) (0.409) (0.525) (0.197)
AM/PM Ratio 0.014*** -0.008 0.002 0.003 0.024*** 0.002 0.018*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.016*** -0.031*** -0.012* -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.010* -0.022** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Tot Amount of Lender -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.032*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.043***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007)
Tot Amount of Borrower 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.027*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.051***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Lender’s B/L Ratio 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001** -0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
LT Maturity -0.005 -0.061** -0.033 -0.024 0.059** -0.031 -0.009 0.001
(0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865
R-squared 0.590 0.624 0.609 0.653 0.627 0.782 0.734 0.694
Number of pairs 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Table 2.6: BiA - Determinants of LPI and BPI
Dep.var.: LPI Dep.var.: BPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
Transaction Ratio 0.450 0.876 1.655** 0.475 0.369 1.013*** 1.398*** 0.438
(0.333) (0.652) (0.653) (0.326) (0.290) (0.333) (0.416) (0.308)
AM/PM Ratio 0.099*** 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.028*** 0.033** 0.045**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.021 -0.071*** -0.065* -0.037 -0.027* -0.043** -0.091*** -0.060
(0.015) (0.026) (0.038) (0.043) (0.015) (0.021) (0.032) (0.097)
Tot Amount of Lender -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.039*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.017*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009)
Tot Amount of Borrower 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.038*** 0.055*** -0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011)
Lender’s B/L Ratio -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.002 -0.001* -0.002** -0.002*** -0.004
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio -0.001** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
LT Maturity 0.259*** 0.107* 0.134 0.154* 0.265*** 0.087 0.113** 0.151*
(0.081) (0.057) (0.101) (0.082) (0.076) (0.080) (0.052) (0.081)
Observations 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745
R-squared 0.179 0.186 0.421 0.244 0.174 0.328 0.384 0.210
Number of pairs 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Table 2.7: LiA - Determinants of O/N spreads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI 0.587*** 0.055 0.699*** 0.509**
(0.088) (0.081) (0.132) (0.205)
BPI -0.626*** -0.200** -0.018 -1.003***
(0.091) (0.086) (0.143) (0.177)
Average LPI(4M) 0.828*** 0.146 0.513*** 0.929***
(0.111) (0.129) (0.197) (0.210)
Average BPI(4M) -0.492*** -0.007 -0.101 -0.820***
(0.104) (0.109) (0.209) (0.231)
Transaction Ratio 6.200*** 5.101*** -0.912 5.996*** 4.490*** 2.332*** 2.709** 3.172***
(1.430) (1.455) (1.715) (2.081) (0.882) (0.743) (1.173) (0.987)
AM/PM Ratio 2.396*** 1.253*** 3.458*** 1.679*** 2.383*** 1.252*** 3.450*** 1.669***
(0.064) (0.082) (0.123) (0.112) (0.064) (0.082) (0.123) (0.112)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.299** -0.082 -0.840** 0.027 -0.296** -0.078 -0.846** 0.034
(0.128) (0.157) (0.354) (0.073) (0.128) (0.157) (0.354) (0.073)
Lender’s B/L Ratio -0.005* -0.010* -0.004 -0.001* -0.005* -0.010* -0.004 -0.001**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio -0.023** -0.035*** -0.011 -0.085*** -0.023** -0.035*** -0.011 -0.085***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
LT Maturity -0.033 -0.223*** 0.027 0.496*** -0.060 -0.224*** -0.015 0.489***
(0.159) (0.077) (0.167) (0.187) (0.161) (0.074) (0.168) (0.187)
Observations 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865
R-squared 0.097 0.037 0.084 0.178 0.097 0.037 0.083 0.176
Number of pairs 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Table 2.8: BiA - Determinants of O/N spreads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI 0.211** 0.044 0.256*** 0.453*
(0.088) (0.046) (0.096) (0.265)
BPI -0.094 0.032 -0.011 -0.060
(0.106) (0.075) (0.143) (0.302)
Average LPI(4M) 0.280** 0.158* 0.565*** 0.257
(0.114) (0.082) (0.164) (0.516)
Average BPI(4M) -0.220 -0.022 -0.305 -0.016
(0.156) (0.110) (0.213) (0.583)
Transaction Ratio 0.080 -0.017 0.236 0.265 0.113 -0.005 0.387 0.369*
(0.103) (0.068) (0.255) (0.177) (0.106) (0.058) (0.296) (0.204)
AM/PM Ratio 1.633*** 0.669*** 1.949*** 2.155*** 1.636*** 0.665*** 1.950*** 2.173***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.161) (0.288) (0.094) (0.102) (0.161) (0.288)
Reciprocity Ratio -1.003* -0.153 -1.870 0.451 -1.005* -0.150 -1.877 0.476
(0.589) (0.330) (1.184) (1.938) (0.590) (0.330) (1.184) (1.940)
Lender’s B/L Ratio 0.001 -0.005 0.007 -0.029 0.001 -0.005 0.007 -0.030
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.031) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.031)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.036*** 0.002 -0.001 0.012 -0.036***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010)
LT Maturity -0.171 0.004 -0.180 0.254 -0.149 -0.003 -0.157 0.290
(0.198) (0.051) (0.145) (0.385) (0.192) (0.052) (0.147) (0.382)
Observations 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745
R-squared 0.078 0.037 0.079 0.163 0.078 0.038 0.079 0.162
Number of pairs 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed effects.
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Table 2.9: LiA - Analysis by bank size
Coefficient of LPI on O/N spreads
Size of Lender
Foreign Major Big Medium Small Minor
Foreign -0.227 -3.538** 1.752 4.619* 0.729 -2.898
(0.246) (1.537) (2.419) (2.772) (1.100) (2.256)
S
iz
e
of
B
or
ro
w
er Major -1.738 -0.721 3.203 3.414 1.816*** 0.348
(1.096) (2.340) (3.885) (2.849) (0.628) (1.488)
Big -0.941 1.889 1.581* 0.132 0.395 1.192**
(1.520) (1.403) (0.761) (1.654) (0.373) (0.474)
Medium 0.890 0.319 2.753** 0.891 0.645** -0.289
(0.628) (0.740) (1.297) (0.722) (0.265) (0.324)
Small -0.345 0.175 0.673 0.404 0.751*** 0.845***
(0.518) (0.741) (0.413) (0.253) (0.136) (0.305)
Minor N/A -21.77 -7.227 0.366 -0.858 -2.616
(17.93) (7.748) (1.239) (1.090) (2.462)
Effect of BPI on O/N spreads
Size of Lender
Foreign Major Big Medium Small Minor
Foreign -0.146 -1.178 -1.403 1.928** -0.486 -2.916
(0.225) (1.210) (1.737) (0.840) (1.072) (3.514)
S
iz
e
of
B
or
ro
w
er Major -1.166 -1.240 -9.906** -0.201 -0.849** -0.139
(1.619) (1.428) (3.699) (2.077) (0.408) (1.254)
Big 4.903** -0.763 -0.648 0.505 0.116 -0.367
(2.128) (0.893) (1.348) (1.293) (0.252) (0.339)
Medium -0.957 -0.799 -2.215 -2.282*** -0.494** -0.739**
(0.968) (0.528) (1.817) (0.808) (0.221) (0.330)
Small -0.935 -1.744** -0.886 -1.045** -0.842*** -1.418**
(0.954) (0.743) (0.569) (0.416) (0.196) (0.566)
Minor N/A 29.45** 14.99** -0.380 -0.592 5.310
(13.31) (5.955) (1.412) (0.986) (4.140)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed effects.
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Table 2.10: BiA - Analysis by bank size
Coefficient of LPI on O/N spreads
Size of Borrower
Foreign Major Big Medium Small Minor
Foreign 0.878* -1.473 -0.437 -0.820 1.740 N/A
(0.524) (1.797) (1.163) (0.676) (1.844)
S
iz
e
of
L
en
d
er Major -0.122 4.223 -3.998 0.159 -0.804 N/A
(0.404) (5.357) (4.651) (0.395) (0.672)
Big N/A N/A 3.996*** -4.792*** 1.041 N/A
(0.703) (1.379) (0.944)
Medium 4.159 -20.42 1.490 0.0676 0.0455 1.473
(5.611) (12.55) (1.273) (0.425) (0.505) (2.129)
Small 0.338 2.538 1.206** -0.181 -0.507 -1.878**
(1.690) (2.738) (0.563) (0.188) (0.317) (0.850)
Minor 0 N/A 2.228*** 0.884** 0.0383 0.435
(0) (0.768) (0.424) (0.408) (1.882)
Coefficient of BPI on O/N spreads
Size of Borrower
Foreign Major Big Medium Small Minor
Foreign -0.105 0.379 0.230 -1.278*** -3.621 N/A
(0.504) (1.571) (1.387) (0.454) (2.926)
S
iz
e
of
L
en
d
er Major 0.776 -17.68*** 3.270 -0.646 -0.670 N/A
(0.742) (5.496) (2.772) (0.523) (0.561)
Big N/A N/A -0.295 5.404 -0.301 N/A
(0.995) (4.795) (0.705)
Medium 2.687 -54.16** -0.790 0.324 -0.625 -1.348
(4.768) (24.96) (0.654) (0.469) (0.498) (1.290)
Small 0.0511 -0.558 -1.229*** -0.504** -0.201 -0.0118
(0.971) (1.547) (0.449) (0.249) (0.164) (0.997)
Minor -68.67*** N/A 1.716 -1.452* -0.912* -3.052*
(6.664) (1.528) (0.828) (0.504) (1.615)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed effects.
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Table 2.11: LiA - Determinants of trading volumes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
BPI 0.061*** 0.028*** 0.077*** 0.103***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.013) (0.016)
AM/PM Ratio 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Lender’s B/L Ratio -0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LT Maturity 0.036** -0.011*** 0.045** 0.032*
(0.018) (0.002) (0.019) (0.017)
Observations 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865
R-squared 0.192 0.218 0.347 0.180
Number of pairs 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed effects.
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Table 2.12: BiA - Determinants of trading volumes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI 0.198** 0.142* 0.148 0.158***
(0.088) (0.086) (0.151) (0.033)
BPI -0.008 -0.043 0.162 0.197***
(0.083) (0.093) (0.231) (0.045)
AM/PM Ratio 0.021* 0.006 -0.003 0.040***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012)
Reciprocity Ratio 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.031
(0.006) (0.014) (0.025) (0.031)
Lender’s B/L Ratio -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LT Maturity 0.119 0.113 0.072 0.129*
(0.077) (0.091) (0.066) (0.066)
Observations 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745
R-squared 0.055 0.119 0.099 0.268
Number of pairs 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed effects.
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Table 2.13: LiA - Determinants of spread and trading volume controlling for attrition bias
Dep.var.: Spread Dep.var.: Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI 0.593*** 0.091 0.737*** 0.535*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.016 0.010
(0.100) (0.085) (0.149) (0.199) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.023)
BPI -0.623*** -0.179** 0.003 -0.997*** 0.052*** 0.018*** 0.071*** 0.077***
(0.102) (0.088) (0.149) (0.179) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016)
Transaction Ratio 6.260*** 5.947*** -0.682 6.487***
(1.379) (1.554) (1.769) (2.310)
AM/PM Ratio 2.398*** 1.276*** 3.474*** 1.694*** 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.008
(0.068) (0.085) (0.126) (0.115) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.300** -0.090 -0.845** 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006**
(0.128) (0.157) (0.354) (0.073) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Lender’s B/L Ratio -0.005* -0.010* -0.004 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio -0.023** -0.036*** -0.011 -0.086*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LT Maturity -0.036 -0.254*** 0.013 0.471** 0.039** -0.008*** 0.047** 0.045**
(0.156) (0.081) (0.168) (0.186) (0.018) (0.003) (0.020) (0.019)
invMills -0.064 -0.529* -0.351 -0.414 0.092* 0.086 0.056 0.302*
(0.493) (0.289) (0.435) (0.714) (0.049) (0.064) (0.066) (0.158)
Observations 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865
R-squared 0.097 0.037 0.084 0.178 0.193 0.223 0.348 0.189
Number of pairs 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Table 2.14: BiA - Determinants of spread and trading volume controlling for attrition bias
Dep.var.: Spread Dep.var.: Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI 0.449*** 0.081 0.390*** 0.796** 0.181*** 0.112 0.024 -0.117
(0.125) (0.066) (0.126) (0.356) (0.064) (0.078) (0.159) (0.318)
BPI -0.018 0.039 0.024 0.148 -0.014 -0.050 0.121 0.032
(0.103) (0.075) (0.143) (0.382) (0.094) (0.094) (0.211) (0.177)
Transaction Ratio 0.197** 0.019 0.324 0.458***
(0.081) (0.074) (0.294) (0.133)
AM/PM Ratio 1.700*** 0.678*** 1.986*** 2.306*** 0.016 -0.001 -0.034 -0.074
(0.098) (0.103) (0.163) (0.311) (0.024) (0.011) (0.033) (0.136)
Reciprocity Ratio -1.052* -0.159 -1.895 0.349 0.006 0.008 0.027 0.107
(0.589) (0.330) (1.183) (1.939) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) (0.100)
Lender’s B/L Ratio 0.000 -0.005 0.006 -0.032 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio 0.001 -0.001 0.011 -0.038*** 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
LT Maturity -0.243 -0.012 -0.218 0.087 0.123 0.121 0.095 0.240
(0.207) (0.054) (0.149) (0.409) (0.083) (0.093) (0.072) (0.146)
invMills -1.685*** -0.236 -0.919* -3.665 0.112 0.173 0.787* 2.708
(0.503) (0.191) (0.499) (2.686) (0.324) (0.112) (0.437) (3.263)
Observations 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745
R-squared 0.078 0.037 0.079 0.163 0.055 0.121 0.107 0.274
Number of pair id 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Table 2.15: LiA - Determinants of spread and trading volume, volume weighted LPI and BPI
Dep.var.: Spread Dep.var.: Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI vol 0.579*** 0.223*** 0.907*** 0.360*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.022*** 0.050***
(0.062) (0.054) (0.110) (0.130) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
BPI vol -0.161*** 0.005 0.064 -0.252*** 0.067*** 0.032*** 0.076*** 0.104***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.068) (0.096) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013)
Transaction Ratio 3.020*** 0.618 -3.311*** 2.993**
(1.028) (0.911) (1.178) (1.424)
AM/PM Ratio 2.348*** 1.234*** 3.367*** 1.676*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.004** 0.007
(0.063) (0.081) (0.121) (0.113) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.296** -0.073 -0.841** 0.031 -0.001 0.002** -0.000 0.004**
(0.126) (0.157) (0.343) (0.072) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Lender’s B/L Ratio -0.005* -0.010** -0.004 -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio -0.023** -0.035*** -0.011 -0.087*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LT Maturity 0.006 -0.184** 0.092 0.526*** 0.027 -0.011*** 0.026** 0.023
(0.164) (0.074) (0.166) (0.184) (0.016) (0.002) (0.011) (0.016)
Observations 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865 51,871 19,276 20,730 11,865
R-squared 0.098 0.038 0.088 0.175 0.299 0.395 0.579 0.299
Number of pairs 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728 6,066 4,449 4,441 2,728
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Table 2.16: BiA - Determinants of spread and trading volume, volume weighted LPI and BPI
Dep.var.: Spread Dep.var.: Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis All Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
LPI vol 0.309*** 0.096* 0.379*** 0.369** 0.149*** 0.146** 0.096 0.174***
(0.063) (0.057) (0.086) (0.184) (0.052) (0.063) (0.077) (0.024)
BPI vol -0.071 0.045 0.024 0.080 0.051 -0.008 0.160 0.215***
(0.065) (0.070) (0.105) (0.206) (0.042) (0.050) (0.130) (0.045)
Transaction Ratio 0.033 -0.072 0.043 0.242
(0.114) (0.095) (0.194) (0.193)
AM/PM Ratio 1.601*** 0.655*** 1.900*** 2.129*** 0.006 -0.005 -0.021 0.009
(0.093) (0.100) (0.159) (0.287) (0.012) (0.008) (0.021) (0.011)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.990* -0.147 -1.829 0.497 0.009 0.010 0.019 0.068
(0.589) (0.331) (1.181) (1.919) (0.006) (0.017) (0.025) (0.042)
Lender’s B/L Ratio 0.001 -0.005 0.007 -0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Borrower’s L/B Ratio 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.036*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LT Maturity -0.185 0.003 -0.194 0.260 0.124 0.110 0.092 0.122**
(0.199) (0.051) (0.141) (0.382) (0.084) (0.087) (0.077) (0.062)
Observations 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745 19,643 7,856 8,042 3,745
R-squared 0.079 0.038 0.081 0.164 0.061 0.170 0.098 0.380
Number of pairs 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291 3,705 2,475 2,416 1,291
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include bank-pair and maintenance period specific fixed-effects.
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Chapter 3
Network Centrality and Funding Rates in the e-MID
Interbank Market
3.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008 has highlighted the importance of contagion and
systemic risk in financial markets and the need to go beyond the traditional micro-
prudential approach to supervision. The network structure of markets has important
implications for systemic risk. The actual distribution of links between market par-
ticipants affect how financial distress or the disorderly failure of a financial entity
could be transmitted to other financial firms and markets. When defaults occur,
they can cascade throughout the network and can cause the collapse of an entire
system. Three channels have been identified as primarily responsible for the conta-
gion: bilateral-exposures in interbank markets, fire sales externalities and liquidity
hoarding due to precautionary banks’ behavior, with the first channel the most
extensively studied. While prior to the crisis few academic papers had already in-
vestigated the importance of the interconnectedness of the economy for financial
stability ( Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
Iori et al. (2006), Nier et al. (2007)) it is after the crisis that the role of the network
of exposures has been brought to the fore by the wider academic community and
by policymakers. Among the first, Haldane and May (2011) has called for a better
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understanding of how individually complex institutions connect to one another in a
complex network of counterparty exposures, in order to design policy measures that
can more effectively manage financial stability.
Network analysis of the degree of interconnectedness in the financial system can
inform policymakers on optimal bank resolutions mechanisms and how regulation
can help to reduce instability. Empirical networks have been used for (deterministic)
stress test exercises (see Upper (2011) for a comprehensive review). Of critical im-
portance in macro prudential policy is the identification of key players in the financial
network, which according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) should be
determined in terms of their size, connectedness and substitutability. Network cen-
trality measures, developed to assess centrality in other contexts and adapted to the
context of financial networks, can guide national authorities in their assessment of
the systemic importance of financial and non-financial institutions. In the financial
economic literature network analysis has mostly been applied to payment systems,
interbank lending markets, and more recently extended to capture the mutual expo-
sure of financial institutions to other asset classes, including derivatives contracts,
in a multilayer networks framework ( Markose et al. (2012), Bargigli et al. (2015),
Leon et al. (2014), Molina-Borboa et al. (2015) and Aldasoro and Alves (2015)).
In this paper we focus on interbank lending networks on the e-MID overnight
(O/N) interbank market, an electronic platform, based in Italy, that offers a fully
transparent trading systems with ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ proposals (prices and volumes)
available on screens of the participating banks, along with the identity of the banks
quoting them. Information on the terms (prices and amounts) of executed trades
are available to banks in real time. Search frictions, thus, should not affect the
matching process in the e-MID market. Furthermore lack of information on rates
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offered by alternative lenders cannot be responsible for the observed cross sectional
dispersion of O/N rates in this market. Our paper contributes to the recent lit-
erature that investigates the determinants of banks’ borrowing costs in unsecured
money markets and how network characteristics of interbank market participants
affect their funding rates. Network positioning could affect banks’ interest rates by
different mechanisms. First, in line with Acemoglu et al. (2015), dense interconnec-
tions serve as a mechanism for the propagation of shocks, leading to a more fragile
financial system. As such, banks that are more connected may be perceived by the
market as fragile. Second, the same banks can be perceived as ‘too-interconnected-
to-fail’ such that rather than fragile, those banks are perceived as more likely to
be bailout. This is similar to the too-big-to-fail effect observed in other interbank
markets. Third, as argued by Booth et al. (2014), financial institutions with more
extensive and strategic financial networks, can more efficiently acquire and process
information due to their better access to order flows. Fourth, as stressed by Gabrieli
and Georg (2014), banks with higher centrality within the network have better access
to liquidity and are able to charge larger intermediation spreads. Previous empirical
evidence ( Angelini et al. (2011), Gabrieli (2011), Gabbi (2012), Bech and Atalay
(2010) , Akram and Christophersen (2010) and Gabrieli (2012)) suggests that being
systemically more important, in term of size or connectedness, can explain part of
the cross-sectional variation in banks’ borrowing costs before and during the global
financial crisis. The centrality indicators used in the analysis are constructed from
measures of distance of a bank from the other banks in the network, where distance
is expressed in terms of: (1) paths of length one, i.e. the number of incoming or out-
going links, for degree centrality; (2) geodesics (shortest) paths (no vertex is visited
more than once), for closeness and betweenness; walks (vertices and edges can be
visited/traversed multiple times) for eigenvector centrality, pagerank and sinkrank.
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We evaluate each measure in a quarterly panel data regression set-up of bank pairs,
i.e. lender and borrower match, for the period 2006-2009 and separately for three
sub-periods that encompass the latest 2007-2008 financial crisis: phase I (01 Jan-
uary 2006-30 June 2007, using the key date of the Two Bear Stearns’ hedge fund
bankruptcy was 31 July 2007), phase II (01 July 2007-30 September 2008, using the
key date of Lehman Brothers collapse was 15-Sep-2008) and phase III (01 October
2008-31 December 2009).
Our results show that network measures are significant determinants of funding
rates in the e-MID O/N market. Local measures show that having more links
increases borrowing costs for borrowers and reduces premia for lenders. However,
for global measures of network centrality borrowers receive a significant discount if
they increase their intermediation activity and become more central, while lenders
pay in general a premium (i.e. receive lower rates) for centrality, thus providing some
evidence about the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ hypothesis. That is, banks perceived
to be better inter-connected could borrow at discount rates. This effect is higher in
phase II when systemic risk was the highest. Lenders do not benefit from network
centrality, and as such, it could be that the market perception about their network
positioning (i.e. fragility) dominates their strategic location for intermediation (as
in Gabrieli and Georg, 2014). The regression analysis also highlights that there
is heterogeneity across different measures of network centrality on how they affect
interbank spreads.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses previ-
ous findings in the literature and how they relate to our paper. Section 4.4 describes
the data and variables. Section 3.4 provides methodology of the empirical analysis.
In section 3.5, we present and discuss the results of the regression analysis. Section
3.6 discusses the results and concludes.
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3.2 Network centrality and financial markets
A number of papers have investigated the interplay between financial distress and
topological characteristic of interbank networks, focusing on the network resilience
to different kinds of shocks (Iori et al. (2006); Nier et al. (2007), Gai et al. (2011),
Battiston et al. (2012); Anand et al. (2012), Lenzu and Tedeschi (2012); Georg
(2013); Roukny et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2015)). While some authors have
argued that a more interconnected architecture could enhance the resilience of the
system to failure of an individual bank, because credit risk is shared among more
creditors, others have suggested that a higher density of connections may function
as a destabilizing force, facilitating financial distress to spread further through the
banking system. The overall picture that emerges from this body of work is that the
density of linkages has a non monotonous impact on systemic stability and its effect
varies with the nature of the shock, the heterogeneity of the players and the state
of the economy. Thus no optimal network structure, that is more resilient under all
circumstances, can be identified (see Chinazzi and Fagiolo (2013) for a recent survey
on systemic risk and financial contagion).
The structure of interbank networks has been mapped for several countries. Ex-
amples include Boss et al. (2004) for the Austrian interbank market, Soramaki et
al. (2007) and Bech and Atalay (2010) for the US Federal funds market, De Masi
et al. (2006), Iori et al. (2008) and Fricke and Lux (2015a) for the Italian based
e-MID, Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium, Craig and Von Peter (2014) for
the German interbank market, Langfield et al. (2014) for the UK and in ’t Veld
and van Lelyveld (2014) for the Dutch market. These authors have explored the
topology of these interbank markets and identified stylized facts and regularities.
The most common findings reported in this literature are: (i) interbank networks
are sparse, with only a minority of all possible links that do actually exist; (ii) de-
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gree distributions and transaction volumes distribution are fat tailed, revealing very
heterogeneous players characteristics; (iii) the networks show disassortative mixing
with respect to the bank size, so small banks tend to trade with large banks and
vice versa; (iv) clustering coefficients are usually quite small; (v) interbank networks
satisfy the small-world property1; (vi) interbank networks have a tiering structure
with a tightly connected core of money-center banks to which all other periphery
banks connect.
In particular for the e-MID market, while early studies (Iori et al. (2008)) have
revealed a fairly random network at the daily scale, a non-random structure has been
uncovered for longer aggregation periods. Monthly and quarterly aggregated data
show that since the 1990s a high degree of bank concentration occurred (Iazzetta
and Manna (2009)), with fewer banks acting as global hubs for the whole network.
The hubs tend to cluster together and a significant core-periphery structure has been
observed (Finger et al. (2013)). Hatzopoulos et al. (2015) have investigated the
matching mechanism between lenders and borrowers in the e-MID market and its
evolution over time. They show that, when controlling for bank heterogeneity, the
matching mechanism is fairly random. Even though matches that occur more often
than those consistent with a random null model (over expressed links) exist and
increase in number during the crisis, neither lenders nor borrowers systematically
present several over expressed links at the same time. The picture that emerges from
their study is that banks are more likely to be chosen as trading partners because
they trade more often and not because they are more attractive in some dimension
(such as their financial healthiness or because they charge lower rates).
Fricke and Lux (2015a) and Squartini et al. (2013) have investigated if the
1A network is small-world if the mean geodesic distance between pairs of nodes is small rel-
ative to the total number of nodes in the network, that is, this distance grows no faster than
logarithmically as the number of nodes tends to infinity
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topology of interbank networks, respectively for the e-MID market and the Dutch
market, underwent major structural change as the subprime crisis unfolded, in an
attempt to identify early-warning signals of the approaching crisis. In both markets
at the onset of the crisis the dynamic evolution of the network seemed completely
uninformative as the networks only display an abrupt topological change in 2008,
providing a clear, but unpredictable, signature of the crisis. Nonetheless, when
controlling for the banks’ connectivity heterogeneity, Squartini et al. (2013) show
that higher-order topological properties (such as dyadic and triadic motifs) revealed
a gradual transition into the crisis, starting already in 2005. Although these results
provide some evidence of early warning topological precursors, at least for the Dutch
interbank market, the authors cannot explain the economic rationale for the observed
patterns.
In addition to the abrupt topological change after Lehman defaults, that mostly
appear to be driven by precautionary liquidity hoarding, Cocco et al. (2009), Affinito
(2012), Brauning and Fecht (2012) and Temizsoy et al. (2015) have shown that banks
relied more extensively on relationship lending during the crisis, with both lenders
and borrowers benefiting from close relationship both in terms to access to liquidity
and funding rates. Relationship lending thus plays a positive role for financial sta-
bility and provides a measure of the level of financial substitutability of banks in the
interbank market. Furthermore these results show that interbank exposures is used
as a peer-monitoring device (Rochet and Tirole (1996)) and can help policymakers
to assess market discipline. Finally, reliance on relationship lending is an indicator
of trust evaporation in the banking system. Thus, monitoring how stable relations
affect spreads and volumes over time may act as an early warning indicator of a
financial turmoil.
Bech and Atalay (2008) analyze the topology of the Federal Funds market by
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looking at overnight transactions from 1997 to 2006. They show that reciprocity
and centrality measures are useful predictors of interest rates, with banks gaining
from their centrality. Akram and Christophersen (2010) studies the Norwegian in-
terbank market over the period 2006-2009. He observes large variations in interest
rates across banks, with systemically more important banks, in terms of size and
connectedness receiving more favorable terms. Gabrieli (2012) tests whether mea-
sures of centrality can help explaining heterogeneous patterns in the interest rates
paid to borrow unsecured funds in the e-MID market, once bank size and other bank
and market factors are controlled for 2.This paper shows that the effect of intercon-
nectedness on interbank borrowing costs is very different before versus after August
2007; and that banks of different size profit from different forms of centrality before
the crisis and lose from different forms after the crisis.
Similar to Gabrieli (2012), we also study the e-MID market and implement a
number of centrality measures in our analysis. The main difference with Gabrieli
paper is that, like Akram and Christophersen (2010), she perform the analysis on
daily networks while we compute centrality measures on quarterly aggregated trans-
action networks. This choice is motivated by the analysis of Finger et al. (2012)
who show that the e-MID networks appear to be random at the daily level, but
contain significant non-random structure for longer aggregation periods. While the
use of daily networks is justified by the fact that the underlying loans are O/N
the daily networks are not representative for the underlying ‘latent’ network. Daily
transactions are rather random draws from the true underlying network with the
realizations depending on current liquidity need. A much higher degree of struc-
tural stability is achieved for longer aggregation periods, monthly or quarterly. At
2Furthermore, there is also a very high interconnectedness in other interbank markets besides
the traditional interbank lending market (see for example Markose, Giansante, and Shaghaghi,
2012 for the CDS market )
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the daily scale, several banks act exclusively as lenders or borrowers, and liquidity
flows over short paths resulting in very small values of centrality according to most
measures, which is not the case at longer aggregation scales. In addition we perform
the regression analysis not per bank but per pair, assessing simultaneously the role
of lender and borrower centrality in a transaction on the interest rates.
3.3 Data and variables definition
We use tick-by-tick data of the Italian e-MID from 01 January 2006 to 31 December
2009. We have detailed information about each transaction; time, volume of trade,
maturity, interest rate, the side of the transaction (buy/sell) and the code of the
banks acting as quoter and aggressor, country of origin and size of both parties.
The interest rate is expressed as annual rate and the volume of the transaction is
provided in millions of Euros. The e-MID market includes contracts with maturities
varying from one day to one year. We restrict our analysis to overnight (O/N)
and the overnight long (ONL3), which consists of more than 90% of all e-MID
transactions as the interbank market is mainly a market for short-term trades. If
loans with longer maturities were included in the dataset, it would be difficult to
derive a representative interest rate for the market, as longer term loans tend to be
infrequent.
3.3.1 Interest Rate Spread
In this study, the unit of analysis is not an individual bank but a pair of banks,
that is, lender and borrower in order to control counterparty specific characteristics.
We calculate the quarterly volume weighted average interbank interest rate for each
3ONL refers to contracts when there is more than one day between two consecutive business
days.
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bank pair ij as
Sij,t =
1
∑Nij,t
n=1 Vij,n
Nij,t∑
n=1
(rij,n − r¯
d
m) ∗ Vij,n,
where rij,n and Vij,n are the transaction level interest rate outstanding and volume of
transaction, respectively, for each pair of banks ij where i 6= j, Nij,t is the number
of transactions for the bank pair ij where i 6= j at period t and r¯dm is the daily
volume weighted average rate over all transactions carried out by the bank pairs
and calculated as
r¯dm =
∑Nij,d
n=1
∑
j=1
∑
i=1 rij,n ∗ Vij,n∑Nij,d
n=1
∑
j=1
∑
i=1 Vij,n
,
where rij,n and Vij,n are defined same as spread formula above and Nij,d is number
of transactions for the bank pair ij where i 6= j at day d.
In our study, we only include banks that actively participate in the interbank
overnight market for all sub-periods phase I, II and III of the financial crisis of 2007-
08 in order to avoid potential selection bias in our analysis. The aim of this approach
is to exclude banks that go bankrupt or drop out of the market for any reason or
banks that enter the market during sixteen quarters from January 2006 through to
December 2009. As a result of this data trimming for entering and exiting banks,
the number of banks during the period analyzed decreases from 200 to 140. Further
details about the sample are in Temizsoy et al. (2015). We also consider three
sub-samples according to the evolution of the financial crisis:
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Period Description Key date No. of Quarters
1-Jan-06 - 30-Jun-07 Phase I Two Bear Stearns’ hedge fund bankruptcy 5
(31-Jul-07)
1-Jul-07 - 30-Sep-08 Phase II Lehman Brother’s collapse 5
(15-Sep-08)
30-Sep-08 - 31-Dec-09 Phase III - 5
3.3.2 Network Centrality Measures
Centrality is a concept developed in sociology to assess who occupies critical posi-
tions in a network, and to identify important, or powerful, individuals. Importance
can be interpreted in different ways and this has lead to different definitions of
centrality. The most popular centralities measures used in the financial economics
literature all reflect the involvement of a node in the cohesiveness of the network
but differ on how cohesiveness is measured, that is in terms of how walks between
nodes are defined and counted. The measures described in this paper span from
walks of length one (degree centrality) to infinite walks (eigenvalue centrality). In
simple structures these different measures tend to covary but in more complex and
larger networks, nodes can be more important respect to some centrality measure
and less important respect to others.
The network perspective emphasizes that power is not an individual attribute but
is inherently relational. Power may arise from occupying advantageous positions in
networks of relations, such as by being closer to others. For our analysis we represent
the market as a network consisting of nodes (banks) and a time-varying number of,
weighted and directed, links between them (representing interbank loans). The
direction of the links follow the flow of money (from lenders to borrowers). Two
banks can be connected by two links, one in each direction, if they both act as
lenders and borrowers. Thus, network centrality directed measures provide different
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values of the bank’s interconnectedness, focusing separately on the role of a bank as
lender or as a borrow.
Let A be an adjacency matrix where aij means that i contributes to j’s status
and n is the number of nodes in the network. We compute a directed adjacency
matrices where aij = 1 if bank i lends to bank j, and 0 otherwise.
Nodes with more ties to other nodes have alternative ways to satisfy their needs,
in our contest they have greater opportunities to exchange liquidity. Choice makes
these nodes less dependent on other nodes, and in this sense more powerful, such as
in bargaining better rates. Thus a simple measure of a node centrality is its degree.
When links are directed, it is common to distinguish centrality based on in-degree
from centrality based on out-degree. Nodes that receive many ties are said to be
prominent, or to have high prestige or trust. Nodes who have high out-degree are
said to be influential. Formally indegree and outdegree centrality are defined as
IndegreeCentrality(i) =
∑
j aji
n− 1
,
OutdegreeCentrality(i) =
∑
j aij
n− 1
,
where A is the adjacency matrix and n is the number of nodes in the network.
Degree centrality only takes into account the immediate ties that a node has. A
node might be tied to a large number of others, but those others might be discon-
nected from the network as a whole. In a case like this, the node could be central,
according to degree centrality, but only in a local neighborhood. So degree is a
measure of local centrality.
Closeness and betweenness centrality focuses on the distance of a node to all
the other nodes in the network, and in this sense they are measures of global cen-
trality. In connected graphs there is a natural distance metric between all pairs of
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nodes, defined by the length of their shortest paths. When defining Betweenness
and Closeness we consider two alternative choices of directed paths: the one that
follows the flow of money lent, that is paths go from lenders to borrowers (along
outgoing links), and the one that follows the direction of repayments to be made,
that is paths go from borrowers to lenders (along incoming links). We name these
two measures as OutBetweenness, OutCloseness, InBetweenness, and InCloseness,
respectively.
Betweenness centrality, introduced by Freeman (1979), is based on the idea that
nodes have positional advantage if they lay in between other pairs of nodes. The
intuition is that nodes who are “between” other nodes will be able to translate
their broker role into power. Betweenness centrality is computed, for each node, by
adding up the proportion of times a node fall on the shortest (geodesic) pathway
between other pairs of nodes and is normalized by expressing it as a percentage of
the maximum possible betweenness that a node could have:
InBetweenness(k) =
1
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
i,j
σin(i, j|k)
σin(i, j)
,
OutBetweenness(k) =
1
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
i,j
σout(i, j|k)
σout(i, j)
,
where σin(out)(i, j) is the number of shortest in (out) paths from node i to j and
σin(out)(i, j|k) is the number of such in (out) paths passing through the bank k.
While Gabrieli (2012) reports that this measure is very small and often zero in
daily networks, confirming the limited extent of intermediary trading in the e-MID
market at daily aggregation scale, we find that in quarterly networks, very few
nodes exclusively lend or borrow (on average about 5% of the banks only lend or
only borrow in a given quarter but the proportion increases up to 10% for borrower is
Phase III) and values of betweenness are over 10 times larger than the one reported
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by Gabrieli both for the directed and non directed version of the centrality indicator.
Closeness centrality is calculated as the inverse of the average of the shortest
(geodesic paths) from a node to each other node in the network.
InCloseness(i) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
lin(i, j)
,
OutCloseness(i) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
lout(i, j)
,
where lin(i, j) lout(i, j) represent respectively the length of the shortest in and out
paths.
Bonacich (1972, 1987) and Katz (1953) proposed a modification of the degree
centrality based on the idea that the centrality of a node depends on the centrality
of the nodes that link to it, InEigenvector centrality, or on the centrality of the
nodes it links to, OutEigenvector centrality. These measures are defined as
InEigenvector(i) =
∑
j
ajiInEigenvector(j),
OutEigenvector(i) =
∑
j
aijOutEigenvector(j).
In matrix form, this can be expressed as
InEigenvector = AT InEigenvector,
OutEigenvector = AOutEigenvector,
where InEigenvector and OutEigenvector are vectors of centrality scores4. Thus the
centralities are given by the elements of the eigenvector of A or AT corresponding to
4In undirected networks AT = A and the two measures coincide.
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an eigenvalue of 1, which in general has no non-zero solution. One way to make the
equations solvable is to normalize the rows (columns) so that each adds up to 1 and
A and AT become a stochastic matrix. The other way, first suggested by Bonacich
(1972), is to assume that each individual’s status is proportional (not necessarily
equal) to the weighted sum of the individuals to whom she is connected, in which
case the equation can be rewritten as
InBonacich(i) = 1/λ
∑
j
ajiInBonacich(j),
OutBonacich(i) = 1/λ
∑
j
aijOutBonacich(j),
so that the centrality measure is given by the eigenvector associated to the largest
eigenvalue of AT . If the graph is strongly connected the Perron-Frobenius theorem
guarantees that there is unique and positive eigenvector. Bonacich is the eigenvector
centrality measure computed for our regression analysis.
A practical problem with eigenvector centrality is that it works well only if
the graph is (strongly) connected, i.e. if each node is reachable from every other
node in the network. Real undirected networks typically have a large connected
component. However, real directed networks do not. If a directed network is not
strongly connected, only vertices that are in strongly connected components or in
the out-component and in-component5 of the strongly connected components can
have non-zero eigenvector centrality. This happens because nodes with no incoming
edges have, by definition, a null InEigenvector centrality score, and so have nodes
that are pointed to only by nodes with a null InEigenvector centrality score (and the
analogous for the OutEigenvector centrality). Thus, when a node is in a directed
acyclic graph, centrality becomes zero, even though the node can have many edges
5The in-component of a node is the set of vertices from which that node can be reached; the
out component is the set of vertices that can be reached from that node.
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connected to it. A way to work around this problem is to give each node a small
amount of centrality for free, regardless of the position of the vertex in the network,
C = αATC + β1
which has the solution C = (I − αAT )−1 · β1. This measure of centrality is equiv-
alent to a measure proposed by Katz (1953) who suggested that influence could
be measured by a weighted sum of all the powers of the adjacency matrix A (or
AT ). Powers of A (or AT ) give the number of directed walks of length given by
that power. Giving higher powers of A less weight would index the attenuation of
influence through longer paths
InKatz =
∞∑
l=1
(αAT )l.
OutKatz =
∞∑
l=1
(αA)l.
The infinite sum converges, so for example InKatz = (I − αAT )−1 · 1 as long as
α < 1/λ1, where λ1 is the maximum value of an eigenvalue of A
T . As a result,
eigenvector centrality can be interpreted as a distance between nodes measured by
unrestricted walks of any length, rather than by paths or geodesics.
A popular commercialization of eigenvector centrality is Google’s PageRank al-
gorithm (Page et al., 1999), which also can be computed for asymmetric networks.
Unlike Katz’s centrality, where a node passes all its centrality to its out-links, or
inherit all the centrality from its incoming links, with PageRank each connected
neighbour gets a fraction of the source node’s centrality
InPagerank(i) =
1− β
N
+ β
∑
j
aji
InPagerank(j)
OutDegree(j)
,
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OutPagerank(i) =
1− β
N
+ β
∑
j
aij
OutPagerank(j)
InDegree(j)
,
where β the damping factor (that is the parting of PageRank that is transferred by a
node). For β = 1 page rank converges to eigenvector centrality (normally β = 0.85
is used). Pagerank can be reformulated in matrix format as InPagerank(j) =
(I − βATD−1)−1 · δ1 where D is a diagonal matrix of out-degrees and δ = (1 −
β)/n. As a result of Markov theory, it can be shown that PageRank is the steady
state probability distribution of a random walk with a restart probability δ. Thus
PageRank can be interpreted as the fraction of time that a random walk(er) will
spend at a node over an infinite time horizon. The restart probability allows the
random process out of dead-ends (dangling nodes). PageRank (as well as SinkRank
below) can be generalized to weighted networks by replacing the adjacency matrix
with the weights matrix and the nodes’ degrees with their strengths.
For all the centrality measures considered so far, the in version capture the
importance of a bank as a lender and the out version captures the importance of a
bank as a borrower. If we are interested in systemic risk it is the in centrality version
of the centrality measures that is more relevant. A borrower can be systemically
important only if their lenders are also systemically important borrowers as in this
case distress can propagate through the network On the contrary banks characterized
by a high out-centrality measure can be important liquidity providers as, by lending
to other central lenders, they contribute to the overall market liquidity.
Two recently-developed centrality measures are Acemoglu et al. (2015) harmonic
distance and Soramaki (2013) SinkRank.
The harmonic distance from bank i to bank j is defined as
Harmonic(i, j) = θi +
∑
k 6=j
(yik/yi)CH(k, j)
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where yik represents the value of the loans borrowed by bank k from bank i and
yi all loans given by bank i. The centrality of the node can then be measured by
the increase of the sum of the harmonic distance of a node from all other nodes in
the network6. Acemoglu et al. (2015) shows that the matrix Q, whose elements are
qij = yij/yi, is a stochastic matrix and hence can be interpreted as the transition
probability matrix of a Markov chain. For this Markov chain, one can define the
mean hitting time from i to j as the expected number of time steps it takes the
chain to hit state j conditional on starting from state i. Acemoglu et al. (2015,
p.588) show that the harmonic distance from bank i to j is equal to the mean hit-
ting time of the Markov chain from state i to state j. Acemoglu et al. (2015) argues
that “various off-the-shelf (and popular) measures of network centrality (such as
eigenvector or Bonacich centralities) may not be the right notions for identifying
systemically important financial institutions. Rather, if the interbank interactions
exhibit non-linearities similar to those induced by the presence of unsecured debt
contracts, then it is the bank closest to all others according to our harmonic dis-
tance measure that may be ‘too-interconnected-to-fail.’ ” (pp. 566-567) Similar to
Acemoglu et al. (2015) measure Soramaki’s SinkRank is based on absorbing Markov
chains. SinkRank is defined as
Sinkrank =
n−m∑
i
∑
j qij
where m is the number of absorbing states and n−m the number of non absorbing
states and qij the element of the matrix Q = (I − S)
−1 and S is the matrix of
transition probability for non-absorbing states. Q is a matrix whose elements give
the number of times, starting in state i a process is expected to visit state j before
6Acemouglu’s Harmonic distance is, in our terminology an out − centrality measure, and the
corresponding in version could also be defined.
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absorption, that is the total number of visits a process is expected to make to all the
non-absorbing states. Sink distance can only be calculated when a directed path
exists between the absorbing node and the non-absorbing node being considered,
thus it is most useful as a centrality metric for networks that are strongly connected.
It can be generalized to networks that are not strongly connected by adding a small
constant to the zero elements of the transition matrix, equivalent to the random
jump probability used in the PageRank algorithm, in which case the transition
probabilities become pij = β
sij∑
j sij
+ 1−β
n
. We compute both the in and out versions
of the Sinkrank centrality, where, as for the other centrality measures, the in version
is obtained from the transpose of the connectivity matrix, and is also known as
Sourcerank. While Sinkrank identify liquidity sinks, Sourcerank identifies liquidity
providers.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the network centrality variables used
in the regression models below.
Figure 3.2 illustrate the average and quantiles of indegree of borrower and outde-
gree of lender for three phases of 2007-2008 financial turmoil. Both variables show a
higher inter-quantile range before Lehman’s collapse than after. There is, however,
a sharp decrease in the upper quantile of both measures during the second phase.
Figure 3.3 shows the average and quantiles of closeness and betweenness central-
ity over the time. Although there is no clear pattern in the betweenness centrality
of banks, closeness decreases during the second and third phase of the 2007-2008
financial turmoil, a trend that is similar to the local degree centrality measures.
Figure 3.4 shows no clear trend in the quantiles of the eigenvector-based centrality
measures but some of the distributions appear to become more right skewed towards
the end of the analyzed period.
Figures 3.5-3.7 show the distribution of centrality measures for the entire sample
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and for the three different subsamples, phases I-III. We discuss these figures in more
details in the Results section.
Global centrality measures tend to correlate with local centrality measures as,
by construction, high degree can lead to high centrality. To quantify the importance
of this effect, we regress the nodes global InCentrality (OutCentrality) versus their
Indegre (Outdegree) and plot the coefficients of the pooled OLS regressions, for
each quarter separately, in Figure 3.8. The plots show interesting dynamics: while
correlations decrease over time for pagerank, they increase for closeness and have
a non monotonous behavior for betweenness. We do not explore in this paper
what consequences such dynamic change may have in terms of the banking system
stability, but we do control for these correlations when assessing the effect of global
centrality on interbank spreads.
3.3.3 Other control variables
In our analysis, in addition to centrality measures, we also control for a other vari-
ables that may affect interest rate spreads.
The identity of the banks trading in the e-MID is unknown to us and replaced
by a unique identifier in our dataset. This makes it impossible to match e-MID
trading data with balance sheet or other banks’ specific data. Other studies (see
Angelini et al., 2011) have shown that banks characteristics such as credit ratings,
capital ratios, or profitability remained roughly unchanged during the precrisis and
crisis period. Neither borrower and lender liquidity nor their shortage of capital
correlate with e-MID market spreads in Angelini et al. (2011) study. Of course,
since credit ratings lost credibility as the crisis unfolded we do not know if banks
used rating agencies’ scores to inform their choices of counterparty. Neither we know
what other private or public information was available to banks. For this reason we
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also include time varying measures of aggregate volumes of O/N trading by both
the lender and borrower as a proxy of banks’ characteristics. The intuition is that
participation in terms of volume captures all unobserved factors that may be relevant
to explain banks’ spreads. We also include transaction concentration, Transaction
Ratio (%), that measures the ratio of the number of transactions between each pair
to all transactions that takes place in the same period. This variable captures the
overall importance of the pair within the network structure.
Another key determinant of O/N rates is the time of a transaction. While
Angelini (2000) using hourly e-MID data shows no intraday pattern of interest rates,
Baglioni and Monticini (2008) and Gabbi et al. (2012) find a decreasing trend in
the O/N rate as the trading day progresses. The intraday slope becomes more
pronounced with the financial crisis and, in particular, after the Lehman Brothers
collapse. The intraday term structure of interest rate is due to the maturity of O/N
deposits which are expected to be reimbursed at 9 am of the day following the trade.
The increase in the slope of the yield curve after the default of Lehman apparently
creates a risk-free profit opportunity. Baglioni and Monticini (2008) suggest that
this opportunity is not arbitraged away for two main reasons: uncertainty about
availability of liquidity late in the afternoon and an increase in the implicit cost of
collaterals. Similar to Baglioni and Monticini (2008), we also examine the effect
of the time interval of the transaction performed. Instead of dividing the day into
hourly segments, we use only two slots: morning (8 am - 1 pm) and afternoon (1 pm -
6 pm). Morning-Afternoon (AM/PM Ratio) is the fraction of the difference between
number of transactions that occur during morning and afternoon to all transaction
of each pair at a given period. In the interbank market, participants must repay the
loans at 9 am on the next trading day of transaction. Hence, morning interest rates
have a premium to account for the longer maturity period than those transactions
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in the afternoon.
While the e-MID market is not affected by search frictions and lack of trans-
parency, trading in the electronic segment of the interbank market is affected by
its own specific micro-structure features. Gabbi et al. (2012) and Temizsoy et al.
(2015) have shown that due to a bid-ask spread effect, better rates are obtained,
both by lenders and borrowers, when they act as quoters rather than as aggressors.
A credit institution that first comes to the market with a proposal to lend or borrow
is called quoter, while the bank that picks a quote and exercises a proposal is called
aggressor. Aggressors, by choosing their counterparties, may have more power than
quoters in a pair relationship. Thus we control for variations in rates that are ex-
plained by the bid-ask spread effect by separately studying quoters and aggressors.
Then we control for the ratio of the difference between number of transactions of a
pair that occurs when lender is a quoter and when a lender is aggressor, divided by
all transactions of the pair at a given quarter (Quot/Agg Ratio).
3.4 Econometric Model
In order to investigate the effect of network characteristics on the interbank market
we consider the following econometric model. Let
Sij,t = β0 + β1Aij,t + β2Bi,t + β3Cj,t + uij,t
uij,t = µij + δt + eij,t.
where i, j denotes bank pairs (bank i lends to j), t indexes time, Sij,t is the spread,
Aij,t, Bi,t and Cj,t represent pair, lender, and borrower related variables, respectively,
µij is the pair-specific effect, δt a time-specific effect, and eij,t is the unobserved
residual. We estimate the model above using fixed-effects (FE) at bank pair level
and time dummies. We also compute robust standard errors clustered at the bank
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pair level which allows us to control for the time-varying bank heterogeneity. Since
we want to allow different effect of variables on spread, we run the same model for
three time spans, phase I, phase II, phase III of the latest financial turmoil, and for
all pooled periods.
All analysis are done conditional on bank pair ij fixed-effects, and therefore, the
effect of the variables should be interpreted as conditional on the existence of that
particular link i → j. We cannot claim that network characteristics cause spreads.
Feedback effects between network positioning and prices are possible, with network
characteristics leading to better prices and more favorable prices reinforcing network
effects. This feedback loop makes it difficult to establish the causality of the effect.
Temizsoy et al. (2015) shows that such feedback effects are small. Spreads do not
determine survival of a bank pair into the following months once relationship indexes
are controlled for, while relationship lending has an effect on spreads. Previous
studies (see Hatzopoulos et al., 2015) have also shown that, when controlling for
banks heterogeneity in trading activity, the matching process in the e-MID market
is fairly random. This suggests that links are not preferentially formed with banks
that offer lower rates or that are more trustworthy. Rather banks appear to be more
likely to selected as trading partners because they trade more often. This points to
a causal effect of relationship on prices rather than the other way around. In this
paper we do not model the entry and exit decisions of banks and their matching
patterns. What we show is that network variables, once formed, possibly at random,
persists and are important for explaining prices and can play an important role also
within a transparent market such as the e-MID.
Network variables are introduced one at a time in different specifications, to-
gether for both lender and borrower. The reason is that while they are intended to
describe different features of the network they are very correlated with each other.
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For global measures, we consider specifications both with and without controlling for
the local network counterparts. Network variables are considered in logarithm form,
and as such, regression coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of doubling
network centrality on spreads, in basis points.
All specifications include a set of baseline covariates given by Transaction Ra-
tio(%), AM/PM Ratio, Quot/Agg Ratio, Reciprocity Ratio, O/N Trading Amount
of Lender, O/N Trading Amount of Borrower, described in section 3.3.3. The inclu-
sion of these covariates is to isolate the effect of network characteristics on transac-
tion spreads from bank- and pair-specific variables that contribute to spreads (see
Temizsoy et al., 2015, for a description of the effect of these variables on spreads).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Local network measures
As a first approximation to the effect of network centrality on the interbank market
we evaluate the effect of local centrality measures (in logs) on spreads. Table 3.2
shows the effect of degree centrality on interbank spreads. Columns (1)-(4) presents
a specification with lenders (L) and borrowers (B), indegree and outdegree. The
results show that B with high indegree pay higher spreads, and this effect increases in
magnitude as the financial crisis evolves. The pooled effect determines that doubling
borrowing links (i.e. increasing the logarithm of the indegree centrality measure by
1 unit) increases interest rate by 1.437 basis points in all pooled periods, which
corresponds to 0.653, 0.929, and 3.849 in phases I, II and III, respectively. That
is, B pay a premium to be able to get more partners in the interbank network,
and this increases when systemic risk increases. We might thus speculate that
financial uncertainty directs banks towards looking for better connections within
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the established network structure and they paid a premium for the number of links.
L have no clear pattern regarding outdegree network centrality measures. L
outdegree has a non-significant effect for all pooled periods (column (1)), positive
for phases I and II (columns (2) and (3)), and negative (although not significant) for
phase III (column (4)). This shows that L were able to obtain better rates for having
more links within the network before Lehman’s collapse, but the effect reverses after
it. L thus pay a price for diversification when systemic risk increases. Possibly this
suggests that in the presence of systemic risks, banks diversify their transactions,
and incur in worse interest rates. Diversification may in turn increase uncertainty
as well established information flows with a few partners are reduced (see Temizsoy
et al., 2015).
The results show that L (B) who engage in a well connected borrowing (lending)
activity benefit by obtaining better rates. Overall this suggests that network effects
depend on the joint lending and borrowing activities of the banks. In order to
explore this further we add the interaction terms indegree by outdegree, separately
for L and B, to the previous specification (columns (5)-(8)). Considering all pooled
periods, L obtain higher rates and B lower rates when they engage in both lending
and borrowing activities. The same effects appear in phase I, although they are not
present in phases II and III.
Figure 3.5, first row, shows the bivariate kernel density estimation for lenders (L)
outdegree and borrowers (B) indegree, for the all periods together, phase I, phase
II and phase III. The graphs show a differentiated behavior for lenders and B. L
outdegree has lower dispersion in phase I than in Phases II and III, thus indicating
increasing heterogeneity in L as the financial crisis evolves. B indegree, on the other
hand, has decreasing dispersion across phases. In fact the phase I plot indicates
the existence of B with many lenders, which eventually disappear in the following
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phases.
Figure 3.5, second row, shows the bivariate kernel density estimation for out-
degree and indegree of L, while the third row does it for outdegree and indegree
of B, for the all periods together, phase I, phase II and phase III. The second row
also shows that, from the point of view of L, banks borrow from less counterparts
overtime, while outdegree becomes bimodal in phase III. The graphs in the third
row indicate an overall reduction in the amount of incoming and outgoing links, in
this case from the point of view of B.
Two potential situations should be mentioned for systemic risk. The first case
corresponds to banks who lend to few counterparties (small outdegree of L) that in
turn borrow from many (large indegree of B). The lenders in this case are highly
exposed to the B (as lenders do not diversify) and if these borrowers default they
may spread the distress to several lenders. Note that while the proportion of L with
few counterparties increased, B had less and less counterparties. This indicates that
this case has not been observed in our sample. The second case corresponds to
banks who lend to many counterparties (large outdegree of L) who in turn borrow
from few banks (small indegree of B). If such lender exits the market or default they
may generate a liquidity crisis as their borrowers may find it difficult to satisfy their
liquidity needs unless they create new links in the market, i.e. substitutability. The
e-MID interbank market seems to be very prone to this second kind of systemic
risk, provided that the overall outdegree of B reduces while there appear to be some
lenders that attract many links to themselves.
3.5.2 Global network measures
Global network measures show the positioning of a bank and its relationship to the
interbank system. In contrast to local measures, these variables tend to identify if the
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bank is located in a particular position with a particular flow of money going through
it. Moreover, while local measures can be affected by individual banks’ decisions, and
thus regression coefficients cannot be interpreted as causal effects, global measures
are less affected by individual decisions, as they depend on collective actions, and
then they could be considered as exogenous variables in regression models.
Consider first the effect of betweenness in table 3.3. Recall that betweenness
measures a bank’s access to the interbank liquidity. When all pooled periods are
considered, InBetwenness has a negative effect for both L and B, and OutBetween-
ness has a positive significant effect for B. For B, the effects increase in absolute
value as the financial crisis evolves (i.e. the largest effect is in phase III). When lo-
cal centrality is controlled for, only OutBetweenness remains significant. For L, the
largest effect appear in phase III, where InBetweenness has a large negative effect
while OutBetweenness is positive and significant. When both in and out measures
are interacted B obtain a negative effect, which is significant for all pooled periods
and for phase II. The fact that L coefficients are not significant suggests that the
effect is not driven by market power, as otherwise both L and B would benefit from
it, but by a ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ perception of the B that benefit of lower
spreads because the market participants believe highly connected borrowers will be
bailout in case of default to avoid systemic effects. Then network interconnectedness
were perceived as an asset for B during the crisis (i.e. phase II), and this vanishes
after Lehman’s collapse.
Now consider the effect of closeness in table 3.4. Closeness is the inverse of the
average shortest distance of a bank from all banks that are reachable from it, and
thus, a bank with higher closeness is connected to more banks. For B, InCloseness
has a large positive and significant effect for all periods and subperiods, except for
phase II when local centrality is controlled for. For L, OutCloseness is negative, and
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statistical significant. These results suggest that both B and L pay a premium for
being interconnected to the network, and this increases when systemic risk is high.
Note that in this case the interaction for B of in and out has a positive coefficient
for all pooled periods but not significant for subperiods.
Figures 3.6-3.7 plot betweenness of L and B bivariate density estimates. The
figures clearly reveal two features producing an L-shaped density in betweenness.
First, the existence of a large number of L for which betweenness is either zero or
close to zero, possibly L who do not borrow. Second, there is also a big proportion
of B that also have zero or small betweenness. For closeness, figure 3.6 also reveals
two types of borrowers, some with positive closeness and some with close to zero
closeness. The latter group increases as a proportion of the total amount of borrowers
in phase III.
Tables 3.5-3.7 present the coefficient estimates of different global network vari-
ables using eigenvector centrality measures. All specifications include the same
control variables as described in section 3.3.3, although they are not reported.
Eigenvector type centrality measures how well connected the nodes to which
that bank is connected to. It does not only measure how a bank is connected to
the network, but it also indicates connectedness of its neighbors. Three different
measures are used in the regression models (see the definitions above): Bonacich’s
eigenvector, pagerank and sinkrank. In each case, the centrality measure can be
constructed by using the adjacency matrix A or its transpose. The former is the out
definition and corresponds to the centrality of a bank as a lender. The latter is the
in definition and corresponds to the centrality of a bank as a borrower. For each
pair of banks and a particular direction, we can consider the in and out centrality
of both L and B in different specifications.
The eigenvector network variables have similar and consistent effects across mea-
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sures. They show that for all pooled periods L receive lower rates for higher out-
centrality (doubling out-centrality reduces spreads by 0.65 basis points) while B pay
higher rates for higher incentrality (doubling in-centrality increases funding rates
by 0.9 basis points). These effects increase in absolute value across the financial
crisis, with the pooled effect driven by phase III for B (where the effect increases
up to 3 basis points) and by phase II or III for L. The coefficient estimates have,
in general, the same sign with and without controlling for local measures. Overall,
controlling for local network degree, the effect is marginally reduced. Note that
Bonacich measure has in general smaller (and less significant) effects than pagerank
and sinkrank. Such differences are due to the nature of the e-MID sample as not
strongly connected. This produces a significant amount of nodes with zero centrality
even though they are connected nodes. Pagerank and sinkrank do not suffer from
this and these are our preferred global centrality measures.
The opposite edge measures, i.e. out for B and in for L, have an overall non
statistically significant effect. The exception is the out-centrality measures for B
that appear with a negative and significant effect in phase II. That is, B who have
a high global centrality in lending obtain lower rates for their borrowing. In order
to explore this further, we consider the in- and out-centrality interaction. B obtain
a significant discount on their funding rates, suggesting that B receive better (i.e.
lower) rates when engage in both lending and borrowing. L, however, have a non
statistically significant effect for all pooled periods. The largest interaction effects
appear in phase II for B, and in phase III for L, the latter with a negative effect.
3.6 Conclusion
From a policy perspective monitoring how funding cost advantages, associated to the
perceived systemically importance of financial institutions, can be an important tool
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to assess the effectiveness of the regulatory reforms. Banks perceived as more likely
to receive taxpayer support may benefit from lower funding costs. These implicit
subsidy can create moral hazard and provide an incentive to take on additional risk,
exacerbating system fragility. Regulators thus have the objective to eliminate the
perception that some financial institutions are too big to fail or, in our case, ‘too-
connected-to-fail’. Monitoring how funding cost advantages evolve over time may
provide a way to measure the effectiveness on regulatory policy to reduce systemic
risk on one side and act as an early warning indicator of systemic risk on the other.
In our regression analysis we find that borrowers pay a premium (i.e. higher
rates) for being central. However, lenders’ centrality do not necessarily leads to
higher rates. However, there is also evidence pointing out to the ‘too-interconnected-
to-fail’ hypothesis that favors brokers, in particular during the acute phase of the
latest financial crisis. That is, banks that are central both as borrowers and lenders
at the same time, receive a discount on their funding rates. This effect is only
present for borrowers.
Favorable rates obtained by more central banks do not necessarily reflect lower
credit risk owing to any implicit government guarantee against default. It could
also reflect higher bargaining power and/or lower credit risk through more diversi-
fied portfolios. Disentangling these effects is difficult in the case of OTC markets
where market participants actively search for counterparties. When counterparties
meet, they negotiate terms privately, often ignoring prices available from other po-
tential counterparties and with limited knowledge about trades recently negotiated
elsewhere in the market. Thus better connected banks may have better access to
liquidity and benefit from better rates in compensation of their intermediation role.
But the e-MID is a fully transparent trading platform. There is little scope for inter-
mediation in this market. Search frictions and lack of information on rates offered by
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alternative lenders cannot be responsible for the observed cross-sectional dispersion
of O/N rates in this market. Nonetheless our analysis does not allow to identify
why centrality affect banks terms of trade in a financial network. The theoretical
literature does not help us in this respect. While several theoretical papers have
analyzed how the incentives of single agents to form linkages affect the resulting
network topology (Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007), Babus (2011), Babus (2013),
van der Leij and Kovarik (2012)) leading in some cases to a core-periphery structure
(in ’t Veld et al. (2014), Lux and Farboodi (2013)) they do not provide any insights
on the benefit of centrality in terms of prices.
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Figure 3.1: Bank Pair Spread over Time
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Figure 3.2: Quantile Analysis Degree Centrality
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Figure 3.3: Quantile Analysis of Betweenness & Closeness
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Figure 3.4: Quantile Analysis of Eigenvector, Pagerank, Sinkrank
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Figure 3.5: Bivariate Kernel Density - Local Network Measures (Graph Type; Directed:Yes, Weight:None)
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Figure 3.6: Bivariate Kernel Density - Global Network Measures(In) (Graph Type; Directed:Yes, Weight:None)
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Figure 3.7: Bivariate Kernel Density - Global Network Measures(Out) (Graph Type; Directed:Yes, Weight:None)
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Figure 3.8: Global InCentrality (OutCentrality) vs their Indegre (Outdegree)
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Note: Bold data points reflect coefficients significant at 10% significance level. All global and degree measures are in logarithmic form.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bank Pair Spread 37872 -.434 8.422 -114.934 82.004
lndegree of L 37872 20.076 22.968 0 108
Indegree Centrality of L 37872 .125 .141 0 .645
Outdegree of L 37872 30.361 15.18 1 89
Outdegree Centrality of L 37872 .19 .092 .006 .533
Indegree of B 37872 43.775 23.78 1 108
Indegree Centrality of B 37872 .274 .146 .006 .645
Outdegree of B 37872 20.365 15.931 0 89
Outdegree Centrality of B 37872 .126 .097 0 .533
OutBetweenness of L 37872 .01 .018 0 .14
InBetweenness of L 37872 .01 .01 .001 .066
OutBetweenness of B 37872 .013 .019 0 .14
InBetweenness of B 37872 .006 .008 .001 .066
OutCloseness of L 37872 .391 .066 .006 .606
InCloseness of L 37872 .337 .196 0 .716
OutCloseness of B 37872 .336 .11 0 .606
InCloseness of B 37872 .493 .088 .006 .716
OutBonacich of L 37872 .098 .056 0 .262
InBonacich of L 37872 .052 .059 0 .346
OutBonacich of B 37872 .061 .05 0 .241
inBonacich of B 37872 .118 .069 0 .346
OutPagerank of L 37872 .009 .006 .002 .039
InPagerank of L 37872 .006 .007 .001 .147
OutPagerank of B 37872 .007 .005 .001 .039
InPagerank of B 37872 .013 .012 .001 .147
OutSinkrank of L 37872 .004 .003 .001 .022
InSinkrank of L 37872 .005 .005 .001 .056
OutSinkrank of B 37872 .003 .003 .001 .022
InSinkrank of B 37872 .01 .007 .001 .056
Reciprocity Ratio 37872 .566 3.842 0 422
AM/PM Ratio 37872 .036 .81 -1 1
Quot/Agg Ratio 37872 -.537 .714 -1 1
Transaction Ratio 37872 .034 .066 .004 6.44
ON Trading Amount of Lender 37872 14.471 18.901 .007 154.421
ON Trading Amount of Borrower 37872 20.029 22.487 .002 154.421
Logarithmic Form of Network Measures
ln(Indegree of L) 30052 2.644 1.272 0 4.682
ln(Indegree Centrality of L) 30052 -2.429 1.264 -5.13 -.439
ln(Outdegree of L) 37872 3.263 .608 0 4.489
ln(Outdegree Centrality of L) 37872 -1.805 .596 -5.13 -.629
ln(Indegree of B) 37872 3.575 .739 0 4.682
ln(Indegree Centrality of B) 37872 -1.493 .731 -5.13 -.439
ln(Outdegree of B) 36094 2.687 1.02 0 4.489
ln(Outdegree of B) 36094 -2.385 1.004 -5.13 -.629
ln(OutBetweenness of L) 29960 -5.577 1.859 -13.341 -1.967
ln(InBetweenness of L) 37872 -5.012 .825 -6.574 -2.723
ln(OutBetweenness of B) 36056 -5.244 1.611 -13.341 -1.967
ln(InBetweenness of B) 37872 -5.453 .797 -6.578 -2.723
ln(OutCloseness of L) 37872 -.957 .228 -5.106 -.501
ln(InCloseness of L) 30052 -.92 .505 -5.13 -.334
ln(OutCloseness of B) 36094 -1.099 .462 -5.106 -.501
ln(InCloseness of B) 37872 -.729 .238 -5.13 -.334
ln(OutBonacich of L) 37838 -2.605 1.226 -25.999 -1.341
ln(InBonacich of L) 29686 -3.393 1.692 -32.993 -1.061
ln(OutBonacich of B) 36022 -3.513 2.712 -25.999 -1.424
ln(InBonacich of B) 37813 -2.405 .933 -32.993 -1.061
ln(OutPagerank of L) 37872 -4.844 .581 -6.447 -3.232
ln(InPagerank of L) 37872 -5.586 .967 -6.957 -1.916
ln(OutPagerank of B) 37872 -5.24 .65 -6.515 -3.232
ln(InPagerank of B) 37872 -4.566 .729 -6.938 -1.916
ln(OutSinkrank of L) 37872 -5.59 .574 -7.014 -3.811
ln(InSinkrank of L) 37872 -5.834 .974 -7.033 -2.886
ln(OutSinkrank of B) 37872 -5.987 .653 -7.033 -3.811
ln(InSinkrank of B) 37872 -4.819 .726 -7.014 -2.88699
Table 3.2: All O/N Loans - Local Network Measures as Determinants of Interest Rate
Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Phase I Phase II Phase III All Phase I Phase II Phase III
OutdegreeCentrality (L) -0.000 0.731** 0.766 -0.773 0.059 0.783** 0.835 -0.866
(0.235) (0.329) (0.528) (0.732) (0.246) (0.340) (0.551) (0.724)
IndegreeCentrality (B) 1.437*** 0.653*** 0.929 3.849*** 1.338*** 0.575*** 0.896 3.756***
(0.235) (0.217) (0.718) (0.684) (0.248) (0.215) (0.773) (0.679)
IndegreeCentrality (L) 0.171** -0.114 -0.218 0.604*** 0.175** -0.094 -0.219 0.941***
(0.078) (0.096) (0.150) (0.190) (0.078) (0.097) (0.150) (0.337)
OutdegreeCentrality (B) -0.107 0.065 -0.726*** -0.363 -0.000 0.103 -0.675*** 0.133
(0.085) (0.088) (0.184) (0.247) (0.096) (0.088) (0.201) (0.457)
DegreeCent. (L) (in*out) 0.212* 0.322* 0.438 -0.936*
(0.124) (0.170) (0.267) (0.568)
DegreeCent. (B) (in*out) -0.279** -0.299* -0.121 -0.645
(0.134) (0.173) (0.387) (0.484)
Transaction Ratio 4.932** 0.800 0.137 17.800*** 4.884** 0.720 0.237 16.626***
(2.318) (1.532) (1.889) (2.642) (2.301) (1.539) (1.899) (2.679)
AM/PM Ratio 2.270*** 1.155*** 3.247*** 1.638*** 2.273*** 1.158*** 3.241*** 1.680***
(0.093) (0.098) (0.197) (0.246) (0.093) (0.098) (0.196) (0.246)
Quot/Agg Ratio 1.606*** 0.872*** 1.794*** 3.125*** 1.614*** 0.873*** 1.793*** 3.163***
(0.119) (0.137) (0.255) (0.364) (0.119) (0.137) (0.255) (0.361)
Reciprocity Ratio -0.070*** 0.027 -0.040 -0.031 -0.069*** 0.029 -0.037 -0.062
(0.020) (0.039) (0.029) (0.175) (0.019) (0.039) (0.029) (0.179)
ON Trading Amount of L -0.009* -0.012** -0.027** -0.066 -0.007 -0.010* -0.022* -0.081
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.054) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.055)
ON Trading Amount of B 0.012** -0.001 0.010 -0.071** 0.009 -0.004 0.008 -0.081***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.028) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.031)
Observations 28,690 12,886 10,996 4,808 28,690 12,886 10,996 4,808
R-squared 0.084 0.037 0.082 0.174 0.085 0.038 0.083 0.178
Number of pair id 6,214 4,710 4,565 2,360 6,214 4,710 4,565 2,360
All network measures are in logarithmic form. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ON Trading Volume is used as proxy for bank size.
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Table 3.3: All O/N Loans - Global Network Measures as Determinants of Interest Rate
Spread (Betweenness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Phase I Phase II Phase III All Phase I Phase II Phase III
InBetweenness (L) -0.531*** 0.321*** -0.301 -2.038*** -0.535** 0.155 -0.345 -4.368***
(0.131) (0.123) (0.224) (0.393) (0.245) (0.276) (0.529) (0.945)
InBetweenness (B) -0.608*** -0.238* -0.639*** -0.918** -1.138*** -0.714* -0.951 0.487
(0.125) (0.130) (0.245) (0.405) (0.281) (0.419) (0.711) (1.033)
OutBetweenness (L) 0.057 -0.089 0.055 0.390*** 0.071 -0.261 0.020 -1.996**
(0.052) (0.059) (0.104) (0.129) (0.226) (0.259) (0.553) (0.856)
OutBetweenness (B) 0.330*** 0.104* -0.109 0.444*** -0.440 -0.580 -0.589 2.672*
(0.066) (0.062) (0.124) (0.150) (0.376) (0.499) (1.137) (1.506)
Betweenness (L)(in*out) 0.003 -0.032 -0.007 -0.496***
(0.044) (0.052) (0.102) (0.186)
Betweenness (B)(in*out) -0.130** -0.111 -0.078 0.395
(0.061) (0.081) (0.180) (0.263)
R-squared 0.081 0.036 0.079 0.159 0.081 0.036 0.079 0.164
Controlling for Local Measures
InBetweenness (L) -0.639*** 0.079 -0.858*** -1.444*** -0.565** -0.012 -0.047 -3.917***
(0.161) (0.133) (0.293) (0.436) (0.251) (0.294) (0.521) (0.937)
InBetweenness (B) -0.148 -0.156 -0.410 -0.152 -1.338*** -0.868** -1.718** -0.324
(0.126) (0.153) (0.253) (0.405) (0.278) (0.419) (0.749) (1.039)
OutBetweenness (L) 0.012 -0.131 0.196 0.413** 0.151 -0.234 1.351** -2.372**
(0.066) (0.081) (0.124) (0.184) (0.248) (0.265) (0.640) (0.943)
OutBetweenness (B) 0.332*** 0.011 0.233 0.424** -1.562*** -1.107** -1.937 0.256
(0.095) (0.095) (0.230) (0.169) (0.389) (0.535) (1.278) (1.584)
Betweenness (L)(in*out) 0.024 -0.018 0.209* -0.565***
(0.045) (0.050) (0.114) (0.195)
Betweenness (B)(in*out) -0.313*** -0.179** -0.354* -0.031
(0.062) (0.084) (0.198) (0.275)
R-squared 0.084 0.038 0.084 0.178 0.085 0.038 0.085 0.182
All network measures are in logarithmic form. In all models, we control for same variables used in the analysis of
local network measures in table 3.2; transaction ratio, AM/PM ratio, quoter/aggressor ratio and ON trading
volume. ON Trading Volume is used as proxy for bank size. In the second set of results, we also control for
indegree and outdegree of both lender and borrower. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3.4: All O/N Loans - Global Network Measures as Determinants of Interest Rate
Spread (Closeness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Phase I Phase II Phase III All Phase I Phase II Phase III
InCloseness (L) 0.068 -0.026 -0.256 -0.219 0.186 3.148 -0.039 3.113***
(0.111) (0.080) (0.174) (0.222) (0.960) (2.277) (0.890) (1.168)
InCloseness (B) 5.226*** 3.668*** 3.628** 19.255*** 9.499*** -2.767 1.339 20.615***
(0.909) (1.065) (1.595) (3.243) (1.329) (4.343) (8.942) (2.880)
OutCloseness (L) -2.214*** 3.167** 0.474 -5.909*** -1.650 5.811** 0.626 -0.685
(0.722) (1.352) (1.775) (1.807) (1.090) (2.825) (1.952) (1.946)
OutCloseness (B) 0.034 0.441 -1.180*** -0.597** 2.113*** -4.098 -2.628 -0.917
(0.124) (0.559) (0.298) (0.262) (0.412) (3.183) (5.254) (1.003)
Closeness (L) (in*out) 0.091 3.585 0.226 2.814***
(0.950) (2.552) (0.857) (1.027)
Closeness (B) (in*out) 2.941*** -7.051 -2.060 -0.580
(0.575) (4.993) (7.473) (1.396)
R-squared 0.083 0.037 0.079 0.208 0.085 0.038 0.079 0.213
Controlling for Local Measures
InCloseness (L) 0.056 0.037 -0.048 -0.664** -0.256 3.569 -0.313 2.349*
(0.118) (0.080) (0.185) (0.277) (0.994) (2.330) (0.864) (1.224)
InCloseness (B) 2.188** 3.733** 1.798 20.844*** 6.420*** -3.228 -2.629 25.098***
(1.051) (1.731) (1.751) (5.949) (1.721) (4.889) (8.764) (4.165)
OutCloseness (L) -4.694*** 0.766 -9.283*** -7.491*** -4.643*** 3.863 -9.629*** -2.225
(1.252) (1.878) (3.108) (2.363) (1.524) (3.190) (3.222) (2.376)
OutCloseness (B) 0.185 -0.167 -0.288 -0.777*** 1.925*** -4.744 -2.921 -0.503
(0.126) (1.083) (0.285) (0.287) (0.443) (3.284) (4.938) (0.985)
Closeness (L)(in*out) -0.302 3.968 -0.265 2.522**
(0.980) (2.604) (0.833) (1.061)
Closeness (B)(in*out) 2.504*** -7.130 -3.741 0.332
(0.629) (5.095) (7.022) (1.426)
R-squared 0.086 0.038 0.084 0.213 0.087 0.038 0.084 0.218
All network measures are in logarithmic form. In all models, we control for same variables used in the analysis of
local network measures in table 3.2; transaction ratio, AM/PM ratio, quoter/aggressor ratio and ON trading
volume. ON Trading Volume is used as proxy for bank size. In the second set of results, we also control for
indegree and outdegree of both lender and borrower. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3.5: All O/N Loans - Global Network Measures as Determinants of Interest Rate
Spread (Bonacich eigenvector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Phase I Phase II Phase III All Phase I Phase II Phase III
OutBonacich (L) -0.244** 0.711** 0.018 -0.621** -0.092 0.813 0.059 -0.973*
(0.108) (0.319) (0.327) (0.273) (0.127) (0.553) (0.390) (0.546)
OutBonacich (B) -0.012 0.072 -0.832*** -0.147*** 0.167*** 0.146 -0.624* -0.455***
(0.020) (0.060) (0.165) (0.042) (0.050) (0.325) (0.369) (0.149)
InBonacich (L) 0.027 -0.076 -0.083** 0.650*** 0.170* 0.020 -0.067 0.388
(0.035) (0.068) (0.039) (0.166) (0.091) (0.290) (0.141) (0.318)
InBonacich (B) 0.955*** 0.709*** 0.401** 2.709*** 1.392*** 0.804** 0.727 2.169***
(0.183) (0.168) (0.186) (0.517) (0.181) (0.409) (0.621) (0.580)
Bonacich (L)(in*out) 0.039* 0.036 0.003 -0.123
(0.022) (0.097) (0.032) (0.141)
Bonacich (B)(in*out) 0.110*** 0.031 0.077 -0.208**
(0.030) (0.137) (0.118) (0.091)
R-squared 0.083 0.039 0.083 0.190 0.084 0.039 0.083 0.193
Controlling for Local Measures
OutBonacich (L) -0.531*** 0.842 -2.668*** -0.751** -0.432** 1.099 -2.679*** -1.190*
(0.160) (0.626) (0.645) (0.325) (0.175) (1.017) (0.668) (0.655)
OutBonacich (B) 0.014 0.106 -0.738** -0.166*** 0.149*** 0.262 -1.132* -0.436***
(0.021) (0.121) (0.374) (0.047) (0.046) (0.348) (0.648) (0.153)
InBonacich (L) 0.027 -0.005 0.001 0.701*** 0.130 0.214 0.043 0.404
(0.037) (0.103) (0.046) (0.229) (0.122) (0.397) (0.180) (0.377)
InBonacich (B) 0.394* 1.047*** 0.159 1.520* 0.838*** 1.284** -0.366 1.100
(0.203) (0.332) (0.154) (0.879) (0.216) (0.589) (0.700) (0.921)
Bonacich (L)(in*out) 0.025 0.072 0.010 -0.143
(0.027) (0.125) (0.037) (0.146)
Bonacich (B)(in*out) 0.092*** 0.064 -0.110 -0.191*
(0.030) (0.145) (0.130) (0.098)
R-squared 0.085 0.039 0.088 0.193 0.085 0.039 0.088 0.196
All network measures are in logarithmic form. In all models, we control for same variables used in the analysis of
local network measures in table 3.2; transaction ratio, AM/PM ratio, quoter/aggressor ratio and ON trading
volume. ON Trading Volume is used as proxy for bank size. In the second set of results, we also control for
indegree and outdegree of both lender and borrower. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3.6: All O/N Loans - Global Network Measures as Determinants of Interest Rate
Spread (Pagerank)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Phase I Phase II Phase III All Phase I Phase II Phase III
OutPagerank (L) -0.551*** 0.170 0.060 -1.321*** 0.403 1.974** -0.317 -5.832***
(0.149) (0.181) (0.265) (0.339) (0.694) (0.829) (1.235) (1.909)
OutPagerank (B) -0.033 0.046 -0.659*** -0.141 -2.552*** -0.019 -5.253*** 0.155
(0.106) (0.125) (0.201) (0.288) (0.642) (0.705) (1.596) (1.284)
InPagerank (L) -0.157* -0.237** -0.248 0.683*** 0.726 1.439** -0.573 -3.113**
(0.094) (0.117) (0.182) (0.262) (0.583) (0.705) (1.027) (1.491)
InPagerank (B) 1.243*** 0.637*** 0.507* 3.515*** -1.687** 0.567 -4.949** 3.870**
(0.125) (0.142) (0.266) (0.277) (0.755) (0.764) (2.003) (1.502)
Pagerank (L)(in*out) 0.181 0.342** -0.065 -0.824**
(0.117) (0.141) (0.203) (0.341)
Pagerank (B)(in*out) -0.563*** -0.015 -1.059*** 0.070
(0.142) (0.145) (0.367) (0.291)
R-squared 0.092 0.034 0.079 0.182 0.093 0.035 0.081 0.184
Controlling for Local Measures
OutPagerank (L) -0.629*** -0.425* -0.409 -1.264** -0.694 1.548* -1.041 -11.267***
(0.217) (0.255) (0.382) (0.575) (0.812) (0.930) (1.450) (2.510)
OutPagerank (B) 0.309* -0.054 -0.085 0.479 -3.599*** -0.684 -5.196*** -2.488
(0.160) (0.192) (0.297) (0.477) (0.799) (0.926) (2.008) (2.066)
InPagerank (L) -0.167 -0.160 0.322 1.023** -0.207 1.677** -0.229 -7.657***
(0.152) (0.185) (0.316) (0.452) (0.698) (0.744) (1.259) (2.074)
InPagerank (B) 0.871*** 0.536** 0.156 3.317*** -3.769*** -0.178 -5.993** -0.166
(0.213) (0.242) (0.520) (0.530) (0.970) (1.002) (2.534) (2.376)
Pagerank (L)(in*out) -0.007 0.376** -0.110 -1.934***
(0.140) (0.154) (0.243) (0.480)
Pagerank (B)(in*out) -0.866*** -0.137 -1.177** -0.665
(0.175) (0.187) (0.462) (0.462)
R-squared 0.085 0.038 0.083 0.194 0.086 0.039 0.084 0.201
All network measures are in logarithmic form. In all models, we control for same variables used in the analysis of
local network measures in table 3.2; transaction ratio, AM/PM ratio, quoter/aggressor ratio and ON trading
volume. ON Trading Volume is used as proxy for bank size. In the second set of results, we also control for
indegree and outdegree of both lender and borrower. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3.7: All O/N Loans - Global Network Measures as Determinants of Interest Rate
Spread (Sinkrank)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Phase I Phase II Phase III All Phase I Phase II Phase III
OutSinkrank (L) -0.556*** 0.167 0.070 -1.352*** -0.385 2.133** -0.428 -5.930***
(0.152) (0.183) (0.278) (0.339) (0.788) (0.834) (1.340) (2.062)
OutSinkrank (B) -0.037 0.045 -0.670*** -0.221 -1.660** 0.072 -6.754*** -0.187
(0.107) (0.126) (0.203) (0.290) (0.663) (0.727) (1.596) (1.509)
InSinkrank (L) -0.163* -0.242** -0.246 0.657** 0.013 1.777** -0.727 -3.499**
(0.095) (0.118) (0.183) (0.267) (0.731) (0.780) (1.256) (1.747)
InSinkrank (B) 1.294*** 0.642*** 0.501* 3.543*** -0.754 0.678 -7.488*** 3.588*
(0.132) (0.144) (0.269) (0.302) (0.845) (0.867) (2.191) (1.831)
Sinkrank (L)(in*out) 0.032 0.362*** -0.083 -0.753**
(0.128) (0.138) (0.218) (0.333)
Sinkrank (B)(in*out) -0.344** 0.005 -1.360*** 0.010
(0.140) (0.145) (0.354) (0.304)
R-squared 0.092 0.034 0.079 0.177 0.092 0.035 0.082 0.178
Controlling for Local Measures
OutSinkrank (L) -0.645*** -0.443* -0.414 -1.298** -1.619* 1.612* -1.028 -11.541***
(0.226) (0.262) (0.408) (0.592) (0.919) (0.965) (1.575) (2.689)
OutSinkrank (B) 0.310* -0.058 -0.095 0.476 -2.884*** -0.642 -7.344*** -4.070*
(0.161) (0.194) (0.301) (0.486) (0.831) (0.904) (2.036) (2.428)
InSinkrank (L) -0.178 -0.171 0.326 1.037** -1.176 1.947** -0.243 -8.541***
(0.153) (0.187) (0.319) (0.461) (0.885) (0.867) (1.551) (2.412)
InSinkrank (B) 0.915*** 0.539** 0.167 3.311*** -3.176*** -0.182 -9.438*** -2.058
(0.233) (0.250) (0.534) (0.570) (1.076) (1.059) (2.787) (2.846)
Sinkrank (L)(in*out) -0.177 0.382** -0.102 -1.778***
(0.156) (0.158) (0.266) (0.465)
Sinkrank (B)(in*out) -0.674*** -0.123 -1.621*** -0.896*
(0.173) (0.178) (0.453) (0.480)
R-squared 0.085 0.038 0.082 0.191 0.086 0.039 0.086 0.197
All network measures are in logarithmic form. In all models, we control for same variables used in the analysis of
local network measures in table 3.2; transaction ratio, AM/PM ratio, quoter/aggressor ratio and ON trading
volume. ON Trading Volume is used as proxy for bank size. In the second set of results, we also control for
indegree and outdegree of both lender and borrower. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Chapter 4
Effect of Economical and Monetary Shocks on Country
Risk: Application of GVAR model
4.1 Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial turmoil urged governments of advanced economies to step
in to the center of financial systems and assume the risk of privately held debt across
capital markets. Consecutive bail-outs and governments’ intervention to protect “too
big to fail” institutions led to a stream of risk transmission from private financial
sector to public sector, eventually leading to a lack of investor confidence in sovereign
debt. As a result, spillover and contagion among countries attracted great attention
after the global financial crisis. With multiple European countries being in the center
of debt troubles, rapidly weakening situation in the Eurozone attracted a number
of empirical papers covering the issues of sovereign risk in the euro area. Most
importantly, the debt crisis in Greece, Ireland and Portugal focused the attention
of the sovereign bond spreads literature on the interdependence of countries’ risks.
This paper contributes to the understanding of (i) how monetary policies affect
sovereign risk, (ii) international linkages among sovereign risks and, (iii) heterogene-
ity among Eurozone countries, using an econometric specification of Credit Default
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Swaps (CDS) as a proxy of country-specific sovereign risk.
The literature on sovereign risks and contagion is very extensive, and it has
recently focused on Europe. Most papers analyze contagion mechanism and study
its determinants. Dungey and Martin (2007) analyze the linkage between countries
and financial markets and find significant evidence of spillover and contagion during
East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Fratzscher (2009) studies the transmission
channels of US shocks to foreign exchange markets and finds that macroeconomic
variables and financial exposure are important elements of transmission for both
advanced and emerging markets. Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) examine the spread of
shocks in global equity markets using variance decomposition methods. Bekaert et
al. (2010) provide evidence on the importance of monetary shocks. Niehof (2014)
finds that foreign shocks have a higher effect on countries with higher debts, and
European bond markets are primarily driven by European shocks. There is also
evidence of global interdependency and determinants of volatility of bond spread
changes across countries.
There is strong evidence of co-movement of government bond spreads in the Euro
area. The government spreads are generally decomposed into three main factors
of the government bond spreads: risk aversion, fiscal factors and liquidity factors
(Codogno et al., 2003; Geyer et al., 2004; Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Haugh et
al., 2009).
Apetite for risk is an important driver of sovereign bond spreads in the Euro area.
US corporate bond spreads, as a proxy of global risk measure, is found statistically
significant factor of European bond spreads (Codogno et al., 2003; Geyer et al., 2004;
Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). With the start of Economic
and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) and until the middle of 2008,
sovereign bond yields for EMU member countries remained relatively close to each
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other. However, after late 2008 with financial markets realizing the impact of the
crisis, sovereign bond yield spread between Germany and other Euro area countries
started to widen significantly. Recent studies also confirm that the start of EMU and
2008-09 financial crisis change the effect of government debt and deficit on sovereign
bond yields within the Euro area and find that Germany was perceived as a “safe-
haven” in international financial market after 2008-09 financial crisis (Bernoth et
al., (2012)).
The second common determinants are fiscal fundamentals and growth. Bernoth
and Wolff (2008); Bernoth et al. (2012); Favero (2013) examine the effect of both
debt and deficit on bond spreads. Assmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012) use time-
varying approach and find debt to GDP ratio is the most important factor which can
explain fluctuation in government bond spreads. Sovereign bond spreads become
an interesting area to analyze after 2008-09 sovereign debt crisis and studies on
government bond spread started to investigate whether yields co-movements differ
over time. Fiscal fundamentals are time-varying factors and European co-movement
differs over time (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Attinasi et al., 2010;
Borgy et al., 2011; Assmann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2012; Bernoth et al., 2012).
The third commonly used determinant of spread yields is liquidity risk. This is
a very important factor as countries within the Euro area have not perfect control
over monetary decisions which are taken by the central institutions, i.e. European
Central Bank (ECB). We consider the effect monetary shocks by studying M3 growth
and ECB refinancing rate in our model as the main determinants of the Eurozone
liquidity. We thus study how liquidity shocks and monetary policy in general affects
Euro countries’ CDS. There are different results on the importance of liquidity on
government bonds. Favero et al. (2010) do not find liquidity as a significant factor
in sovereign bond spreads, and show that liquidity is not independent from default
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risk and risk aversion.
Niehof (2014) also defines a fourth element which is financial market risk of
spillover due to evidence in the literature of co-movement of bond market and stock
market. This is specially relevant for countries in the EMU that have the same
currency, and as such, they are connected with strong links that go to European
central institutions.
We apply the global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model of Pesaran et al.
(2004); Chudik and Fratzscher (2011); Chudik and Pesaran (2011). This is a frame-
work for capturing interdependence and spillovers allowing for common factors and
time-varying components. Since GVAR allows for interdependencies across indi-
vidual variables within and across units, we model government bond CDS relative
to Germany by domestic, global, monetary and weighted foreign variables where
weights are calculated using their fiscal position. We include two factors that de-
termine the fluctuation in government bond CDS similar to Favero (2013); a local
factor (fiscal fundamentals and growth), and a global factor (market’s appetite for
risk).
We find evidence of positive correlation between sovereign bond CDS and risk
aversion for almost all countries in the Eurozone. When ECB increases its refinanc-
ing rate, we observe an increase in risk of sovereign bond of all countries due to
the negative environment in Euro area. A decline in money aggregates (i.e. M3)
leads to all countries becoming more fragile, hence increasing sovereign risk. In
contrast, monetary policies have the opposite impact on Greece, possibly due to a
differentiation effect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the
literature on measuring monetary shocks. Section 4.3 presents the eocnometric
model. In section 4.4, we describe data and perform some pre-analysis of sovereign
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bond CDS with 5-years maturity. In section 4.5, we provide the results, and section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 Monetary shocks in the Eurozone
Financial and non-financial markets are unlikely to respond to policy actions that
were already anticipated. That is, central banks actions are systematically related
to economic variables (i.e. inflation, output gap) which are both observed by the
national governments, international institutions and economic agents, then then an-
ticipatory responses occur before the actual change happens (i.e. a tightening of the
monetary policy, increment of the interest rate). In that case, it is difficult to iden-
tify the causal effect of monetary policy on financial markets. Distinguishing thus
between expected and unexpected policy actions is a key fundamental challenge of
the literature, and for this the definition of what is a shock and how it is constructed
varies.
This has been a topic of continuous interest in the US, where the Federal Re-
serve Bank (Fed) actions were systematically analyzed. Since Bernanke and Blinder
(1992) and Sims (1992), a considerable literature employed vector autoregressive
(VAR) methods to identify and measure these shocks. The canonical methodology
of Christiano et al. (1996) propose to measure exogenous monetary shocks using
orthogonalized shocks to the Fed funds rate (FFR) in a structural VAR model. The
system is identified by assuming that Fed behavior has no contemporary effect on
other “real” economic variables, but it takes these into account for policy actions.
Many other alternative methodologies have been proposed in the literature.
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) follows Kuttner (2001) in using FFR futures data
to construct a measure of “surprise” rate changes. They use the event study analy-
sis of comparing the future 1-month futures contract with the actual target rate set
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by the Fed. The economic rationale is that future interest rates reflect expectations
about monetary policies, and thus, deviations of the actual rate from the predicted
one by the futures market represent a shock. Their approach overcomes some of
the problems encountered by Christiano et al. (1996)’s VAR such as the time in-
variant parameter issue and omitted-variable bias. These “surprise” measures of
monetary policy are based only on the actual/observed policy rate. These might
not fully capture monetary policy shocks for two reasons. First, agents might be
able to anticipate changes in the policy rate but might be surprised about the path
of monetary policy. Second, recent changes in monetary policy, such as reaching
the zero lower bound and the use of unconventional monetary policy, might make
FFR-based measures superfluous.
The literature emphasizes that monetary policy is multi-dimensional. Gurkay-
nak et al. (2005) and Buraschi et al. (2014), among others makes an important
distinction between measures of surprises on the target rate (target shocks) and
surprises on the path of monetary policy (path shocks). While Bernanke and Kut-
tner (2005) and Christiano et al. (1996) shocks fall within the category of target
shocks, because they capture the unanticipated variation in monetary policy that
is reflected in the current reaction of the policy instrument, path shocks intend to
capture shocks to the path of monetary policy. More specific, Buraschi et al. (2014)
define a path shock as reflecting the surprises about future policy that can be in-
ferred from forward guidance and/or other communications by the Board members.
Intuitively, Buraschi et al. (2014) path shock allows assessing agents’ expectations
about the evolution of monetary policy. BCW uses survey data to learn directly
about agents’ expectations/forecasts about different measures of economic activity
and financial aggregates without imposing assumptions about the underlying data
generating process. These shocks are based on expectations about the path of the
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FFR controlling for forecasts about the evolution of the inflation and output gap.
Econometric models for the US have particular features that cannot be found in
Euro area countries. While the ECB is the central bank of Euro area countries its
policies may not be directly linked to individual countries’ performance but to more
aggregate performance at the Eurozone. The primary objective of the ECB, as laid
down in Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is
to maintain price stability within the Eurozone. The Governing Council in October
1998 defined price stability as inflation of under 2%, “a year-on-year increase in
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area of below 2%”
and added that price stability “was to be maintained over the medium term”. The
basic tasks, as defined in Article 3 of the Statute, are to define and implement the
monetary policy for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take
care of the foreign reserves of the European System of Central Banks and operation
of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system and
the technical platform (currently being developed) for settlement of securities in
Europe (TARGET2 Securities). The ECB has, under Article 16 of its Statute,
the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of Euro banknotes. Member states
can issue Euro coins, but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand
(upon the introduction of the Euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins).
The principal monetary policy tool of the European central bank is collateralised
borrowing or repo agreements. These tools are also used by the US Fed, but the
Fed does more direct purchasing of financial assets than its European counterpart.
The collateral used by the ECB is typically high quality public and private sector
debt.
Unlike the US Fed, the ECB has only one primary objective but this objective
has never been defined in statutory law, and the HICP target can be termed ad-
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hoc. In fact, the ECB has been at the center of the recent European crisis with
interventions that exceeded its original mandate. On 9 May 2010, the 27 member
states of the European Union agreed to incorporate the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF). The EFSF’s mandate is to safeguard financial stability in Europe by
providing financial assistance to Eurozone Member States. The EFSF is authorised
to use the following instruments linked to appropriate conditionality:
(i) To provide loans to countries in financial difficulties (e.g. Greek bailout);
(ii) To intervene in the primary and secondary debt markets. Intervention in
the secondary debt market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising
the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial
stability.
(iii) Act on the basis of a precautionary programme.
(iv) Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to govern-
ments.
Both for US and Europe, the classical tools of monetary policy (i.e. FFR for the
US, managing the ECB refinancing rate for the ECB) lost its flexibility and effective-
ness as it reached the zero lower bound. US monetary authorities gradually changed
its policy instruments by considering forward guidance and QE (Quantitative Eas-
ing).1 In contrast to the Fed, the ECB normally does not buy bonds outright. The
normal procedure used by the ECB for manipulating the money supply has been via
the so-called refinancing facilities. In these facilities, bonds are not purchased but
1Forward guidance is a change in the strategy of underpinning policy communication. The
structure of FOMC statements has been modified to include: (i) an economic outlook, in January
2000; (ii) qualitative statements about future policy inclinations, in August 2003; (iii) calendar
based-guidance, in August 2011; (iv) outcome-based guidance, in December 2012. Quantitative
Easing policies consist of purchases, by the central bank of specified quantities of long-term financial
assets. This could be separated into QE1, (late 2008-2009) and QE2 (2010 q2-2011 q2). While
QE1 consisted of purchases of MBS, Treasuries and Agency securities, QE2 focused only on the
purchase of long-term Treasury securities. The Fed intervened in both Treasury and mortgage
securities in QE1 and QE2.
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used in reverse transactions: repurchase agreements, or collateralised loans. These
two transactions are similar, i.e. bonds are used as collaterals for loans, the differ-
ence being of legal nature. In the repos the ownership of the collateral changes to
the ECB until the loan is repaid.
This changed with the recent sovereign-debt crisis. The ECB always could,
and through the late summer of 2011 did, purchase bonds issued by the weaker
states even though it assumes, in doing so, the risk of a deteriorating balance sheet.
As of 18 June 2012, the ECB in total had spent e212.1bn (equal to 2.2% of the
Eurozone GDP) for bond purchases covering outright debt, as part of its Securities
Markets Programme (SMP) running since May 2010. On 6 September 2012, the
ECB announced a new plan for buying bonds from Eurozone countries. The duration
of the previous SMP was temporary, while the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) programme has no ex-ante time or size limit. On 4 September 2014, the
bank went further by announcing it would buy bonds and other debt instruments
primarily from banks in a bid to boost the availability of credit for businesses.
The Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) programme was designed for financial
institutions in a liquidity crisis, such as the Greek banks in the course of the 2015
Greek financial snafu, when the banks experienced massive deposit flight. On 9
March 2015 the ECB started its own Quantitative Easing programme, which was
designed to ease sovereign stress in its member states. Purchases are e60bn per
month. The program is expected to last until at least September 2016. Though the
ECB’s main refinancing operations (MRO) are from repo auctions with a (bi)weekly
maturity and monthly maturation, the ECB now conducts long-term refinancing
operations (LTROs), maturing after three months, six months, 12 months and 36
months. In 2003, refinancing via LTROs amounted to e45bn which is about 20% of
overall liquidity provided by the ECB.
114
There is also an extensive literature exploring monetary shocks in Europe, al-
though the changing institutional environment makes it less conclusive. Barran et
al. (1996), Ramaswamy and Slok (1998), Dornbusch et al. (1998) analyze the mon-
etary transmission across countries in Europe before Euro was introduced and finds
that European countries respond similarly to the monetary shocks but with different
magnitude. Since the data used by these study are before EMU was established,
they only consider monetary policy effect and/or interest rate changes for each
country separately. After euro-zone was established, there has been further studies
considering effect of common Euro area monetary policy shocks and in the Euro
area. Georgiadis (2015) included ECB intervention in addition to macroeconomic
variables (output growth, inflation etc.) to analyze determinant of transmission of
Euro area monetary policy and concludes that economies of Euro area countries
are affected by the ECB’s monetary policy and transmission of monetary policy in
Euro area countries differs. The results of his research confirms to results of similar
studies related to effect of monetary policy shock in Eurozone (also see Ciccarelli et
al., 2012; Georgiadis, 2014).
We analyze the effect of monetary shocks on sovereign risk using two monetary
measures. The first one is the ECB refinancing rate and the second one is broad
money aggregate (M3). M3 is the broadest measure of money supply, and Euro area
M3 money supply includes following items; (i) liabilities of the money-issuing sector
and central government liabilities with a monetary character held by the money-
holding sector, (ii) currency in circulation, (iii) overnight deposits, (iv) deposits
(v) repurchase agreements (vi) money market fund shares (vii) debt securities up
to 2 years. Changes in both monetary variables are assumed to be exogeneous to
individual Eurozone countries’ sovereign risk, once interdependence is taken into
account.
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4.3 GVAR model
We use global vector autoregressive (GVAR) models to capture time-varying in-
terdependence of variables (see also Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009; Dees et al., 2007;
Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009; di Mauro and Pesaran, 2013; Favero, 2013). Our baseline
specification is
∆Sit = βi0 + βi1Sit−1 + βi2∆RiskAvit + βi3(Dit −D
g
it) + βi4(Bit −D
g
it) (4.1)
+βi5ln(ECB)it + βi6ln(M3)it + βi7ln(oil)it + βi8W
d
it−1 + βi9W
b
it−1 + uit,
Sit = CDSit − CDS
g
t , and ut ∼ i.i.d. (0,Σ) ,
i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 1, 2, ..., T,
where ut is the collection of shocks for the N countries and Σ is a N ×N variance-
covariance matrix of contemporaneous shocks interdependence.
In this model, the initial determinants of CDS of 5-years sovereign bond over
CDS of 5-years German (g) bund of a country i for a given period t, Sit, are fiscal
fundamentals. We use two proxies for country’s macroeconomic and fiscal condi-
tions: debt to GDP ratio (Bit) and deficit to GDP ratio (Dit). Second and third
determinants are global risk aversion (∆RiskAVit) and monetary policies (which
are proxied by ln(ECB) refinancing rate and ln(M3)). Finally we also consider oil
prices (in logs) as a proxy for global shocks that might affect the sovereign risk in
Euro area. These common variables are treated as exogenous.
The GVAR specification allows for time-varying interdependencies among coun-
tries. A time-varying weighting matrix captures the importance and influence of
country j on country i’s economy. Following Favero (2013) we employ fiscal funda-
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mentals as distance between countries to construct the interrelation matrix of the
GVAR specification. We rescale debt to GDP and deficit to GDP ratios as in Favero
(2013) based on Maastricht Treaty framework for time t as
distBji,t = |Bj,t − Bi,t| /0.6, and dist
D
ji,t = |Dj,t −Di,t| /3ω
B
ji =
1/distBij
∑ 1
distBij
and ωDji =
1/distDij
∑ 1
distDij
W bit =
∑
ωBjiSit and W
d
it =
∑
ωDjiSit
The contemporaneous global CDS spreads (W bit and W
d
it) are not included in
the model like a standard GVAR model, because these variables are unlikely to be
exogenous due to low number of cross-section units. Therefore, we use lags of global
spread in our specification.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 CDS and other data
A credit default swap (CDS) is a swap contract in which the protection buyer of the
CDS makes a series of premium payments to the protection seller and, in exchange,
receives a payoff if the bond goes into default. CDS is direct measure of the default
risk but not of the probability of default, as the price of a CDS depends both
on the probability of default and on the expected recovery value of the defaulted
bond. Moreover, such measure is not perfect; CDS differentials might also reflect
the different liquidity of different sovereign CDSs, as well as counterparty risk (i.e.
the risk that the protection seller of the CDS is not able to honour her obligation
when the bond goes into default).
The data on daily CDS with maturities between 1 and 10 years are provided by
Bloomberg and S&P Capital-IQ starting from 2006. In particular, we consider the
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monthly mean of 5-years CDS bonds.
The primary goal of this paper is to analyze the effect of monetary policy on Euro
area countries’ sovereign risks, as measured by 5 years CDS bonds. We focus on ten
countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. The sample has monthly frequency and runs from January
2006 to December 2014.
Considering the findings of Bernoth et al. (2012) on Germany’s “safe-haven”
status in Euro area, the CDS relative to German bund reveals the risk that an
investor takes by buying a specific sovereign bond. Therefore, CDS data used in our
study is the spread to CDS of German bund.
Figure 4.1: Monthly Average 5-yr Sovereign CDS Spread (in basis points)
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Note: CDS relative to CDS of German Bunds have seen two stress periods in last 10 years. First, CDS spreads in
Eurozone increased sharply in 2008/09 global financial crisis. Between mid 2009 and mid 2011, CDS spread in the
zone decreases, however with the start of Euro area crisis in may 2010, CDS spreads move up sharply.
If the country’s fiscal position degrades in comparison to the benchmark country
(Germany in our case), the CDS of government bond spread increases due to demand
of higher default risk premium. Debt to GDP and fiscal deficit to GDP ratios are
the most common fiscal variables used as a proxy of country-specific credit risk.2 We
2Some of the studies which use debt to GDP ratio as credit risk indicator are Favero and Missale
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use both variables constructed from Eurostat. Since these variables have quarterly
frequency, we interpolate data from quarterly to monthly using cubic splines.
We also include US corporate long-term Baa-Aaa spread (as per Moody’s rating
scale) in our analysis in order to control for time-varying global risk aversion which
is a conventional measure in the related literature (Codogno et al., 2003; Geyer et
al., 2004; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; Bernoth et al., 2012; Favero, 2013). When
there is high uncertainty in the market, the investors prefer safer bonds to riskier
corporate bonds. Therefore difference between low-grade bond (Baa) and high-grade
bond (Aaa) increases.
4.4.2 Unit root and structural break tests
The possibility of unit root is one of the key issues facing econometric modeling.
Therefore, we present the results of unit root tests (without a possible structural
break) in table 4.1. The t-statistics reported in the table for Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron unit root tests corresponds to the statistics with
the longest significant lag and 4 lags, respectively. The lag length used in ADF
unit root test is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) based on the
standard ADF regressions. In addition to the result of unit root test for individual
country, we also include results for panel. We run the unit root tests using time
trend and a constant.
Our results point out that CDS of 5-years government bond has unit root for all
countries apart from Netherlands according to ADF. However, the version of CDS
that we use in our model, CDS of sovereign bond relative to CDS of German bund,
(2012); Favero (2013); Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009); Beirne and Fratzscher (2013); Bernoth
and Erdogan (2012); Bernoth et al. (2012); Aizenman et al. (2013). Credit risk is proxied then
by deficit to GDP in the study of Bernoth and Erdogan (2012); Bernoth et al. (2012). Beirne
and Fratzscher (2013); Lane (2012); de Grauwe and Ji (2012) use current account deficit or fiscal
balance in their studies.
119
are stationary for all countries and also for panel. Unit root test of all explanatory
variables, that we include in our baseline mode, are also reported in the table 4.13.
Another important problem in the econometric modeling that we might face is
the possibility of structural breaks. The issue is likely to be observed in economies
that are subject to significant political, social and economical events. The fact that
country-specific models within GVAR are specified conditional on foreign and global
variables should somewhat eliminate the structural break issue. Since the GVAR
framework is vulnerable to this problem (Dees et al. (2007)), we run three tests; (i)
the possible breaks in our dependent variable, (ii) possible breaks in the regression
(iii) confirmation of on whether break dates apply to all countries.
We apply Quandt Likelihood Ratio(QLR) structural break test in CDS of sovereign
bond over CDS of German Bund for nine countries in Eurozone in order to deter-
mine the periods where trend of CDS is statistically changed at 5% significance level.
Graph 4.2 shows QLR statistic of the structural breaks in CDS from the beginning
of 2006 to the end of 2014 for each country. Apart from Belgium and France, trend
of sovereign risk of all other countries is affected by 2007-2008 financial crisis. Al-
most all countries’ risk show structural change for the Greece debt crisis in 2012,
but only trend of sovereign risk for Netherlands is not affected by 2012 debt crisis.
We also run the QLR test for unknown dates to determine the structural breaks
in country-specific models and report our result in graph 4.3. There is statistically
significant variation in the structure of the model for almost all countries. In line
with the QLR results in variable level, only Netherlands has no structural change
in model.
Finally, we apply Chow test for each possible break point in model that we
3Favero (2013) states that non-stationary exogenous variable can be used in GVAR model,
therefore we employ Debt/GDP ratio relative to Germany. Debt/GDP ratio relative to debt/GDP
ratio of Germany is the only variable in our model that has unit root.
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Figure 4.2: Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) Structural Break in CDS relative to
German Bund
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Austria − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Belgium − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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France − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Greece − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Ireland − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Italy − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Netherlands − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Portugal − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
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Spain − Testing breaks in CDS (2004−2014)
Note: We check structural break in CDS for 4 lags. Vertical red lines represent Aug’09 for 2007-2008 financial
crisis and Mar’12 for 2012 Greece debt crisis respectively. Horizontal black line is for critical value of F-test at 5%
significance level.
determine using QLR test; Sep’08, Apr’10 and Apr’12 and present results in table
4.2. We run regression for each country separately and the only possible break
affects all countries is Apr’12 which is the period closer to Greece debt crisis.
Overall, not surprisingly, there is strong evidence of structural instability and
almost all countries are affected by recent financial and debt crisis. Therefore, we
also run our baseline GVAR model before and after 2012 Greece debt crisis in order
to detect the changes in the effect of domestic and foreign variable on sovereign risk.
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Figure 4.3: Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) Structural Break in Regression
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Austria − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Belgium − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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France − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Greece − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Ireland − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Italy − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Netherlands − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Portugal − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
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Spain − Testing Reg for breaks (Jan 2005− Dec 2014)
4.5 GVAR results
In this section we present and interpret the result of seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) using GVAR model and impulse response function for country-specific shocks
and monetary shocks.
4.5.1 Seemingly unrelated regression model
We present the results of SUR for nine countries using GVAR model in order to
analyze interdependence of countries in Euro area and other the factors that affect
country risk.
In table 4.3, our sample data covers the period from the beginning 2006 to the
end of 2014. In order to compare the changes before and after 2012 Greece debt
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crisis, we also run the same regression for a sub-sample between Jan-2006 and Dec-
2012. The results for before and after 2012 Greece debt crisis are provided in tables
4.4 and 4.5.
CDS spread is negatively affected by its lag for all countries which is in line
with the findings of Favero (2013). However, only Portugal presents positive effect
when we include all periods in our analysis. However, when taking into account the
subsample before the 2012 Greece debt crisis, Portugal is also negatively affected by
its CDS lag.
When M3 increases in the Eurozone, the government risk of almost all countries
decreases, except for Greece that is affected in the opposite direction. Similar results
are obtained for the effect of ECB refinancing rate. An increase in ECB refinancing
rate increases sovereign risk of all countries except Greece. A tightening of the
monetary policy (i.e. M3 decreases or ECB increases) is thus associated with a
negative signal on the Euro zone countries’ CDS. The case of Greece deserves special
attention.
As anticipated, there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and sovereign
bond CDS for almost all countries, but statistically significant for only Austria and
Italy (an increase in uncertainty for the corporate bond market leads to a rise in
sovereign risk).
4.5.2 IRF
Graph 4.4 and 4.5 show impulse response functions. First set of graphs present how
other countries (excluding Greece) are affected by a shock in a given country, where
the second set of graphs shows the effect of a shock in a given country on Greece
and country itself.
Shocks in all countries including Portugal has positive effect on sovereign risk
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Figure 4.4: Impulse Response Functions - Excluding Effect on Greece and Country
Itself
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of Greece. If any country’s sovereign risk deteriorates relative to the benchmark
country (Germany), this shock also impacts Greece as well and Greece’s position
also weakens.
All countries are negatively affected by their own shocks in the following period,
however shocks in Portugal has positive effect on the country. The reason might be
that Portugal has different economical structure than other countries. Regression
results also confirm that lag of CDS has different effect for all periods and before
2012.
Portugal, Spain and Italy are also highly affected by the shock of other countries
in terms of magnitude. The difference is that Spain and Italy are positively affected
by the shocks in other countries, however the shocks have negative effect on Portugal.
Regardless of the source of shocks, the largest effect is always on Greece in terms
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of magnitude. The other countries that follow Greece are Portugal, Spain and Italy.
Although the magnitude of reflection of shock on these three countries are relatively
small in comparison to Greece, figure 4.4 shows that they are affected by shocks
more than other Euro area countries.
Figure 4.5: Impulse Response Functions - Effect on Greece and Country Itself
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Graph 4.6 presents impulse response function for monetary shock on country risk
for each country. The set of graphs on the left and right hand side show the monetary
shocks in terms of money aggregate (M3) and ECB refinancing rate respectively.
An increase in money aggregate (M3) makes all countries more fragile and in-
crease sovereign risk. However, Greece is affected by change in M3 in a different
way than all other Eurozone countries in our sample. When ECB increases the M3,
the shock creates a positive effect on Greece and CDS of 5-yrs government bond
relative to CDS of Germany decreases.
As expected, shocks caused by changes in ECB rates have opposite effect on
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shocks generated by M3. Similar to the result of M3 above, Greece is affected by
the shock in opposite direction. In cases where ECB increases refinancing rate, it can
be interpreted as sensitivity to crisis and uncertainty in Euro area rises. Therefore,
the shock increases sovereign risk.
Figure 4.6: Impulse Response Functions - Monetary Shocks
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Note: The set of graphs shows the monetary shocks on countries. Money aggregate (M3) and ECB refinancing rate
are used as proxy for monetary policy and reported on the left and right hand side of the graph respectively.
4.6 Conclusion
With increase in risk transmission to public sector, this paper draws attention to
Eurozone debt crisis which affected sovereign bond spread and the CDS. It is crucial
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to understand how monetary policies affect the country risk, international linkages
between country risks and whether drivers of risk change across countries. Since
Global VAR allows for interdependencies across individual variables within and
across units, we model government bond CDS relative to Germany by domestic,
global, monetary and weighted foreign variables where weight is calculated using
their fiscal position. As expected there is positive relationship between risk aversion
and sovereign bond CDS for almost all countries. When distance between countries
are measured based on distance of deficit/GDP ratio of a country, sovereign risk of
Portugal and Ireland benefit from any common shock in the Eurozone. An increase
in ECB refinancing rate is a signal of negative environment in Euro area, therefore
it increases risk of government bond of all countries. A decrease in money aggregate
(M3) makes all countries more fragile and increase sovereign risk. In cases where
ECB increases refinancing rate, it can be perceived as sensitivity to crisis and uncer-
tainty in Euro area surges. Therefore, the shock increases sovereign risk. However,
Greece is affected by monetary policies in a different way than all other Eurozone
countries in our sample. When ECB increases the M3 or decreases refinancing rate,
Greece benefits from the shock and CDS of 5-yrs government bond relative to CDS
of Germany decreases.
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Table 4.1: Unit Root Tests
CDS of 5-yrs bond relative to CDS of German Bund with same maturity
Variable ADF ADF PP PP
at level at first difference at level at first difference
Austria AT -2.280 -6.432*** -2.341 -8.924***
Belgium BE -1.723 -6.475*** -1.529 -7.677***
France FR -1.639 -6.158*** -1.618 -7.974***
Greece GR -2.820 -11.853*** -3.335* -16.550***
Ireland IE -0.868 -4.906*** -1.047 -9.252***
Italy IT -1.936 -5.473*** -1.812 -8.108***
Netherlands NL -3.576 ** -6.710*** -2.968 -7.224***
Portugal PT -0.889 -5.378*** -1.285 -10.530***
Spain ES -1.360 -6.492*** -1.187 -8.142***
CDS Panel 1.136 -18.254*** 2.247 -24.017***
Debt/GDP Ratio
Variable ADF ADF PP PP
at level relative to GR at level relative to GR
Austria AT -3.326* -2.221 -2.405 -3.555**
Belgium BE -1.735 -1.807 -2.117 -2.316
France FR -1.970 -1.203 -2.058 -2.009
Greece GR -1.730 -1.976 -2.325 -2.666
Ireland IE -0.282 -0.921 -0.928 -1.352
Italy IT -1.213 -0.336 -1.799 -1.120
Netherlands NL -1.717 -1.497 -2.132 -2.311
Portugal PT -1.538 -1.708 -1.649 -1.860
Spain ES -4.250*** -2.518 -2.683 -1.950
Debt/GDP Panel -5.311*** -7.222*** 1.770 1.043
Deficit/GDP Ratio
Variable ADF ADF PP PP
at level relative to GR at level relative to GR
Austria AT -3.719* -3.427* -4.012** -4.452***
Belgium BE -4.968*** -4.810*** -4.199*** -4.200***
France FR -3.735** -3.195* -3.426* -3.942**
Greece GR -2.523 -2.985 -3.388* -3.757**
Ireland IE -1.943 -2.090 -2.621 -2.839
Italy IT -3.302* -2.829 -4.157*** -4.197***
Netherlands NL -1.995 -2.779 -3.446* -4.191**
Portugal PT -2.608 -3.990** -3.101 -4.101**
Spain ES -3.260* -4.228*** -2.871 -3.755**
Debt/GDP Panel -21.035*** -23.140*** -6.789*** -7.844***
Other Variables
Variable ADF ADF PP PP
at level at first difference at level at first difference
Ln(Oil) -1.606 -7.624*** -2.682 -7.760 ***
Ln(Ecb) -1.784 -9.274*** -1.953 -9.403***
Ln(M3) -3.572** -8.502*** -3.674** -9.025***
Baa-Aaa(Risk) -1.732 -6.025*** -2.348 -5.882***
Notes: Philips-Perron test results are based on lag(4).
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Table 4.2: Structural break test for baseline regression for known dates: sep’08,
apr’10 apr’12
Country Code F(9, n) Prob F(9, n) Prob F(9, n) Prob
sep-08 apr-10 apr-12
Austria AT 3.40 0.002 0.69 0.717 3.72 0.001
Belgium BE 2.90 0.006 3.50 0.001 4.98 0.000
France FR 1.51 0.167 3.04 0.005 1.72 0.096
Greece GR 0.64 0.761 1.10 0.380 5.25 0.000
Ireland IE 1.37 0.224 1.71 0.1089 2.72 0.008
Italy IT 1.36 0.226 2.80 0.008 3.12 0.002
Netherlands NL 1.30 0.262 3.82 0.001 11.57 0.000
Portugal PT 2.18 0.035 2.01 0.052 5.86 0.000
Spain ES 1.09 0.385 1.96 1.38 0.218 0.053
Notes: We apply the Chow test for each break separately. After confirming that 2012-apr is break point for all
countries, we drop observations which date is greater than 2012-apr in order to test break for 2009-sep and
2010-apr. Therefore, we were able to test if there is a second common break in the dataset.
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Table 4.3: CDS Spreads on Bunds, SUR - Sample: Jan’06-Dec’14
Variable AT BE FR GR IE IT NL PT ES
L.Spread -0.016 -0.101*** -0.052* -0.56*** -0.025 -0.131*** -0.286*** 0.16*** -0.095***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.03) (0.075) (0.03) (0.029) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028)
Weight(1) 0.008 0.007*** 0.002*** 12.439*** -0.015** -0.037** 0 -0.012** 0
(0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (1.65) (0.007) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Weight(2) -0.03 -0.009 -0.007 1.649 -0.005 0.058*** 0.012*** -0.267*** 0.079***
(0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (4.01) (0.028) (0.015) (0.003) (0.062) (0.027)
Debt/GDP 0.18 -0.805** 0.025 -37.457* 0.073 0.175 1.142*** -0.178 -0.017
(0.367) (0.38) (0.188) (22.394) (0.395) (0.697) (0.163) (0.918) (0.345)
Deficit/GDP 0.242 -0.077 0.129 16.01 -0.596 0.716 0.433*** 0.046 -0.451
(0.354) (0.248) (0.21) (30.869) (0.514) (0.76) (0.12) (1.608) (0.353)
ln(M3) -2.226 -6.573*** -2.693*** 522.742** -11.079* -4.961 -0.666 -7.988 -7.229**
(1.435) (1.655) (0.831) (222.277) (6.395) (3.202) (0.464) (9.477) (3.522)
ln(ECB) 2.923* 3.361 1.701 -999.307* 14.607 4.576 5.331*** 7.915 6.579
(1.646) (2.051) (1.651) (563.47) (14.15) (7.071) (0.881) (22.655) (8.169)
ln(Oil) -22.182* -9.804 -2.519 898.454 -82.292 -50.132* -3.856 -40.841 -21.973
(13.05) (14.907) (7.623) (1930.516) (53.088) (26.661) (4.262) (72.9) (28.832)
L.Risk Aversion 13.951* 12.724 6.894 552.459 -7.192 27.155* -0.039 2.405 18.764
(7.492) (8.415) (4.433) (1150.172) (30.921) (15.482) (2.408) (43.767) (17.072)
Constant 3.25 33.951*** 4.878** 1435.151 16.712 6.649 18.942*** 15.946 10.589
(2.891) (11.189) (1.884) (1405.506) (10.484) (30.389) (2.712) (23.222) (7.268)
No of Obervation 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
R2 0.203 0.213 0.190 0.607 0.170 0.344 0.478 0.211 0.187
Notes: Weight(1) and Weight(2) are weighted average government bonds relative to German government bunds of all countries where weights are based on deficit/GDP
and debt/GDP respectively.
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Table 4.4: CDS Spreads on Bunds, SUR - Sample: Jan’06-Mar’12
Variable AT BE FR GR IE IT NL PT ES
L.Spread 0.018 -0.182*** -0.108** -0.356** -0.214*** -0.217*** -0.431*** -0.317*** -0.242***
(0.057) (0.044) (0.046) (0.167) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063) (0.092) (0.05)
Weight(1) 0.009 0.023*** -0.001 9.85*** -0.024*** -0.138*** -0.014*** -0.006 0.011
(0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (1.706) (0.009) (0.031) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Weight(2) 0.001 0.008 0.052*** 14.622*** -0.078 0.128*** 0.038*** 0.296** -0.045
(0.036) (0.012) (0.016) (4.988) (0.05) (0.029) (0.006) (0.124) (0.055)
Debt/GDP -0.047 -0.996** -0.647* -143.708*** 3.555*** 0.503 1.518*** 8.224*** 3.374***
(0.47) (0.43) (0.351) (26.731) (1.104) (1.207) (0.19) (2.113) (1.066)
Deficit/GDP -0.394 -0.006 -0.056 40.278 0.702 0.05 0.51*** 1.575 -0.721*
(0.626) (0.257) (0.291) (31.219) (0.594) (0.731) (0.129) (1.259) (0.383)
ln(M3) -3.656 -5.182** -4.432*** -243.248 13.225 -5.056 0.138 5.882 -3.382
(2.694) (2.443) (1.413) (245.316) (10.401) (4.245) (0.637) (9.241) (4.219)
ln(ECB) 9.759 0.587 5.379* -322.869 2.873 0.839 6.161*** 11.508 4.696
(7.154) (6.137) (3.1) (590.806) (23.909) (10.314) (1.718) (22.65) (9.906)
ln(Oil) -27.946 -10.71 -2.943 -251.481 -38.428 -59.897** -9.895** -52.074 -15.206
(17.482) (17.755) (8.637) (1710.933) (67.068) (29.966) (4.33) (63.887) (27.672)
L.Risk Aversion 9.457 9.207 3.933 -516.536 1.422 16.916 -2.625 10.113 13.447
(10.32) (10.492) (5.138) (1017.74) (38.588) (17.932) (2.551) (36.941) (16.583)
Constant -2.195 39.023*** 3.774 6643.809*** 108.144*** -1.301 24.009*** -44.477* 101.653***
(5.031) (13.226) (2.299) (1340.961) (28.659) (47.731) (3.486) (24.486) (26.991)
No of Obervation 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
R2 0.178 0.261 0.220 0.583 0.180 0.356 0.621 0.307 0.139
Notes: Weight(1) and Weight(2) are weighted average government bonds relative to German government bunds of all countries where weights are based on deficit/GDP
and debt/GDP respectively.
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Table 4.5: CDS Spreads on Bunds, SUR - Sample: Apr’12-Dec’14
Variable AT BE FR GR IE IT NL PT ES
L.Spread -0.062 -0.283*** -0.327*** -0.846*** -0.439*** -0.318*** -0.12* -0.123 -0.311***
(0.054) (0.061) (0.074) (0.125) (0.044) (0.049) (0.061) (0.103) (0.061)
Weight(1) 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 8.412*** -0.005 -0.044*** 0.004*** -0.042*** 0
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (2.863) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
Weight(2) -0.05*** 0.006 -0.014 14.314* 0.013 0.06*** 0.019*** -0.135 0.065**
(0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (8.56) (0.025) (0.011) (0.003) (0.092) (0.031)
Debt/GDP -0.171 1.505** -0.444 -115.453 -0.297 -0.812 3.41*** -5.318 -2.283**
(0.513) (0.636) (0.591) (104.204) (0.989) (1.051) (0.376) (4.598) (1.148)
Deficit/GDP 0.19 0.414 -0.068 52.881 -29.253*** 0.229 0.851*** -3.184 -0.325
(0.205) (0.352) (0.439) (40.862) (3.572) (1.487) (0.147) (3.22) (0.503)
ln(M3) -5.161* -9.87*** -1.67 3719.907*** 11.482 -6.754 -2.701* -0.496 -9.871
(2.887) (3.763) (2.753) (1173.31) (11.828) (9.289) (1.571) (38.012) (11.704)
ln(ECB) 4.98 17.301*** 8.472* -4087.824* 10.122 39.174*** 12.038*** 57.433 34.556**
(3.216) (4.945) (4.678) (2144.684) (13.456) (13.27) (2.276) (45.341) (15.598)
ln(Oil) -25.04** -40.182** -13.841 10223.61** -93.229** -21.196 14.013** -9.284 -12.775
(12.693) (16.894) (10.735) (4973.402) (39.049) (36.669) (6.188) (148.865) (52)
L.Risk Aversion 8.433 56.291*** 35.235*** -4882.74 85.032** 190.14*** -2.44 397.01** 260.56***
(12.624) (19.137) (12.063) (5162.694) (39.539) (38.378) (5.812) (161.461) (50.13)
Constant 10.407** -15.296 28.335*** 3536.907 -112.792* 126.732** 47.284*** 386.817 110.325***
(4.933) (18.135) (7.862) (8978.168) (67.074) (57.273) (5.899) (263.16) (31.272)
No of Obervation 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.563 0.659 0.667 0.709 0.851 0.765 0.719 0.529 0.648
Notes: Weight(1) and Weight(2) are weighted average government bonds relative to German government bunds of all countries where weights are based on deficit/GDP
and debt/GDP respectively.
132
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This chapter synopsizes the methodological and empirical findings generated by this
dissertation. As this dissertation is composed of three different empirical studies, a
summary of their findings and their limitations are discussed separately, and agendas
for future researches are explored.
5.1 Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, we investigate how the effect of bank relationships on interbank interest
rate spread and financial stability evolved during 2007-08 financial turmoil. Unlike
other studies that argue about the determinants of e-MID borrowing cost, this study
also includes the bank’s relationship and study the stability of relationships.
One issue with working with the e-MID data is that entry or exit of banks from
the e-MID platform is driven by endogenous decisions, and thus, this may lead to a
self selection bias (see Gabbi et al. (2014) for a recent analysis of this issue). For
this reason we limit the analysis to the banks that traded actively on the electronic
platform during the period of study. Trimming away the entering and exiting banks
reduces the sample size significantly. Since banks that are dropped from the sample
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are less likely to have relationships, this is likely to overstate the importance of
relationships among banks. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize that there is
no standard model that accounts for entry and exit in the interbank market. We
do not have an exclusion restriction for building a structural model using our data.
One particular problem is that we do not observe the identity of the bank (only up
to a code) and we cannot know the financial situation (balance sheet) of each bank.
For this reason we cannot observe the reason for an exit from the e-MID.
Banks can engage in other over-the-counter (OTC) trades, which are not ob-
served in the e-MID (the reason discussed above). Since the e-MID is a transparent
platform, banks may decide not to post any bid on the e-MID market to avoid a
reputation effect (i.e. a borrower posting an urgent need for funds). More specif-
ically, it might be the case that after the occurrence of the financial crisis only
banks with sound financial conditions would remain trading in the e-MID market
whereas troubled banks would search for alternative ways of obtaining financing in
more opaque markets. Some papers have analyzed bank survival using the bank
financial situation as regressors to model participation. For example Angelini et
al. (2011) show that banks characteristic such as credit ratings, capital ratios, or
profitability remained roughly unchanged during the precrisis and crisis periods or
improved slightly. Neither borrower and lender liquidity nor their shortage of capi-
tal correlated with spreads in their study. They address the potential self-selection
problem on longer maturity loans in the e-MID market but conclude that these type
of distortions did not influence their empirical findings. More recently, Iori et al.
(2015b) reject an overwhelming presence of survivorship bias in their analysis of the
overnight segment of the e-MID market. While they find some effect during the
early periods of the financial crisis (where banks that dropped had obtained, in the
preceding periods, higher borrowing rates than those banks that remained in the
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market) they do not find statistically significant differences in funding rates between
dropping and surviving banks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Our LPI and BPI are local measures, in the sense that they capture lending
and borrowing relationships within the banks with existing relationships, and not
a global measure, as it does not takes into account the number of banks or other
transactions happening simultaneously at the same time. As a matter of fact, by
construction, LPI and BPI have an aggregated value of 1 for all aggregated banks
and for each individual bank. As such, we cannot use it for explaining entry and
exit of banks.
The chapter implements an estimation strategy to account for potential attri-
tion bias. However the analysis is done at the level of bank pairs and not individual
banks due to following reasons; First, our measure of analysis are bank-pairs and
not individual banks. We claim that ”As a result of this data trimming for enter-
ing and exiting banks, the number of banks during the period analyzed decreases
from 200 to 140.” We then focus on selection bias for bank-pairs for our restricted
sample of 140 banks that participate in all periods. Our results are then valid for
the subsample of banks that actively participate in the e-MID market for the entire
sample. Second, pairs however do fluctuate considerably over the period of analysis.
We use a bank-pair-level fixed-effects strategy in all models. Therefore, unobserved
characteristics of pairs, as long as they remain ”fixed” for all periods is controlled
for. Our results should thus be interpreted as whether conditional on the pair un-
observable fixed characteristics building a relationship with a certain counterpart
has an effect on price and/or volume. Third, attrition or survivorship bias is how-
ever a potential concern if time-varying pair-specific shocks are correlated with our
relationship variables, LPI and BPI. We then implement a Heckman-type selection
model to account for potential attrition bias. The results appear in the new robust-
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ness section of chapter 2. The results show that controlling for potential attrition
bias at the bank-pairs level does not change the main results of the paper, that is,
the effect of LPI and BPI on interbank spreads and trading volumes.
The other point to be discussed might be that there are no controls for the
financial health of the banks in the sample and this information is unobserved. So,
the question might be raised as whether banks are pairing repeatedly with healthy
banks because they are healthy, or because the relationship is valuable on other
dimensions such as lowering information costs.
As we remark in the chapter, we do not observe the identity of the bank. That
is, we only have a code that we can identify throughout the sample period but
cannot really observe the real name of the bank. As a result we do not observe
the healthiness situation of a particular bank. Angelini, et al. (2011) and Gabrieli
(2011a, 2011b) note that the bank credit ratings did not change much over the
financial crisis period. Of course, since credit ratings loose credibility we are not sure
if banks were actually looking at credit ratings and we do not know what private or
public information was available to each bank. Note that in all cases we use a panel
data model with fixed-effects at the pair-level. That is, we control for unobserved
characteristics of the pair, a model which also contains information about each bank,
i.e. lender and borrower. Then, unobserved characteristics regarding healthiness are
captured by pair-level dummy variables. This strategy is valid as long as unobserved
characteristics are fixed across time. This may not happen if lending/borrowing
decisions are affected by a time-varying healthiness factor structure, that is, if the
variables are affected by particular situations of a bank at a given time (i.e. current
balance sheet situation). We refer to this factor as the residual component in the
error component structure, eg. eijt.
As discussed above, we do not have a structural model and then, the coefficients
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cannot be interpreted as causal effects. To be clear, we cannot completely rule out
that relationships (as measured by LPI and BPI) are themselves ”only” caused by
the banks’ matching process based on their specific financial situation. This does
not seem to be the case in the overnight e-Mid market, as explained below in the
reply to your next comment. However, even if this was true, for a bias to occur, in
the sense that this makes LPI or BPI to be correlated with eijt, then a particular
relationship measure should have an effect on the banks’ financial healhiness. That
is, banks match with each other based on their healthiness (controlled for fixed-
effects), and then further interaction has an effect on spreads/volume (i.e. through
the residual e) which feedbacks into more relationship lending.
Nevertheless, we believe the data provide weak evidence pointing out that this
feedback effect is small. When we study survival of a bank-pair into the next months
we find that spreads are not statistically significant, while LPI and BPI are (see
tables 3 and 4). However, LPI and BPI are significant determinants of spreads,
even when controlling for potential survivorship bias.
The other question might be why we do not analyze why links are created in
Chapter 2 although links between banks i and j are almost surely not random and a
structural model would reveal much more. In fact, when controlling for bank hetero-
geneity, the matching between lenders and borrowers in the e-MID market is fairly
random. Hatzopoulos et al. (2015) have shown that, given a lender who makes l
transactions over a given period of time and a borrower who makes b transaction over
the same period, and such that they trade m times with each other over that period,
m is consistent with a random matching hypothesis for almost all lender/borrower
pairs. Even though matches that occur more often than consistent with a random
hypothesis (over expressed links) exist and increase during the crisis it is never the
case that all incoming links to a given bank are over expressed. The picture that
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emerges from Hazopoulos et al. (2015) study is that banks are more likely to be
chosen as trading partners because they trade more often and not because they are
more attractive in some dimension (such as their financial healthiness). As discussed
above in our paper we do not have a structural model that explains the banks lo-
cation in the network. We study if relationships within a network structure, once
formed, possibly initially at random, are important for explaining spreads and vol-
umes. While feedback effects between relationships and prices are possible (that is
relationship leads to better prices and this in turn leads to stronger relationships
in a self-reinforcing loop), and this makes it difficult to establish to causality of the
effects, our claim that lending relationships play an important for the interbank
market is still valid.
5.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we study that local and global measures of centrality identify different
features of how the network characteristics affect the interbank market funding rates.
Local measures show that having more links increases borrowing costs for B and
reduces premia for L. We interpret this effect as a premium paid by lenders to
diversify counterparty risk, and by borrowers to reduce funding risk.
A node is important from a global network perspective if it is pointed by other
important nodes. In our case, B are important if their L are important borrowers
as well. As such, importance, given through borrowing, is the potential to prop-
agate distress and generate systemic risk. Nonetheless eigenvalue-based centrality
measures may be dominated by the degree of the nodes as, by construction, high
Indegree produces high InEigenvector centrality. InEigenvector centrality can be
large for banks that are liquidity sinks, that is, banks that borrow from many (and
borrow a lot), but that are rather peripherical to the network and as such do not
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spread distress beyond their direct creditors. A visual inspection of local vs. global
measures indeed confirms this fact, that is, there is a high correlation between local
and global measures, but several banks stand out as being characterised by high
centrality and low degree. These are the banks that inherits their centrality from
their lenders and are the potential spreader of systemic risk.
To disentangle the role of local factors (degree) on global centrality measures
in the analysis, we control for local degree in our regressions. The fact that global
effects remain statistically significant after controlling for the local network effects,
suggests that overall global and local network effects operate on a different level in
the e-MID market. Our constructed global eigenvector-based measures of centrality
are in general in line with the local measures of centrality when looked at in isolation.
For banks being central is a cost. Note that, in general, the highest effect in absolute
value corresponds to either phases II or III. In fact, the coefficient sign for all pooled
periods is either dominated by that of phase II or phase III. The higher spreads paid
by both L and B with high in-centrality measures suggests the market associates
InEigenvalue centrality with higher credit risk.
Betweenness, on the other hand, is high, and different from zero, for banks
that both lend and borrow, and it increases as the intermediation role of banks
increase. This measure is thus probably large for the banks in the core and small
for those in the periphery. The negative coefficient for InBetweenness for both
lenders and borrowers suggest the market participants perceive borrowers who are
central according to this measure as too connected to fail, likely to be bailout in
case of default to avoid systemic effects, and as such offer them a discount. This
interpretation is confirmed by the negative coefficient observed for B when the in
and out centrality measures are interacted, indicating again that large B that are
central in both directions obtain lower funding rates. However, L do not benefit
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from high betweenness or the joint in and out network centrality. The fact that
only B, and not L, benefit from joint centrality point to a ‘too-interconnected-to-
fail’ hypothesis rather to a broker or intermediation effect. As such, these B get
better deals for funding in the interbank markets, and this is probably due to the
market perception of their network positioning. This effect is the largest in phase
II, when banks became affected and/or aware of systemic risk. For L, the market
perception about their network positioning (i.e. fragility) dominates their strategic
location for intermediation (as in Gabrieli and Georg, 2014).
5.3 Chapter 4
In chapter 4, we study how European monetary policies affect the countries sovereign
risk, international linkages between country risks, and whether risk determinants
differ across countries using the global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model. The
empirical findings indicate that the shocks that originated from monetary policy
shocks lead to an increase in country risks because of sensitivity to crisis and uncer-
tainty in Euro zone. However, Greece is affected by monetary shocks on the opposite
way due to the particular fragile situation of the Greece economy.
This chapter investigation can be inproved in several directions. First, our anal-
ysis in this study covers data from ten countries from the Euro area where one
(Germany) is used as a benchmark. The research analysis can be improved if all
remaining countries in the Euro area (or possibly in the European Union) are in-
corporated into the analysis. Second, robustness analysis could be implemented to
evaluate the GVAR methodology.
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